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Abstract 
Evidence shows that startups create jobs, add value and play a vital role in the economy of 
every country, but these startups face several difficulties resulting in a high rate of failure all 
over the world, with millions fading each year and millions not getting the proper funding to 
even start. Hence, this lack of financial liquidity and funding is one of the main reasons for 
these failures and startups that find proper sources of finance tend to survive longer than the 
others. 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of a different taxation model based 
on tax deferral and whether it would impact the startups’ financial situation and allow them 
to survive the initial years of their activity. This model would be an incentive and a support 
given by governments, who would initially abdicate tax income but would have it repaid in 
case the firms survived. To reach this purpose, the Portuguese context was studied, 
introducing only a deferral of taxes, with the tax structure remaining the same. It was then 
accounted the impact to the Portuguese government and applied to a representative set of 
companies. Another aim was to conduct a qualitative and quantitative research on the 
benefits of this model through the collection of the opinion of specialists and through the 
realization of surveys. 
The results demonstrated that if companies were free of taxes during their initial years of 
activity they would have had an increased financial liquidity that could be important for the 
firm’s survival while acting as an incentive for the starting of new businesses, without 
prejudice of the state. Moreover the opinions of the experts and the survey’s results are 
favorable to the benefits of this model.  
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Abstracto 
A realidade empresarial demonstra que as startup criam emprego, valor e desempenham um 
papel crucial em cada país. No entanto estas startup enfrentam grandes dificuldades que 
resultam numa reduzida taxa de sobrevivência em todo o mundo, sendo que milhões 
declaram falência todos os anos e outras tantas não conseguem sequer obter o financiamento 
necessário para começar. Estas dificuldades de acesso ao crédito e falta de liquidez financeira 
são as principais razões de falência destas starups, sendo que as que conseguem encontrar 
fontes de financiamento adequadas tendem a sobreviver mais do que as outras. 
O propósito deste estudo prende-se com o interesse em investigar os efeitos que um 
diferente modelo de impostos, baseado no diferimento dos mesmos teria na situação 
financeira das empresas, se as ajudaria a sobreviver nos seus anos iniciais de actividade. Este 
modelo seria um incentivo e um suporte concedido pelo governo que abdicaria inicialmente 
de receitas de imposto mas que teria o seu reembolso no futuro, caso as empresas 
sobrevivessem. Para este propósito, o contexto português foi estudado, introduzindo apenas 
um diferimento de imposto, com a restante estrutura de impostos a manter-se igual. 
Posteriormente foi avaliado o impacto que tais medidas teriam para o governo português 
assim como para um grupo representativo de empresas portuguesas. Outro objectivo, 
consistiu em fazer uma análise qualitativa e quantitativa dos benefícios deste modelo através 
da recolha de opinião de especialistas e da realização de inquéritos. 
Os resultados demonstraram que se as empresas pudessem diferir os impostos nos seus anos 
iniciais de existência, teriam uma maior liquidez financeira que pode ser importante para a 
sua sobrevivência ao mesmo tempo que pode ser utilizado como incentivo para a criação de 
novos negócios sem prejuízo do estado. As opiniões dos especialistas e os resultados dos 
inquéritos foram ambos favoráveis para com a validação destes benefícios. 
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Introduction 
All over the world startups play a vital role in the creation of jobs and fostering the economic 
growth, but these startups face several difficulties in gathering the necessary conditions to 
survive and achieve stability. Many causes are on the basis of these difficulties but one very 
important is related with the access to funding and subsequent financial liquidity, because 
many startups fail and many others do not even start due to the lack of proper access to 
sources of funding. 
While facing several liquidity problems companies are also demanded to pay taxes as if they 
were in a satisfactory situation, causing a vicious cycle of increased expenses that will 
annihilate any chance of the startups’ survival. From this evidence, the questions whether 
these firms would survive if they had access to proper funding as so as if the governments 
and societies would benefit from their survival emerge. 
The literature review provides us the necessary background on the importance of startups 
and the influence that entrepreneurship can have in the economic arena of every country. 
Previous research gives us the proper insights on the main causes of the firm’s bankruptcy 
confirming the lack of proper funding as one important cause of failure. The main sources of 
financing where also reviewed as so as the economic impact of taxes with the evidence that 
tax deferral can be a way to increase investment. 
In this sense it is the purpose of this dissertation to analyze if a different tax policy based on 
tax deferral can avoid startups’ bankruptcy and possible leverage their growth. The main 
aim is through a simple method of tax deferral on the first two years of existence prove that 
companies can be given better conditions to succeed without decreasing significantly the 
government’s revenues while maintaining the possibility to have those revenues back in the 
future if the startups indeed survive. 
This study advances an analysis of the application of this hypothesis in the Portuguese 
context, starting by understanding what is the importance of the startups in Portugal and 
their main causes of failure as so as the weight taxes play on the structure of costs of these 
and so as on the revenues of the Portuguese government. The main goal is then to realize if 
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taxes can allow the survival of firms without prejudice of the Portuguese government’s 
revenues. 
The completion of this study will be conducted through the analysis of a representative set of 
Portuguese companies on their initial years of activity, including failed and still existent 
companies with the goal of understanding the weight taxes had on these. 
Finally, on a quantitative and qualitative basis the realization of two surveys and two 
interviews will be performed in order to understand the perceptions of the population 
regarding the topic in study and the experts’ opinions on this model. 
In the end, it is expected that it will be possible to conclude whether this new model of taxes 
based on a tax deferral would have a positive impact on the startups’ survival and on the 
government revenues on the medium/long term. 
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Literature Review 
Startup 
Startups are enterprises with a ‚limited operating history. These companies, generally newly 
created, are in a phase of development and research for markets‛ (Wikipedia, 2012) (1). 
A startup is essentially a small enterprise recently constituted. Berger and Udell (1998) (2) 
categorize firms into “infants” or seed (0-2 years), “adolescents” or startups (3-4 years), 
“middles-aged” (5-24 years) and “old” (25 years or more), also called later stages. Using this 
categorization, both seed and startup companies are relevant for this study but in order to 
facilitate future analysis, I will also name startups the companies just created that in the 
Berger and Udell (1998) (2) terminology are known as seed companies. Startup companies 
are the future small and medium enterprises (SMEs1) and possible the future big and 
multinational companies. They play a vital role in every country, viewed by many as the 
incubator of employment, innovation, competition, efficiency and growth (Craig, Jackson, & 
Thomson, 2005, p. 1) (3) with about 150 million businesses attempting to start every year 
worldwide, which gives about 137 000 new businesses per day (Mason, 2012) (4). Due to the 
lack of detached information regarding startups and SMEs (once they are often inter-related), 
for the purposes of this dissertation I will consider that the SMEs studies used can also be 
applied to startups. 
Even in developed economies such as the USA and Europe the importance of SMEs is 
noticeable. Although not all are currently startups, most of the SMEs were once a startup 
therefore talking about SMEs’ importance also incorporates the startups’ importance, like it 
was previously assumed. In the European Union context, there are about 23 million SMEs 
that account for 75 million jobs and represent 99 p.p. of all enterprises “playing this way a 
central role in the European economy” (European Commission, 2005, p. 5) (5). In the USA case, 
for the past 15 years, the SMEs have been the ‚engine of the American economy‛ being 
                                                          
1
 From this point forward the abbreviation SME (displayed in brackets) will be used when referring to small and 
medium enterprises. SMEs are “are companies whose headcount or turnover falls below certain limits” 
(Wikipedia, 2012) (97).All abbreviations can be seen on the list of abbreviations. 
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responsible for the creation of 64 p.p. of American jobs within the private sector (National 
Economic Council, 2011, p. 1) (6). 
The weight of SMEs across the world is undoubtedly relevant, which by logical reasons 
makes the study of startups equally relevant for economic purposes. This has been 
recognized by the U.S. Government and the European Commission that have both engaged 
in the enlargement and improvement of the conditions for the startups to succeed:  
‚President Obama2 is committed to ensuring that small businesses continue to receive the 
tools and resources they need to address the challenges they face. These initiatives offer 
support to small businesses so they are able to bring the power of their ideas to the marketplace 
in ways that can catalyze and transform our economy, creating jobs through new innovations 
in products and services.‛ (National Economic Council, 2011, p. 1) (6)  
‚Support for SMEs is one of the European Commission’s3 priorities for economic growth, job 
creation and economic and social cohesion.‛ (European Commission, 2005, p. 5) (5) 
The initiatives of increased support to SMEs stem from the acknowledgment that they face 
several difficulties in the marketplace and central to the concept of startups and even SMEs is 
the notion of entrepreneurship. 
  
                                                          
2
 “Barack Hussein Obama II, born Aug. 4, 1961, Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S. He is the 44th president of the United 
States (2009 –) and the first African American to hold the office. Before winning the presidency, Obama 
represented Illinois in the U.S. Senate (2005–08). He was the third African American to be elected to that body 
since the end of Reconstruction (1877). In 2009 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize “for his extraordinary 
efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples.” (Encyclopædia Britannica, 
2012) (89) 
3
 “The European Commission is the executive body of the European Union. The body is responsible for proposing 
legislation, implementing decisions, upholding the Union's treaties and the general day-to-day running of the 
Union” (Wikipedia, 2012) (92) 
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Entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship is a growing field in economics and business, everyday more news and 
studies point out its importance to the equilibrium of the economy, for the wellbeing of the 
society and the development of countries. But, when it comes down to words, hardly ever 
can we get a clear accepted concept or definition of entrepreneurship mostly because from 
the several concepts and definitions existent they are all looked under a philosophical 
perspective with a lack of specific empirical measures (Ahmad & Seymour, 2008, p. 5) (7). 
The first definition of entrepreneurship reaches us from the XVIII century by Richard 
Cantillon4, an Irish economist who used the term entrepreneur to define someone who 
engages in exchanges for profit, in the face of uncertainty. This uncertainty is the central 
aspect of Cantillon’s entrepreneurship to whom, all those who deal with uncertainty are 
entrepreneurs (Hébert & Link, 1989, p. 41) (8). 
Many other economists contributed for the definition of entrepreneurship but Joseph 
Schumpeter’s5 definition in 1934 was the one that shaped today’s conception of 
entrepreneurship by introducing the notion of innovation6 into it (Ahmad & Seymour, 2008, 
p. 8) (7). In Schumpeter’s words, ‚*t+he carrying out of new combinations we call ‘enterprise’; the 
individual whose function it is to carry the out we call ‘entrepreneurs’‛ (Schumpeter, 1928 cited in 
Hébert & Link, 1989, p. 44) (9). Moreover, Schumpeter defined five manifestations as the 
basis for entrepreneurship: 1) the introduction of a new (or improved) good; 2) the 
introduction of a new method of production; 3) the opening of a new market; 4) the 
exploitation of a new source of supply; and 5) the re-engineering/organization of business 
management processes (Ahmad & Seymour, 2008, p. 8) (7). 
                                                          
4
 “Richard Cantillon, born 17th century, Ballyheige, County Kerry, Ireland, died May 14, 1734, London. Irish 
economist and financier who wrote one of the earliest treatises on modern economics.” (Encyclopædia 
Britannica, 2012) (90) 
5
 “Joseph Alois Schumpeter born Feb. 8, 1883, Triesch, Moravia (now Třešt, Czech Republic), died Jan. 8, 1950, 
Taconic, Conn., U.S. Moravian-born American economist and sociologist known for his theories of capitalist 
development and business cycles” (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2012) (91) 
6
 In his notion of innovation Schumpeter “argues that technological innovation often creates temporary 
monopolies, allowing abnormal profits that would soon be competed away by rivals and imitators. He said that 
these temporary monopolies were necessary to provide the incentive necessary for firms to develop new 
products and processes” (Wikipedia, 2012) (96) 
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Nowadays entrepreneurship can be seen as a set of factors and capabilities. According to 
Hébert and Link (1989) (8), it incorporates ‚risk, uncertainty, innovation, perception and change‛ 
accommodating ‚coordination, arbitrage, ownership, speculation, innovation and resource 
allocation‛. Still in the authors’ words, an entrepreneur is a person that ‚has a comparative 
advantage in decision making, and makes decisions that run counter to the conventional wisdom 
either because he has better information or a different perception of events or opportunities‛, having 
‚the courage of his convictions and face the consequences of his actions‛. It is in this sense that 
startups can be related with entrepreneurship, because in most cases the creation of a startup 
is done accordingly to, at least, some of the previous factors and capabilities. 
Another important classification of entrepreneurship is related with its nature. There is a 
difference between “opportunity entrepreneurship” and “necessity entrepreneurship”. In 
low-income countries people have the tendency to start on their own, through micro or small 
business at a familiar level, out of necessity, created with the aim of subsistence, being this 
type of entrepreneurship called “necessity entrepreneurship”. “Opportunity 
entrepreneurship” occurs mostly in developed countries and it is related with the existence 
of an opportunity (through the introduction of an innovation), allowing the creation of a 
business with employees (commonly not just at a familiar level) that will contribute for the 
sector’s growth (Bohoney, 2011, p. 7) (10). 
Having understood what entrepreneurship is, the question of its importance and its relation 
with economic development arises. Nevertheless, it is not the aim of this section or this 
dissertation to understand if entrepreneurship is the best way for a country to flourish but to 
analyze if entrepreneurship can at least influence a country’s economic development. 
Economic development can be defined ‚as sustained improvement in the economic well-being of 
the population‛ (Bohoney, 2011, p. 7) (10), determined through economic growth (measured 
by variations in the gross domestic product (GDP7) per capita) and changes in the structure 
of the economy (e.g., from primary activities to services) (Bohoney, 2011, p. 7) (10). 
                                                          
7
 From this point forward the abbreviation GDP (displayed in brackets) will be used when referring to gross 
domestic product. GDP is the “the monetary value of all the finished goods and services produced within a 
country's borders in a specific time period, though GDP is usually calculated on an annual basis. It includes all of 
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A possible way to analyze whether or not entrepreneurship is actually related with economic 
development would be through the analysis of statistical data. This relation is difficult to 
assess due to the innumerous definitions of entrepreneurship, which make it unclear as to 
what type of data to use and what factors to measure. Therefore the methods to do so are 
limited and based on empirical evidence, like it was noticed by Wennekers & Thurik (1999) 
(11) who tried to link entrepreneurship and economic growth. On their study they concluded 
that ‚entrepreneurship matters. In modern open economies it is more important for economic growth 
than it has ever been. The reason is that globalization and the ICT-revolution imply a need for 
structural change, requiring a substantial reallocation of resources. This induces an intense demand 
for entrepreneurship.‛ (Wennekers & Thurik, 1999, p. 51) (11). 
It is also important to clarify that entrepreneurship is not exclusive of individual 
entrepreneurs or small firms, these are vehicles ‚in which entrepreneurship thrives‛ but ‚there 
are more such vehicles, for instance business units within large companies‛ (Wennekers & Thurik, 
1999, p. 29) (11). This means that to study the impact of entrepreneurship we must link ‚the 
individual level to the firm and macro level‛ (Wennekers & Thurik, 1999, p. 50) (11). 
We’ve seen before that since Schumpeter, entrepreneurship is connected with the notion of 
innovation and innovation is clearly connected with today’s societies, which are based in 
modern technologies and globalization that are both enhanced by innovations (Wikipedia, 
2012) (12). A conclusion also achieved by Wennekers & Thurik (1999) (11), like it was seen 
earlier. 
Structural changes are critical to the economic development and these changes are done 
through the innovation process, only possible due to a continuously relocation of resources 
done by the entrepreneurs who in order to ‚carry out innovations‛ constantly engage in a 
process of ‚selection of the most viable firms and industries‛ in order to replace obsolete firms 
‚by higher productivity and by expansion of new niches and industries‛ which also fosters 
economic growth (Wennekers & Thurik, 1999, p. 50) (11).  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
private and public consumption, government outlays, investments and exports less imports that occur within a 
defined territory.” (Investopedia ULC., 2012) (85). All abbreviations can be seen on the list of abbreviations. 
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Historically there is also evidence of a positive relation between entrepreneurship and 
economic development, with the first playing ‚a vital role both in the takeoff stages of the 
European economy and during the Industrial Revolution‛ and more recently in some East Asian 
countries such as the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand all experiencing economic growth in the past decades (Wennekers & 
Thurik, 1999, p. 34) (11). 
All these evidences clearly demonstrate that entrepreneurship can in fact influence the 
economic development of a country and can also be ‚at the heart of national advantage‛ (Porter, 
1990 cited in Wennekers & Thurik, 1999, p. 43) (13).  
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Bankruptcy 
Many companies in general but startups in particularly face several difficulties in the 
marketplace. These have been perceived by a number of studies that noticed that inadequate 
financial resources are the primary cause of SMEs failure (Gregory, Rutheford, Oswald, & 
Gardiner, 2005, p. 383) (14). Inadequate financial resources mean that in most cases, 
companies will face liquidity problems by having difficulties in obtaining adequate funding.  
In here appears the notion of failure in business, many definitions of business failure have 
been acknowledged making it a broad concept and difficult to measure. Carter and Auken 
(2006) (15) reviewed these definitions and resumed them in four, the discontinuance for any 
reason, loss to creditors, business liquidation to prevent further losses and failing to ‚make a 
go of it‛.  
It is significant to define the concept of failure because the broader it is the higher rate of 
failures there will be. Like Carter and Auken (2006) (15), I will use the definition of failure as 
being ‚only those firms that declared bankruptcy‛ and by bankruptcy I mean the ‚firms that lack 
sufficient capital to cover the obligations of the business‛ (Thornhill & Amit, 2003, p. 497) (16). 
Bankruptcy is common among startups with about 80 p.p. of startups fading within the first 
5 years of activity (Mason, 2012) (17). Although bankruptcy can be seen in a positive way as 
part of the self-destruction phenomena, contributing for the innovation and economic 
renewal, it always carries costs that do not only can impact the firm’s stakeholders, more 
significantly the owner, employees, customers, suppliers and families and friends of the 
affected people but also the community’s economic viability (Carter & Auken, 2006, p. 493) 
(15). 
Evidence shows that there is a positive correlation between the firm’s age and its probability 
of failure, with younger firms showing signals of a higher bankruptcy rate called this 
situation the ‚liability of newness‛8. Both Carter and Auken (2006) (15) and Thornhill and 
                                                          
8
 “Liability of newness”, a definition used by Thornhill and Amit (2003) (16) who also use the concept of 
“liability of obsolescence” to define the misalignment of older firms with the environment, which is dependent 
on their capacity to learn over time and use it to increase (positive) competence or to increase (negative) 
rigidity. 
Portuguese Startups: Benefits and Consequences of a Model of Tax Deferral 
 
 
CATÓLICA-LISBON School of Business & Economics                     Page 11 
by Pedro Filipe Abreu 
Amit (2003) (16) tested this hypothesis and reached the same conclusion that the age is not 
the primary source of failure among firms.  
The causes of bankruptcy can be many and difficult to define in a way that can be studied. 
Nevertheless, Carter and Auken (2006) (15) hypotheses four main causes of bankruptcy 
based on the previous studies, being the characteristics of the firm, accessibility to capital, 
characteristics of the owner/manager and external markets.  
They concluded that the owner/manager, the market and access to capital are important to 
determine the firm’s likelihood of failure. On the other hand, the size of the firm (measured 
in number of employees or total assets) appeared not to be an important factor to the failure 
of a company. Finally in what concerns the firms’ age, they found contradictory results that 
the older the firm, the more likely it is to fail. 
Thornhill and Amit (2003) (16) focused only on the firms’ age as the cause of failure and they 
found that young firms do not fail for being young, they fail because ‚their internal assets 
stocks are exhausted‛ while ‚others successfully develop resources and capabilities that enable them 
to survive beyond infancy and adolescence‛. Grounded on a resource based view, the authors 
state that “it is not the age that defines the firms failure, but their ability to create and capture value 
in the marketplace‛ while younger firms are ‚at risk for their lack of valuable resources and 
capabilities”, older firms seem to be in risk if they don’t “adapt to the demands of the changing 
competitive environment‛. They also found that industry membership can influence the 
survival of firms. 
Other than the firm’s age as one of the causes of failure, for the purpose of this dissertation, 
the difficulty to access capital is the other factor that is of interest and relevant to be studied. 
If companies do not have access to capital or have only at unbearable levels of interest they 
will not be able to face initial expenses or expand themselves resulting most likely in the 
death of the company. Liquidity problems are therefore a point of concern for every startup. 
This can be seen in both studies with capital problems being considered as a contributing 
factor to a firm’s failure. Thornhill and Amit (2003) (16) even point out that ‚younger firms are 
more likely to become insolvent if their initial asset endowments are exhausted before they develop and 
deploy value creating strategic assets‛. This reasoning is crucial because it raises the question 
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that if younger firms had more time (and to have more time it is implicit the necessity to 
have more capital availability) to develop their competences there could be the possibility 
that they would not fail and were more likely to survive.  
In what concerns funding, smaller companies do face several difficulties, the pecking order 
theory proposed by Myers (1984) (18) states that companies tend to prefer to use their 
internal sources of capital first and only after, if necessary use external sources. This theory is 
particular relevant within small companies that face difficulties accessing external capital 
due to several factors referred by Berger and Udell (1998) (2), who propose that changes in 
the company structure and subsequent difficulties on obtaining capital are a function of the 
firm size, age and information availability. 
Size and information availability are particularly connected with each other once lenders 
have less information availability about smaller firms than bigger ones, which will result in a 
demand of higher returns by the lenders, forcing smaller companies to use short-term debt 
raising the firm’s risk. This lack of information availability also known as information 
opacity is a result of the fact that most of the smaller firms are not subject of specific 
disclosure regulations about their operations neither have their financial statements audited 
as bigger firms are obliged to. This situation restricts investors’ capacity to distinguish 
between worthy and unworthy businesses, raising the costs of access to funding by smaller 
firms and even sometimes requiring the owners of the business to personally guarantee the 
loan, with increased costs in the access to funding The pecking order theory, by Myers (1984) 
(18) is confirmed with smaller firms using first all their internal sources of funding. 
Regarding the age of the company, Berger and Udell (1998) (2) suggested that older firms are 
less likely to use external sources of funding as younger firms, once they have had more 
opportunities to accumulate retained earnings, which confirms the pecking order theory, 
with these funds being used first. 
The study of Gregory, Rutherford, Oswald and Gardiner (2005) (14) is consistent with some 
of the evidences of Berger and Udell (1998) (2) with their results confirming that the size of 
the company do matters in regard to capital structure decisions. Regarding firms’ age, their 
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study showed that older firms which tend to do not show strong signals of growth are 
consequently less attractive for possible investors. 
There could be some debate around these conclusions, but the studies showed that age is not 
necessarily the main cause of failure among firms. On the other hand difficulties finding 
funding externally are predominant in younger firms which if they cannot find forms of 
finance themselves their most likely destiny will be its failure.  
Additionally evidence also shows that many firms may not even start if they don’t get the 
proper funding or many individuals may not even try to implement their ideas knowing 
how hard and risky it would be to survive in a competitive environment with not enough 
resources (Hamilton, Kinnett, & Pinson, 1990, p. 1) (19). 
All these studies, in general pointed out the same evidence, on how an additional source of 
funding could be crucial for the survival of many startups. 
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Financing 
There are many ways that a firm, and especially a small firm can find to finance its activities 
but all these possibilities will fit into two types of funding, either debt or equity. Like 
Hamilton, Kinnett and Pinson (1990) (19) stated debt is a direct obligation to pay something 
to someone with the correspondent interest in exchange for the lending of the money. This 
type of funding might be particularly interesting for the startup companies as it allows the 
owner to maintain control of the company. But on the other side it is a commitment to make 
monthly payments and in many cases only possible with high interest rates. While equity is 
different because it does not necessarily carry the obligation to repay the loan. The investor 
in its turn becomes a partner of the business which can be positive as he is interested on the 
firm’s long-term success bringing contacts and valuable advices for the firm, but this means 
that he also has a say in the management and control of the company, a situation that might 
create some conflict with the business’ owner. 
Within these two types of funding there can also be a subdivision in what concerns their 
nature. It can be from private or governmental sources. 
Governmental sources are essentially related with the financing of businesses that might 
impact the agency or the client population. These sources are very different from country to 
country, with each defining its own policy (Hamilton, Kinnett, & Pinson, 1990, p. 16) (19). 
On the private side, Hamilton, Kinnett and Pinson (1990) (19) noticed that the funding could 
be either personal or external. Personal funding is commonly the savings invested by the 
business owner and money borrowed from friends and relatives, typically used to start the 
business on a very premature phase and in many cases it is still dependent on the external 
funding so that it can actually start. The external funding is more related with the formal 
lenders9. Another source of funding comprising both equity and debt is to use customer’s 
interest on the purchase of the firm’s offer and obtain financial help from this to deliver what 
he wants. 
                                                          
9
 These lenders can be diverse, such as Banks, Credit Unions, Consumer Finance Companies, Commercial 
Finance Companies, Trade Credit, Insurance Companies, Factor Companies and Leasing Companies on the debt 
side and Venture Capital Firms, Closed-end Investment Companies, Corporate Capital Sources, Investment 
Clubs, Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Private Investment Partnerships on the equity side Hamilton, 
Kinnett and Pinson (1990) (19). 
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These financing sources and the financing decisions taken by the company will dictate the 
capital structure of the firm. These funding options can be seen through the Financial 
Growth Cycle analyzed by Berger and Udell (1998) (2), a framework ‚used to describe the 
progression of the successful firm through growth phases‛ (Bhaird, 2010, p. 24) (20).  
Figure 1 in appendix 1 illustrates this cycle, showing the relationship between firm size, age, 
information availability and its sources of finance. 
At the beginning very small firms need a certain amount of investment to start the business ( 
seed capital). This capital tends to be financed by insider finance, business angels and a little 
later by financial institutions. At this stage the insider finance and the business angels play a 
vital role because, like it was previously mentioned, at first the firms might face difficulties 
accessing external finance and even if they are able to get it, this funding is not entirely 
external because in many cases it has to be personally guaranteed by the owners making it 
partially insider. By insider finance, Berger and Udell (1998) (2) consider all the funds 
provided by the startup team, family, and friends ‚prior to and at the time of the firm’s 
inception‛. This type of funding is required at the very earliest stage of a firm’s development 
and might be required again when the scale of the business increases. 
As the firm grows it will get access to the intermediate finance provided by venture 
capitalists on the equity side and financial institutions on the debt side. Typically at this 
point the firm has already received one or more rounds of angel finance and it has at its 
disposal retained profits that are saved while the firm grows. Eventually, after this 
intermediated finance, if the firms continue to exist and grow they may gain access to public 
equity and debt markets. This usually happens at a later stage of the company’s existence, 
where they are no longer considered a startup (Berger & Udell, 1998, p. 8) (2). 
This growth cycle allow us to better understand what role entities play in the finance of the 
companies according to their stage of development. Like it was recognized by the authors, 
although this model cannot be applied to all the companies, meaning that it is not intended 
to fit all businesses, it provides a clear view of the most common way companies get access 
to finance. A reality not always evident is that the different types of funding are not 
necessarily exclusive or substitutes but can also be complements, for example the angel 
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finance and venture capital are often complementary as well as the venture capital and 
public equity (Berger & Udell, 1998, p. 12) (2). 
In the case of the startups it is seen that business angels are crucial at the initial stages of the 
creation of the company. The business angel finance can be described as an informal market 
for direct finance (Berger & Udell, 1998, p. 15) (2). It plays a key role in diminishing the 
financial gap that firms might face if they cannot get access to credit but more than a 
financial provider the business angel is a partner of the business bringing also advice and 
counsel which can be very important. 
A business angel can be an individual or a small investing group. Usually their investments 
are local and they are seen as co-entrepreneurs of the firm, providing strategic advice, 
network connections and acting as a facilitator of future finance within the financial 
institutions or the venture capitalists, this means that the business angel provides credibility 
for the firm reducing the ‚liability of newness‛ (Sorheim, 2005, p. 189) (21). 
The financial funds provided by the business angels are small compared to venture capital 
investments, but they can be as or even more important than the venture capital investment 
once it allows the creation of the firm that otherwise wouldn’t exist. Another important view 
of the importance of the role of business angels is referred by Sorheim (2005) (21) where he 
states that centered on the resource-based view literature firms can create a sustainable 
competitive advantage based on their resources but if startups are not able to take advantage 
of these initial resources they won’t be able to create a competitive advantage and it is on this 
sense that business angels can allow the creation of the conditions necessary for firms take 
advantage of their resources. 
The next rounds of finance for startups after the business angels can be of the responsibility 
of venture capitals that appear at a later stage, when in most cases the company is already 
established and commercializing its innovation. Although investing in some startups, 
usually the venture capital industry invests on companies that are no longer considered a 
startup and use this money to invest in bigger businesses (Zider, 1998, p. 133) (22). 
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This way it is seen how startups can find sources of funding, however this process is not 
guaranteed to be successful for every startup and many face several difficulties in finding 
proper funding with some not being able to find it, resulting in the firm’s disappearance or 
in not even starting. 
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Taxation 
According to the Encyclopædia Britannica (2012) (23), taxation is the ‚imposition of compulsory 
levies on individuals or entities by governments‛ being ‚levied in almost every country of the world‛ 
with the purpose of raising ‚revenue for the government‛. Taxes can be direct or indirect, but in 
both cases they are not paid in exchange for other good, for this they are considered 
unrequited. 
The origin of taxation dates back to the ancient world, but this practice was not as common 
as it is nowadays. They start to become usual in the Greek and Roman empires with the 
introduction of taxes on consumption. Since then its importance, diversification and weight 
in the economy have been growing (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2012) (23). 
Governments use taxes in order to finance its operations that should, in theory, be used to 
increase the welfare of the taxpayers. Many studies have examined the purpose and effects 
of taxation in society. Among these, Richard A. Musgrave10 distinguishes three main 
objectives of taxation, being resource allocation, income distribution and economic stability 
(Encyclopædia Britannica, 2012) (23). 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the effects of taxation on the economy will now be the 
topic of concern, in order to understand if taxes are relevant for the economy of a country or 
if they can, at least have an impact on it. Once again it is not the aim of this topic to analyze if 
taxation is the best way to stimulate a country’s economy but only if they can affect it in any 
way, if they are relevant. 
In the research conducted by Gilbert (1942) (24), the author states clearly that ‚every tax has 
economic effects‛, he uses this postulate has the basis of his study. He does so because he 
considers that taxes, by affecting the profitability of investments, clearly affects the savings 
and spending of consumers, therefore they cannot be considered economically neutral. 
Studies point a theoretical negative correlation between the increase in taxes and the 
economic growth. Taxes do not have a neutral effect because they introduce distortions to 
                                                          
10
 “Richard Abel Musgrave (1910-2007) was a leading 20th-century economist whose work transformed the 
field of public finance. He was considered a candidate for the Nobel Prize. Musgrave's seminal work, The Theory 
of Public Finance (1959), theorized the economic role of government in partnership with the private sector in 
democratic societies.” (Princeton University Library, 2007) (83) 
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the economy and to the behavior of the individuals (impacting producers and consumers). 
This negative correlations and distortions will result in a loss of efficiency that affects savings 
and investments (Kresner-Skreb, 1999, p. 146) (25). 
Gilbert (1942) (24) and Kresner-Skreb (1999) (25) both confirm what was previously expected, 
that taxes impact the economy of a country. This evidence is crucial for the relevance of this 
study. 
Kresner-Skreb (1999) (25) brings out a point that is also pertinent for this analysis, which is 
related with the behavior of individuals in the face of taxation. Considering that 
entrepreneurship can be ‚crucial for the vitality of the market‛ (Kresner-Skreb, 1999, p. 153) (25) 
and that entrepreneurship involves essentially high levels of risk taking. Kresner-Skreb 
(1999) (25) suggests that income taxes can influence the investment level, once they are 
decreasing the compensation of investors that put their money on risky investments. This 
reasoning assumes a rational investor who will invest on a business that provides him the 
best output between the conditionings risk/return in accordance to its risk aversion 
preferences and that profitability is the compensation for the risk undertaken. This means 
that for higher levels of taxes there would be a decrease on the levels of investment and 
therefore on the levels of entrepreneurship due to an increased discourage from 
entrepreneurs (who lack incentives for investing), that would affect economic growth and 
development (Krelove, 1995, pp. 55-58) (26). 
Theoretically there can also be another possibility related with the outcome of increased 
taxes. Basically, there could be the case of an increase of investment if the state becomes 
partner of the business even with an increase of taxes. This situation is possible if the state 
becomes partner in the business by bearing part of the risk through the possibility of full 
transfer of losses to future income. In the view of Krelove (1995) (26):  
“In the absence of taxation, an investor would be willing to invest 1 in an asset that has only 
two possible payoffs per unit invested, either 0 or 2, after deducting opportunity costs of the 
funds and the cost of the investment. The investor’s ex post wealth is risky, and equal to 2 or 
0. Now introduce a tax at the rate of 50 percent on the return to the asset, with full loss offset. 
Then by doubling the investment in the risky asset, that is, by investing 2 rather than 1, the 
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investor can attain the same distribution of after-tax returns as in the no-tax situation. For by 
investing 2, the total return after deducting the cost of the investment and the opportunity 
cost, is either 4 or 0 before tax, and either 2 or 0 after tax. But this after-tax distribution is 
identical to what could be attained without taxation of the return. In this example, the tax has 
induced the individual to double investment in the risky asset.‛ 
This reflection demonstrates that taxes can impact positively the investment if the state bears 
part of the risk. Nevertheless the author still alludes that although there was no increase on 
the private risk, the total risk has increased (being the difference beared by the state). Still in 
this research there is no clear evidence on the empirical verification since it is difficult to 
separate factors among the decision investment criteria.  
With this reasoning from Krelove (1995) (26), there is an important idea that is pointed out, 
which is that investments might not be reduced due to taxation if the state becomes, in a 
way, partner of the business, bearing part of the taxes (therefore part of the risk) through the 
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Tax Deferral 
A way for the Government to become partner in the business and provide an incentive for 
investors to invest through taxation is to allow taxes to be deferred. This way the 
Government is giving up on some current revenues from taxation (which can be seen as its 
stake on the company) but having no extra expenses because meanwhile these are non-
payable taxes and not financial aids spent. This means that there is no money coming out on 
the governmental side, just not money coming in as it was supposed to. 
Tax deferral is a concept mainly used to describe a form of tax avoidance11, a legal practice 
used to modify the financial situation of a company or individual in order to lower the 
amount of income tax owed, usually a consequence of tax planning (Investopedia ULC., 
2012) (27). Tax deferral is a broad concept where investment earnings such as interest, 
dividends or capital gains accumulate tax free for a specific period of time. It benefits the 
investor in two ways, with the first being directly related with tax-free growth, the fact that 
the taxes can be paid only at a later date. The second benefit is that taxes are deferred in a 
period where personal or corporate earnings are reduced but when they are taxed the person 
or company is earning higher income, having better conditions to pay the deferred taxes 
(Investopedia ULC., 2012) (28). 
The opportunity for tax deferral arises due to a difference (called taxable temporary 
difference) normally existent between the accounting profit (the profit or loss for a reporting 
period before tax) and the taxable profit (the profit or loss for the reporting period 
determined by reference to tax principles) (Accountancy Students, 2011) (29). According to 
Accountancy Students (2011) (29), these temporary differences can be: 
‚Debit balances in the financial statements compared to the tax written down values.  These 
give rise to deferred tax liabilities12 and are known as taxable temporary differences. 
Credit balances in the financial statements compared to the tax written down values.  These 
give rise to deferred tax assets13 which are known as deductible temporary differences.‛ 
                                                          
11
 Do not confuse tax avoidance with tax evasion, which is “an illegal practice where a person, organization or 
corporation intentionally avoids paying his/her/its true tax liability” (Investopedia ULC., 2012) (80) 
12
 Deferred tax liability is “the total amount of tax that an entity is legally obligated to pay to an authority as 
the result of the occurrence of a taxable event” (Investopedia ULC., 2012) (81) 
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And they can arise in the following circumstances: 
‚Revenue recognized for financial reporting purposes before being recognized for tax purposes. 
Such instances are taxable temporary differences which give rise to deferred tax liabilities. 
Expenses that are deductible for tax purposes prior to recognition in the financial statements. 
These are taxable temporary differences which give rise to deferred tax liabilities. 
Expenses that are accounted for the financial statements prior to becoming deductible for tax 
purposes. These are deductible temporary differences which give rise to deferred tax assets. 
Revenue recognized for tax purposes prior to recognition in the financial statements. These 
give rise to deductible temporary differences and deferred tax assets.‛ 
These common definitions on tax deferral are seen through the accounting side, where firms 
try to plan their revenues and expenses in order to maximize their benefit from existent tax 
policies. For the purposes of this dissertation, the tax deferral approach that will be used will 
be based on the taxation benefits it will bring to the company, but under the perspective of 
being possible to defer due to a governmental incentive. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
13
 Deferred tax asset is “an asset on a company's balance sheet that may be used to reduce any subsequent 
period's income tax expense” (Investopedia ULC., 2012) (86) 
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Industry Analysis 
Global Environment for Investment 
The world is now a polycentric place with a growing number of economic spheres of 
influence. In a globalized world, there has been an increase of the competition among 
countries in order to attract investment while companies have found easier ways to go 
outside their own country and explore more attractive solutions to their businesses (Ernst & 
Young, 2011, p. 2) (30). 
Fast growing markets are a constant focus of companies and people that are relocating or 
opening new business in these markets where the fast growing environment and small costs 
of activity are seen as a perfect match to invest in. These countries obtained for the first time 
in 2010 more than fifty percent of the world’s foreign direct investment (FDI14) (Ernst & 
Young, 2011, p. 6) (31).  
Trying to reemerge from a debt crisis (Matthews, 2011) (32), Europe as whole is facing 
adversities with the European’s FDI falling from 43 p.p. in the last decade to 26 p.p. in 2010 
(Ernst & Young, 2011, p. 9) (30). This means that Europe is less attractive to make business 
and although this index measures the conditions for foreign investment, these can also be 
applied for the home companies as the conditions are similar. 
Although this globalization process presents challenges it also brings opportunities. 
According to the Ernst & Young (2011) (30) study, Europe has many advantages in terms of 
the quality of their products and their brands’ recognition but to face the future and build 
incentives for investment, Europe should adopt more competitive fiscal policies and reduce 
the costs of selling their quality goods and services (see figure 2 in appendix 1). Additionally 
it should provide better sources of funding for companies like is defended by Ronald Kent15, 
who states that European companies need ‚access to affordable capital‛ because many of their 
                                                          
14
 From this point forward the abbreviation FDI (displayed in brackets) will be used when referring to foreign 
direct investment. FDI is “an investment abroad, usually where the company being invested in is controlled by 
the foreign corporation” (Investopedia ULC., 2012) (82). All abbreviations can be seen on the list of 
abbreviations. 
15
 “Ronald Kent, is CEO of NYSE Euronext London, Executive Vice President and Head of International Listings for 
NYSE Euronext, and he is responsible for all of NYSE Euronext’s European and US markets for issuers from EMEA 
and Asia.” (World Investment Conferences, 2011) (84) 
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traditional sources of capital ‚have either dried up or that their terms became much less attractive‛ 
(Ernst & Young, 2011 , p. 38) (30). 
Portugal, being a European country is also subject to these conditionings, possibly facing 
harder times as a result of the specifics of the Portuguese crisis (Barrientos, 2012) (33). 
Besides, countries like Portugal face two challenges, by the more developed economies (in 
activities that are based on knowledge and innovation) and, like it was previously seen, by 
the less developed ones (CSF III Observatory, 2007) (34). 
The FDI in Portugal decreased 46 p.p. from 2009 to 2010 not surpassing the € 1.1 billion. In a 
percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) it shows signs of great variability (from 
about 1 p.p. to 5 p.p.) over the past 20 years with a decreasing tendency accentuated over the 
past 3 years of the study (see figure 3 in appendix 1). The causes pointed to this 
disinvestment are the lack of economic growth, the taxes and public debt increase (Ernst & 
Young, 2011, p. 14) (31). 
The numbers show that Portugal is less attractive to invest in, meaning that measures should 
be taken to invert this tendency. There are two clear options to stimulate economic growth 
(see figure 4 in appendix 1), which are supporting SMEs and reducing taxes (Ernst & Young, 
2011, p. 16) (31). 
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The Portuguese Economic Environment 
The Portuguese economic environment is facing a serious debt crisis that directly and 
indirectly affect the country’s performance at a global and company level.  
Matthews (2011) (32) resumed the factors that forced Portugal to request a bailout to the 
European Union, stating that the country was a victim of the panic generated by the Greek 
debt crisis conjugated with no expectations of a significant growth in the long term, a high 
deficit forecast and a below average productivity. Moreover an outdated legal structure, 
strict labor market regulations and an increase of the interest rates for the Portuguese public 
debt also contributed for the need for a bailout. 
Many other reasons might be in the basis of the current situation which Portugal is in, but it 
is not the purpose of this dissertation to analyze what were those reasons or which ones were 
more significant. It is, on the other hand, an aim of this dissertation to characterize the 
current Portuguese economic environment and assess the role and difficulties that startups 
might have in this context. For that I will start by analyzing some general indicators and 
tendencies over the past years so that the startup’s situation becomes more clear. 
Portugal is a country with about 10,6 million people, a number that has been increasing over 
the past 10 years (see figure 5 in appendix 1). From these, about 66,83 p.p. of the total 
population are adults (from 15 to 64 years old), but with a growing third age population 
(more than 65 years old) representing 18,01 p.p. while children (until 14 years old) are only 
15,16 p.p. (see figure 6 in appendix 1). In terms of gender, there is an approximation of the 
values with the male population representing 48,39 p.p. against the majority of 51,61 p.p. 
being women (see figure 7 in appendix 1). All these values are characterized by a 
stabilization tendency. 
With the increase of the life expectancy, there is also an ageing tendency occurring, not only 
in Portugal but on other developed countries as well. Especially in Europe and Asia, 
signaling a changing in the consumption habits (eldest people tend to consume less) and on 
the public expenses particularly with an increase with expenses in healthcare and in the 
benefit pension system. This increase in the expenses will ultimately result in augmented 
taxation of both individuals and companies resulting in a decrease on the productivity 
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(Wikipedia, 2012) (35). Meaning that Portugal will have the need to try to contradict this 
tendency in the overall consumption and productivity in order to grow. 
The economically active population16 represents 52,46 p.p. of the total population being more 
than 5 million and half (see figure 8 in appendix 1) with the Portuguese unemployment17 rate 
been constantly growing over the past decade (see figure 9 in appendix 1) surpassing the 10 
p.p. rate on 2010, meaning that more than 600.000 persons were without a job (see figure 10 
in appendix 1). Other than the Portuguese unemployment rate, figure 9 in appendix 1 also 
shows the rates of the European Union (EU-27) and the Euro Area18, being possible to 
observe one clear growing tendency since 2008. Another clear observation is that the 
Portuguese rate has been growing more than the average of the European Union and the 
Euro Area in the past decade, growing from 4 p.p. to more than 10 p.p. in 2010, while the 
other European rates have been very similar and stable around the 8 p.p. indicating that the 
Portuguese unemployment is more unstable and is growing to unseen levels.  
These high levels of unemployment are now a reality in Portugal and carry a cost for the 
individual, society and economy. Unemployment will affect the capability of individuals to 
make money and meet their financial obligations, facing a situation where they are no longer 
able to pay what they previously were. This will result in increased social discrepancies that 
might generate more crime, manifestations and possible revolutions. But it will also affect 
the buying power of the families, reducing the consumption and therefore affecting 
negatively the companies (Wikipedia, 2012) (36). 
Although unemployment implies many costs it also brings opportunities for companies and 
individuals (Wikipedia, 2012) (36). For the companies’ side they have now a higher choice 
when hiring, with better possibilities to find the best candidate. For the individuals can also 
be an opportunity in which due to the need to find ways to finance their personal expenses 
they are forced to be creative and are more likely to innovate in ways that they haven’t 
                                                          
16
 Economically active population is “the fraction of a population that is either employed or actively seeking 
employment” (Business Dictionary, 2012) (103) 
17
 Unemployment “as defined by the International Labour Organization, occurs when people are without jobs 
and they have actively sought work within the past four weeks”. (Wikipedia, 2012) (36) 
18
 Euro Area “is an economic and monetary union (EMU) of 17 European Union (EU) member states that have 
adopted the euro (€) as their common currency and sole legal tender” (Wikipedia, 2012) (93) 
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previously think of, by creating their own business, a situation that will possibly benefit the 
individual and the society. This is conceivable by becoming an entrepreneur and according 
to what was seen in the Literature Review, Entrepreneurship can contribute to the economic 
development of a country. In this sense, although startups might face more difficulties with a 
reduction in consumption, there might be room for new opportunities.  
The GDP per capita has shown signs of a steady increase (see figure 11 in appendix 1) over 
the last decade but in 2009, for the first time it decreased most certainly as a result of the 
economic environment. The inflation19 rate (see figure 12 in appendix 1) in its turn, although 
almost always positive over the past decade has shown an unstable behavior with a decrease 
tendency stabilizing between the 2 p.p. to 3 p.p. per year. The exception occurred in 2009 
where there was a deflation20 period, rapidly overcome by an heavy increase in 2010 which is 
expected to continue for the year of 2012 where it is predicted to reach 3,6 p.p. (RTP, 2012) 
(37). Comparing to the tendency in Europe we see once again that Portugal shows a more 
instable conduct, while the inflation rate in Europe has been steady around 2 p.p. with only a 
slight decrease in 2009 (which was also a year of instability to Portugal).  
The existing increase tendency is abnormal considering the previous levels of the Portuguese 
inflation rate. A direct consequence of “a rise in the general level of prices of goods and services‛ 
(Wikipedia, 2012) (38) is lowering the purchasing power of the population (because the real 
value of money drops), this means that consumption will decrease which is also enhanced by 
the Portuguese debt crisis and the previous referred factors like unemployment and ageing 
of population. Once again this will affect jobs and companies making harder for these to 
survive, especially startups that have a limited access to funding. In fact, the number of 
existing companies already showed signs of decrease in 2010, which is against the trend of 
increasing number of companies existent before (see figure 13 in appendix 1). 
The present European and the Portuguese crisis are considered debt crisis because they are 
the result of a significant debt burden engaged by the governments while there was a rising 
                                                          
19
 Inflation “in economics, is a rise in the general level of prices of goods and services in an economy over a 
period of time”. (Wikipedia, 2012) (38) 
20
 Deflation is “a general decline in prices, often caused by a reduction in the supply of money or credit.” 
(Investopedia ULC., 2012) (87) 
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in the interest that made the debt almost unbearable for some European countries. This 
increase of the interest rates is mostly related with the speculation that governments 
wouldn’t be able to pay the debt they were contracting (Barrientos, 2012) (33). 
This was what happened to Portugal, resulting in the adoption of ‚austerity measures that 
angered workers and put its economy into recession‛ (Barrientos, 2012) (33). Figure 14 in 
appendix 1 illustrates this, where we can see an exponential increase of the Portuguese debt, 
being in 2010 € 131.801,90 million, a value almost thirteen times bigger than the € 10.289,20 
million verified in 2000. Although the revenue from taxation showed a steady increase over 
the years (with the 2009 exception), it should be noticed that the austerity measures taken for 
the 2011 year are still not visible in the graph, and when they are it is expected that they 
increase this source of revenue significantly.  
The interest rates for the Portuguese debt have shown a slight decrease tendency until being 
subject of a high increase since 2010. This is true for the 30, 10 and 5 year debt range (see 
figures 15, 16 and 17 in appendix 1). Until 2010, the rates for all the 3 types of debts were 
similar varying from about 4 p.p. to 6 p.p. but since 2010 the increase led to different results. 
For the 30 year debt period it reached a maximum of 12,14 p.p. in the interest rate; for the 10 
year period, the interest rate reached a maximum of 17,39 p.p. against the minimum of 3,16 
p.p. in 2005 and for the 5 year debt period the maximum was of 22,87 p.p. a value 9 times 
higher than the minimum also verified in 2005 (of 2,17 p.p.). These figures demonstrate how 
unbearable the interest rates had become for the Portuguese government forcing the bailout 
request and the subsequent austerity measures. 
The growing debt with rising interest rates forced the Portuguese government to take action 
trying to control the debt levels. The way chosen was to increase taxation, both for 
individuals and companies. This austerity impacted individuals and companies, as a result 
companies are having harder times to survive. This can be seen in the number of failed 
companies, that in the Portuguese context has increased significantly in the past few years 
(see figure 18 in appendix 1). Moreover, it is consistent with the FDI decrease tendency like it 
is shown in figure 3 in appendix 1, being the country less attractive to invest in. 
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The result was a recession period that obviously had significant repercussions on the 
enterprise sector due ‚to a process of structural adjustment – caused by the exhaustion of an 
extensive model of economic growth and by the deterioration of its respective competitiveness within a 
context of globalization" (CSF III Observatory, 2007, p. 14) (34). Nevertheless, Portugal is still in 
the top-30 countries (out of 183) regarding the ease of doing business according to the World 
Bank ranking (see figure 19 in appendix 1) and is in the top-25 (out of 134) according to the 
Forbes ranking (see figure 20 in appendix 1) for the best countries to do business in. These 
rankings are referent to the year of 2011 and take into consideration several topics, while the 
World Bank ease of doing business ranking is more concerned in measuring the regulatory 
environment (The World Bank, 2011) (39), the Forbes ranking is concerned with factors such 
as ‚property rights, innovation, taxes, technology, corruption, freedom (personal, trade and 
monetary), red tape, investor protection and stock market performance‛ (Forbes, 2011) (40). The 
higher the ranking the better conditions the country has to do business and being in the top-
30 in both cases means that Portugal, overall has a good environment for businesses to take 
place. 
Although it’s a good environment for business, there is clear evidence that some measures 
might help the enterprise sector. Ernst & Young (2011) (31) survey evidenced that Portugal 
has about 350.000 SMEs while big companies are about 1.200. If each of the startups creates 
one job (a very achievable number), in the end there will be an extra 350.000 jobs (with the 
Portuguese unemployment population in 2010 being over 600.000 (see figure 10 in appendix 
1) while to achieve that number big companies would have each to create 292 new working 
places (which seems less feasible), therefore betting on SMEs might have a higher impacts for 
the Portuguese economy. The study also refers that a reduction of a 1 p.p. in the average tax 
rate of the companies would result in about € 1000 of annual savings for each company and 
an increase on the economic growth of 0,2 p.p. This is a clear evidence of the weight that 
SMEs have on the Portuguese economy and the effects taxation can also have. Moreover 
figure 4 in appendix 1 points out the importance of supporting SMEs and reducing taxation 
as a way to attract investment. 
Portuguese Startups: Benefits and Consequences of a Model of Tax Deferral 
 
 
CATÓLICA-LISBON School of Business & Economics                     Page 30 
by Pedro Filipe Abreu 
The Portuguese Environment for Startup’s Creation 
About 99 p.p. of the Portuguese enterprise sector is composed by SMEs (Ernst & Young, 
2011, p. 16) (31) therefore these are crucial to the economy confirming what was referred in 
the Literature Review in which startups (the previous SMEs) act as incubators of 
employment, innovation, competition, efficiency and growth. In this sense, supporting 
startups will bring benefits to the economy.  
The number of new startups created every year in Portugal, after a big increase in the 
beginning of the millennium reaching 45.290 new companies created in 2001, dropped 
significantly over the next four years with 22.059 created companies in 2005. Since 2005 until 
2008, this number has been increasing steadily but like it has been seen in the previous 
economic indicators 2009 was a year of decreases and the creation of new companies 
decreased as well by 12,75 p.p. comparing to 2008. In 2010 there was an increase of 8,22 p.p. 
reaching the 28.001 new companies. The tendency, after the big drop in 2001 has been of a 
steady increase with small variations and for the last five years of the data, the number of 
new companies varied little between the 25.651 and 29.657 (see figures 21 and 22 in appendix 
1). 
The survival rate of the Portuguese startups within two years of activity shows a clear 
decreasing tendency from 58,70 p.p. in 2006 to 49,36 p.p. to 2009 (see figure 23 in appendix 
1). This survival rate is referent to the companies created two years earlier, so for a rate of 
49,36 p.p. in 2009 means that for every 100 companies created in 2007, two years after (by 
2009) about only 49 are still in activity.  
The tendency verified demonstrates that Portuguese startups are having higher difficulties 
surviving and although it’s not easy to predict, based on the economic environment and 
austerity measures taken by the Portuguese government it is not expectable that this 
tendency improves, in fact it has higher chances of decline even more. This means that 
measures to support startups are needed so these can have higher chances of survival – in 
here it is seen how pertinent a tax deferral based model for startups might be. 
We’ve seen earlier that according to Thornhill and Amit (2003) (16) startups fail not because 
they are young but because they do not have the time or capacity to create and capture value 
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in the market place. This is so because they exhaust their initial resources before creating 
strategic assets. On other words, startups on their initial years have reduced sources of 
revenue and high liquidity necessities but higher difficulties accessing funding (either 
internal or external) and it is this discrepancy that causes many startups to fail, not the single 
fact of being younger. 
The Portuguese case is no different, and in 2009, 93 p.p. of the Portuguese companies 
accessed some type of credit and from these, 94 p.p. accessed bank credit (see figure 24 in 
appendix 1). A clear demonstration of the financial necessities of the Portuguese companies. 
From the companies that have had access to credit, 53 p.p. found it more difficult to do so, 
being specially difficult among the micro and SMEs contrasting with what was felt in big 
companies where 56 p.p. of them state that they felt no increase difficulties accessing credit. 
(see figure 25 in appendix 1). 
The increased difficulties to access to credit are in contrast with the credit necessities of each 
type of company with 67 p.p. of big companies having identical credit needs and only 28 p.p. 
having higher needs. While the micro and SMEs have bigger difficulties between 33p.p. and 
35 p.p. and identical needs between 47 p.p. and 54 p.p (see figure 26 in appendix 1). In other 
words, the companies that had more credit needs are also the ones with higher difficulty in 
getting it. 
All these can also be proved with the financial situation of every company (evaluated by the 
company itself) with a considerable percentage of micro and SMEs considering their 
situation bad or very bad, specially the micro companies with 52 p.p. in this category. While 
only 15 p.p. of big companies considering their financial situation to be bad or very bad in 
2009. The opposite is also true, with a significant percentage of big companies considering 
their situation to be good or very good (34 p.p.) against smaller percentages in the micro and 
SMEs (see figure 27 in appendix 1). 
Although the study does not differentiate between startups and the rest of the other 
companies, we know that most of the startups start as a micro or SMEs, therefore the 
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information provided in these segments can also be applied to startups, with these having 
higher needs for credit but higher difficulties accessing it as well.  
Internationally this difficulties can also be verified in the The World Bank (2011) (39) rank 
(the same study used to measure the ease of doing business), where Portugal appears in the 
126th position (out of 183) regarding the easiness of getting credit, at the same level of 
countries like Bahrain and Cape Verde. A situation that shows how difficult it is for the 
Portuguese companies to have access to credit. 
Dr. Banha’s21 experience also evidences the difficulty of sartups having access to proper bank 
credit, with innovative companies facing even harder difficulties by the fact that they are 
considered more risky and typically only with venture capital and business angel funds they 
can get access to the necessary funding. But the other startups, considered less risky 
although might face easiness in accessing that credit, they will only get the credit if they have 
a strong and experienced management team, otherwise they’ll find many difficulties as well. 
This shows that in general, Portuguese startups face several difficulties accessing financing 
from the banks. 
The overall conclusions, other than pointing out the importance that startups have on the 
Portuguese economy demonstrate the importance of providing these startups with adequate 
conditions to survive by reducing the fiscal levels, once again it is observable the role that 
deferred taxes might have on the startups survival, that with these higher difficulties could 
benefit from another indirect source of funding. 
There is another important observation made by Valente (2011) (41) of the Portuguese society 
and the Portuguese entrepreneurs that might help validate a model of tax deferral within the 
Portuguese context. It is related with the finding that there is a controversial aspect within 
the entrepreneurship in Portugal. 
Typically, Portugal is a conservative country, predominantly catholic where relations and 
trust are very important for doing business (Kwintessential, 2010) (42). Adding to these, the 
                                                          
21
 Dr. Francisco Banha was interviewed within the purpose of this study. All the information regarding Dr. 
Banha’s opinion inserted within this dissertation is based on the interview made which was transcript and can 
be seen in appendix 2, interview 2. 
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Uncertainty Avoidance Index22, developed by Geert Hofstede23 places Portugal at the top of 
the chart (just surpassed by Greece in a total of 66 countries) (see figure 29 in appendix 1), 
meaning that Portugal maintains ‚rigid codes of belief and behavior‛ and is ‚intolerant of 
unorthodox behavior and ideas‛ (Itim International, 2012) (43), characteristics somehow 
contradictory to the notion of entrepreneur and entrepreneurship that, like it was seen, 
incorporates concepts like ‚risk, uncertainty, innovation, perception and change‛ (Hébert & Link, 
1989) (8). At first this could only mean that Portugal and entrepreneurship or even the 
simple creation of new businesses would not have a positive correlation, with Portugal 
having low indices of business creation.  
The surprising outcome is that in fact, Portugal is in the top-25 (out of 53) concerning the 
most entrepreneurial countries (see figure 30 in appendix 1), a ranking introduced by 
Fortune Small Business (2007) (44) that incorporates the easiness of starting and operating a 
business as so as the national rates of high-expectation entrepreneurship. Portugal is just 
behind Germany and in front of countries like Italy or Spain. This situation shows how in 
fact, against what was expectable, Portugal has a strong entrepreneurial facet. 
The reasoning made by Valente (2011) (41) is that having the Portuguese society a high level 
of risk avoidance, but a good environment for the creation of new businesses (that are indeed 
created every year) seems to create a sort of paradox. But according to Valente (2011) (41), it 
is not really a paradox because what happens is that in Portugal new companies are created 
but with a low level of risk. Businesses are usually replicated after proving they are viable 
and are in many cases successful within their environment and area of scope but are not a 
result of innovative ideas with potential to become a national success or exported 
internationally. In the author’s words:  
                                                          
22
 Uncertainty Avoidance Index “expresses the degree to which the members of a society feel uncomfortable 
with uncertainty and ambiguity. The fundamental issue here is how a society deals with the fact that the future 
can never be known: should we try to control the future or just let it happen? Countries exhibiting strong UAI 
maintain rigid codes of belief and behaviour and are intolerant of unorthodox behaviour and ideas. Weak UAI 
societies maintain a more relaxed attitude in which practice counts more than principles.” (Itim International, 
2012) (43) 
23
 Geert Hofstede “born as Gerard Hendrik Hofstede (5 October 1928 in Haarlem, Netherlands) is an influential 
Dutch researcher in the fields of organizational studies and *…+ organizational culture, also cultural economics 
and management. He is a well-known pioneer in his research of cross-cultural groups and organizations and 
played a major role in developing a systematic framework for assessing and differentiating national cultures 
and organizational cultures. His studies demonstrated that there are national and regional cultural groups that 
influence behavior of societies and organizations. (Wikipedia, 2012) (94) 
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‚Portuguese are quite entrepreneurial but are still risk averse. They are quite disposed and 
able to become their own bosses. But their entrepreneurial spirit is focused on creating small 
businesses and lifestyle businesses: a restaurant, a clothing shop, a bar, a hairdresser salon, a 
newsstand, a consulting/freelance job, etc. Something that basically doesn’t defy the status 
quo, something that is safe, something that won’t shock friends and family and that assures 
that one doesn’t deviate from the norm. Portuguese are still provincial, they are rather happy 
to create businesses that are focused on our small country and that just provide living 
expenses. They are still uncapable of thinking with a European (or worldwide) focus. They are 
still uncapable of thinking big, of having a chance to make millions.‛ 
What is seen is a society showing signs of entrepreneurial capabilities but remaining 
restrained by a conservative mentality. Once again the pertinence of a model of tax deferral 
appears in here. It would allow lowering the risk of creating risky businesses, acting as an 
incentive for entrepreneurs to start on their own. This incentive would allow to take 
advantage of the entrepreneurial capacity of the Portuguese society, resulting possibly in the 
creation of more innovative ideas with higher potential to succeed instead of the already 
known common businesses. 
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The Portuguese Enterprise Taxes 
Taxes are a way for the state to obtain funding that is primarily supposed to be used in order 
to improve the welfare of the taxpayers (either individuals or entities) but there could also be 
other purposes for the use of taxation, like it was previously mentioned, such as resource 
allocation, income distribution and economic stability.  
The recent years, in Portugal have been characterized by constant increases on taxes on both 
individuals and entities. These raises have been justified with the need to face expenses and 
of course, to reduce the debt (some of them were imposed by the time of the agreements for 
the Portuguese bailout) others increases are justified by unexpected budget deviations 
(Jornal de Notícias, 2011) (45). Whatever the reason, currently, in Portugal there has been an 
increase of taxation. 
The ways Portuguese companies can be taxed are many, with the most common being 
(Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira, 2009) (46): 
Corporate Income Tax (CIT24), in Portuguese: IRC – Imposto sobre o Rendimento 
Colectivo 
Value Added Tax (VAT), in Portuguese: IVA – Imposto sobre o Valor Acrescentado 
Municipal Tax on Real Estate Transfer (MTRET) in Portuguese: IMT - Imposto 
Municipal Sobre as Transmissões Onerosas de Imóveis 
Municipal Tax on Real Property (MTRP) in Portuguese: IMI – Imposto Municipal sobre 
Imóveis 
Stamp Duty (SD) in Portugues: IS – Imposto de Selo 
Personal Income Tax (PIT) in Portuguese: IRS – Imposto sobre o Rendimento de Pessoas 
Singulares 
Social Security (SS) in Portuguese: SS – Segurança Social 
                                                          
24
 From this point forward the abbreviations CIT, VAT, MTRET, MTRP, SD, PIT and SS (displayed in brackets) will 
be used when referring to Corporate Income Tax, Value Added Tax, Municipal Tax on Real Estate Transfer, 
Municipal Tax on Real Property, Stamp Duty, Personal Income Tax and Social Security, correspondently. All 
abbreviations can be seen on the list of abbreviations. 
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From the seven different taxes mentioned above, only the first two and the last two, the CIT, 
VAT, PIT and SS contributions are the ones truly general, meaning that they are the only 
ones that are taxable to all the companies no matter their activity, while the other three are 
dependent on other factors, for example the MTRET is only ‚levied on the transfer for 
consideration of ownership rights or parts‛ (Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira, 2009) (46), not 
being necessarily taxed in every company. The Stamp Duty in its turn is ‚levied on any deeds, 
contracts, documents securities, books, papers and other events‛ (Autoridade Tributária e 
Aduaneira, 2009) (46) and although present in every company’s activity (because contracts 
and other documents have to be signed in order for the business to run) will not be equal to 
all but even so, they are small percentages and small fees compared to the other taxes. For 
example, a license document for a typical restaurant is 50€ (Autoridade Tributária e 
Aduaneira, 2009) (46), making this type of tax very different across businesses and in many 
cases almost insignificant. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this study, at first seems that there would be four types of taxes 
that really matter, the CIT, the VAT, the PIT and the contributions to SS. But the VAT is a 
special tax, an indirect one because it is a consumption tax (impacting only the final 
consumer) and consists of a system of partial payments charged as a percentage of the price. 
Due to its characteristics and deductibility it is considered a neutral tax for the companies 
regardless of how many transactions there is. In this sense the companies act as simple 
intermediaries of the government receiving and delivering the VAT to the authorities 
(European Commission, 2012) (47). With no direct impact to the companies the VAT becomes 
pointless to study, remaining only the CIT, PIT and SS as the only ones that are relevant for 
this dissertation. 
The CIT is a tax that is charged directly to the undertaking’s income, not its assets, meaning 
that it will be based on the profit of the company within the referent year of activity. It is the 
most relevant tax for many companies and its impact is fundamental to the company’s 
activity. Currently this tax is 25 p.p. of its results (Deloitte & Associados, 2012) (48). 
The two remaining taxes, the PIT and SS are a different kind of taxes because they are not 
taxed directly to the company’s activity but to the employees’. In terms of rates, the PIT can 
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vary between 10 p.p. and 46,50 p.p (Deloitte & Associados, 2012, p. 2) (48) while the SS is in 
normal cases a tax of 23,75 p.p (PwC Portugal, 2012) (49). But the PIT is a tax that is directly 
taxed at the employee’s earnings, with the company being responsible to deliver it to the 
state, acting only as intermediary. Therefore it cannot be seen as a potential tax to defer. 
Following this reasoning, only the SS can be considered to be deferred along with the CIT. 
Nevertheless, the SS will appear in the income statement grouped into the Social Charges 
(SC25) rubric. This rubric also comprises additional charges incurred by the company referent 
to insurance expenses (typically correspondent to 1 p.p. of the salary) with employees. For 
the purposes of this study they shall be treated as SC as well, which will not interfere with 
the analysis once they are charged over the same base (employees’ salary) and equal (in 
percentage) across companies. 
Because of their characteristics and due to reasons previously explained, these two taxes (CIT 
and SC) will be the ones I will consider for the purpose of being deferred. 
  
                                                          
25
 From this point forward the abbreviation SC (displayed in brackets) will be used when referring to Social 
Charges. All abbreviations can be seen on the list of abbreviations. 
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Methodology 
This dissertation aimed to assess the impact that a model of tax deferral would have on the 
companies’ survival and on the government’s revenues. Within this scope, it was proposed a 
model of tax deferral based on the factors that were considered pertinent to be study, in each 
case. 
The analysis comprised the use of multiple sources of information due to the necessity of 
including many variables for examination. The methods used were mainly five: 
1. The exploration of academic papers, journals, reports, newspapers and books.  
2. The use of the internet to collect data, statistics and other web content such as 
definitions or concepts.  
3. The use of real companies’ statement income values. 
4. The realization of two surveys, one targeted to the general public and other targeted 
to entrepreneurs. 
5. The conduction of two interviews to two Portuguese experts, one in the area of 
entrepreneurship and the other on taxation. 
With no previous studies on the subject, the gathering of the necessary information to define 
the basic concepts was carried on the initial phase of the study. This step, performed with the 
use of the first and second methods described earlier was necessary to clearly define the 
fundamental topics in study as so as to characterize the Portuguese context. For being used 
only as supporting knowledge for the development of the model, this step can be considered 
as a secondary data source. 
The primary data source used includes all the five methods mentioned. First, for the model 
simulation, the collection of data and the research of reports were conducted allowing the 
gather of the necessary information to calculate the impact of the model on the government 
side. At this point the data collected was in some cases incomplete and some assumptions 
were forced to be made, nevertheless all the necessary measures were taken to guarantee the 
maximum veracity on the assumptions made in order to do not compromise the final results. 
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Then for the application to real companies it was necessary to collect the income statement of 
these and develop two surveys in order to better understand how relevant this deferral 
could be for the companies and how it is seen by the general public. 
Finally, the interviews made were used throughout the model, with the main conclusions 
derived from these being applied not only as the premises of the model but also as a way to 
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Tax Model with Deferral 
The main purpose of simulating a tax model based on the deferral of the CIT and SC is to 
understand if it might help the startups’ survival and possibly leverage their growth. 
To do that, the model must take into account the influence those taxes have on the 
company’s expenses because those taxes might not necessarily be big enough to cause any 
special impact on the firm’s survival or the failure of the company might not be related with 
the tax deferral at all but with other reasons inside the company or in the marketplace. 
Finally, another goal of this model is to assess the expected impact on the government side, 
because the possible earnings of the government and the society in general might or might 
not compensate the risk associated with the model. In this sense another aspect to consider is 
the unemployment generated by the failed companies which increases the social security 
expenses and reduces the buying power of the unemployed workers. 
This model was constructed under several norms and under several eligibility criteria, but all 
validated with experts in the subject, namely Dr. José Silva Jorge26 and Dr. Francisco Banha, 
with their opinions being expressed in appendix 2. 
 
The Model 
The model is intended to be simple, comprising four main focus points: 
1. The deferral will be made on the CIT and SC taxes and no other tax is supposed to be 
deferred in this model. 
2. The companies will not pay these taxes for a two year period since the year of their 
creation. 
3. Those taxes shall start to be paid on the third year of activity. On that year companies 
are supposed to pay the value of the taxes they were meant to pay that year plus 25 
p.p. of the value of the taxes of the first year of activity. The same logic applies to the 
                                                          
26
 Dr. José Silva Jorge was also interviewed within the purpose of this study. All the information regarding Dr. 
José Silva Jorge’s opinion inserted within this dissertation is based on the interview made which was transcript 
and can be seen in appendix 2, interview 1. 
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following years until the deferred taxes are totally paid, with the taxes of the second 
year starting to be paid after the taxes of the first year being already paid. With this 
logic, the taxes of the first year are supposed to be totally paid on the sixth year of 
activity and the taxes of the second year should be totally paid at the end of the tenth 
year. 
4. If the startup wishes, it is able to dismiss the deferral or repay the amount in debt 
before the due time. 
 
Eligibility Criteria 
Eligible to be part of this deferral should be all the companies without exception as long as 
they are within the following criteria: 
 The company should be a startup on its first year of activity. Existing companies are 
not eligible to take advantage of this deferral. 
 They should be “genuine” startups27, either owned by individuals only and/or 
registered investment funds, not by other companies. 
 They should not have a tax base equal or above 100.000 € (see figure 31 in appendix 
1). If they have, the deferral of taxes should not be applicable. 
 
Similarities 
There are already some situations where some of the taxes in study might be subject of 
deferral under special conditions.  
The CIT, a tax that is dependent on the taxable profit of the company will always be a 
percentage of this profit. If the profit is equal to zero or negative, then the tax will not be 
charged, making the net profit equal to the profit before tax. In fact, the negative results can 
                                                          
27
 This concept was introduced by Dr. José Silva Jorge during the interview. Appendix 2, interview 1 displays 
more detailed information about this concept. 
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be deferred into the future and be deduced when the company has positive profits, making 
the payment of the tax of that profitable year lower. 28 
The Social Security contributions have as well some cases of exemption during some limited 
periods of time and in some special cases. These can be (Direcção-Geral da Segurança Social, 
2012)  (50): 
 First job and long-term employment 
 Employment of prisoners 
 Rotation employment-training 
 Recovery of inland regions 
Although both cases (of the CIT and SC) are relevant, the SC becomes particularly important 
for this study since the purpose of this dissertation is to understand if the deferral of the 
startups’ taxes might help their survival. What is expected to happen is that if they are not in 
difficulties (and have high profits), then a deferral of the taxes might help them expand but 
will have no impact on the survival (once they would survive on their own already), but on 
the other hand, if the startup is in difficulties with profits of zero or negative results, then the 
company is already able to differ the CIT into the future making the model inconsequent for 
this tax but not for the SC.  
 
Possible problems 
The possible problems that might arise from this model, excluding the extra bureaucracy for 
the companies and fiscal agents, could be related with two main topics, the competition 
issues and the possibility of fiscal evasions29. 
The competition issues might arise from the existing companies feeling somehow 
jeopardized in favor of the new incoming startups. This argument is refused by evidence, 
                                                          
28
 “Income tax: value of the tax in the correspondent period, calculated based on the accounting values 
considering the definitive differences. It can be negative – tax in favor of the state – or positive – sum 
susceptible to be recovered by the entity.” (Comissão Normabilização Contabilística, 2012) (88) 
29
 Remember that fiscal or tax evasion is “an illegal practice where a person, organization or corporation 
intentionally avoids paying his/her/its true tax liability” (Investopedia ULC., 2012) (80) 
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with the Portuguese government already providing many incentives that could also be seen 
as a distortion of the competition. Some of these incentives are managed by the National 
Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF30), in Portuguese QREN – Quadro de Referência 
Estratégico Nacional that defined three systems of incentive in the areas of technological 
development, innovation and internationalization of the SMEs (QREN, 2011) (51) and if these 
incentives are seen as simple incentives so as a model of tax deferral should be seen as well. 
Moreover, Dr. José Silva Jorge and Dr. Banha’s opinion is opposed to this argument. Dr. José 
noticed that startups will not be in direct competition with the big companies (because these 
compete among themselves) and the new incoming firms do not have the resources and 
conditions to compete directly with them, while Dr. Banha referred that if the incentives are 
targeted specially to innovative companies, these will be creating a new market that didn’t 
existed before therefore the competition issues are irrelevant (see interviews 1 and 2 in 
Appendix 2). 
The fiscal evasion option is based on mainly two possibilities, the first would be the case of 
entrepreneurs creating startups only to take advantage of the fiscal benefits, closing the firm 
when they stop having those benefits to start another firm and be covered by the benefits 
again. This could be controlled with legislation because what happens is that the companies 
have a debt to the state and if a firm showing positive performance indices closes for no 
apparent reason then the debt should continue to be demanded to the company’s founders 
with these being limited to open new businesses. But if the firm does show signs of not 
having a chance to survive then the state should bear the debt as a cost of the model. For this 
case the solution will always be based on legislation and inspection.  
The second possibility, introduced by Dr. José Silva Jorge during the interview was that big 
multinationals could create new companies and transfer the profits to them in order to lower 
their taxes. This is easily refused because one of the eligibility criteria is exactly to be a 
startup created by individuals and not other companies, restraining heavily this possibility 
which is also limited by the maximum taxable base until which the startups can defer their 
                                                          
30
 From this point forward the abbreviation NSRF (displayed in brackets) will be used when referring to National 
Strategic Reference Framework. All abbreviations can be seen on the list of abbreviations. 
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taxes (with startups having more than 100.000 € in taxable base not being able to defer them). 
So this possible problem can be contained with these eligibility criteria. 
 
Legislation 
According to Dr. José Silva Jorge (see interview 1 in Appendix 2), a model of tax deferral is 
not included in the Portuguese legislation and if it was to be implemented, the legislation 
would have to change in order to comprise with the needed conditions of the model.  
These changes to the legislation, the requirements and the specificities needed to do so are 
not in the scope of this dissertation, but they are here acknowledged as fundamental to the 
implementation of this model. 
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Application of The Model 
Like previously mentioned, the model will affect directly the companies and the 
government. Therefore it is crucial to understand the impact it might have on both. 
This section will comprise those two analyses, stating the main conclusions derived from 
each. The calculations made for the impact on the government side are more subjective 
because they depend on various assumptions that inevitably will condition the final result.  
On the companies’ side, the calculations are not dependent on assumptions since real 
companies were used. The main limitation on this side is the use of a small sample of 
companies and the lack of information some of them have. In here is important to stress the 
difficulties on accessing the companies’ information because people normally avoid talking 
about their failures or don’t share information for confidentiality reasons. 
Due to its complexity, the detailed explanation of the calculations is displayed in appendix 3, 
while here only the main conclusions will be shown. 
On the government side we analyze the impact of the CIT, the SC and also the impact of 
unemployment (not only the direct costs but also the loss of buying power resultant of it). All 
the factors are analyzed under three scenarios (a realistic, an optimistic and a pessimistic) 
plus the initial situation without model. 
The “no model” scenario is simply the current situation, where the companies do not have 
the possibility to defer their taxes and have to pay them at the correspondent year of 
incurrence 
The remaining ones already account for the possibility of deferral. The “realistic model” is 
the situation where is assumed that the companies will only fail at the market failure rate 
instead of the startups’ failure rate. The “”optimistic model” assumes no failure among 
companies and that they would actually grow by 20 p.p. a year. Finally, the “pessimistic 
model” is an equal scenario to the “no model” situation except the state will lose some taxes 
that were deferred. The detailed information about the constitution and assumption of these 
models is displayed on the appendices’ section. 
Portuguese Startups: Benefits and Consequences of a Model of Tax Deferral 
 
 
CATÓLICA-LISBON School of Business & Economics                     Page 46 
by Pedro Filipe Abreu 
CIT impact on the government side 
Regarding the CIT, table one31 gives a clear idea of the situation under the four scenarios.  
Table 1 
 
It can be seen that in the “no model” situation, the tax is paid when it is incurred, therefore 
there is no CIT to be received or lost. For the other scenarios this does not happen because 
the tax is deferred and there is the risk of it not being paid. On the “optimistic model”, there 
is no CIT lost because it is assumed that on an optimal situation no company would fail (on 
appendix 3 is shown in detail all the criteria used).  
The values displayed show that the worst case would result in a loss of 645.241.222,78€, 
while on the best case, the additional gain would be of 3.290.228.079,88€ (a value more than 6 
times higher than the possible loss).  
An interesting observation is that although the CIT to be received shows a high value in the 
scenarios with deferral (always over 1.000.000.000€) which is not in the best interest of the 
state (because it is money to be received and not received yet), the CIT already received by 
the state on the realistic and optimistic situations is superior to the total CIT received on the 
“no model” situation. In other words, at the end of the seventh year, with the exception of 
the pessimistic situation, the risk of not receiving the CIT deferred is already compensated 
by the CIT received. 
The total is achieved by adding the CIT already received and the CIT to be received, 
deducing the CIT lost.  
The “CIT lost” rubric shows the total CIT which will not be recovered by the state because it 
is the debt the failed companies had at the time of their failure and is borne by the state. 
                                                          
31
 These are the final values that were achieved after an intense process of calculation which is explained in 
detail on Appendix 3, Part 2 - Model for the CIT, Government Side 
CIT Received CIT to be Received CIT Lost Total Difference to No Model
No Model 3.041.761.882,96 €    -  €                        -  €                        3.041.761.882,96 €    -                                  
Realistic Model 3.088.839.570,03 €    1.468.110.524,61 €  275.478.298,58 €     4.281.471.796,06 €    1.239.709.913,10 €           
Optimistic Model 4.685.597.210,05 €    1.646.392.752,79 €  -  €                        6.331.989.962,84 €    3.290.228.079,88 €           
Pessimistic Model 1.811.458.671,69 €    1.230.303.211,26 €  645.241.222,78 €     2.396.520.660,18 €    645.241.222,78 €-             
Resumed Table (CIT)
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Nevertheless, this value is not that significant on the realistic model accounting for about 
6,43 p.p. while on the pessimistic case its significance increases to the value of approximately 
26,92 p.p. of the total. 
 
SC impact on the government side 




In this case, the worst possible scenario would be a loss of 1.106.632.972,62€ to the state, 
while on the best situation it would have an additional gain of 6.081.478.415,89€, a value six 
and half times higher than the possible loss. 
Once again, the values to be received are a significant percentage of the total, but although 
the values already received in the realistic model do not surpass the ones of the “no model” 
situation, they are really close (a difference of 107.375.745,03€) and surpassed on the 
optimistic situation. This means that the risk of deferral will be, on these scenarios, reduced. 
The SC lost, although higher on total values than in the CIT case, will have an equivalent 
percentage of the total. In the pessimistic model accounting for 25,44 p.p. and in the realistic 
model accounting for 8,18 p.p. of the total. 
It can also be seen that the SC account for a higher source of revenue than the expected CIT. 
This happens mostly for two reasons: when the firms have negative results they can already 
defers the CIT and on the initial years of existence the firms tend to have difficult 
                                                          
32
 These are the final values that were achieved after an intense process of calculation which is explained in 
detail on Appendix 3, Part 3 – Model for the SC, Government Side 
SC Received SC to be Received SC Lost Total Difference to No Model
No Model 5.456.945.605,85 €    -  €                        -  €                        5.456.945.605,85 €    -                                  
Realistic Model 5.349.569.860,82 €    2.437.315.957,41 €  588.535.740,82 €     7.198.350.077,41 €    1.741.404.471,57 €           
Optimistic Model 8.787.511.210,28 €    2.750.912.811,46 €  -  €                        11.538.424.021,74 €  6.081.478.415,89 €           
Pessimistic Model 3.414.458.582,22 €    2.042.487.023,63 €  1.106.632.972,62 €  4.350.312.633,23 €    1.106.632.972,62 €-           
Resumed Table (SC)
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implementing itself on the market which decreases their profitability. On the other side, the 
SC must be paid whatever the performance of the company is. So if a company has negative 
results, the CIT can be deferred while the SC can’t be, this results in the higher value of the 
SC in comparison the CIT as seen on table 2. 




In this third table the behavior of the values is already expected. With the state having the 
possibility of winning up to 9.317.706.495,77€ and loosing up to 1.751.874.195,40€ in 
difference to the “no model” scenario. 
The CIT and SC received on the realistic model is almost equal to the one without the model 
and in the optimistic case it surpasses it. The CIT and SC to be received continue to account 
for a big percentage of the total in all the models and the CIT and SC loss maintain an 
equivalent percentage as the ones seen on table one and two.  
Although this third table shows the overall impact that a model of deferral would have on 
the state, it would be incomplete if it did not account for the indirect costs associated with it. 
These costs can be many33 but for this study they will be focused on the unemployment costs 
(UC34), namely the unemployment subsidy paid by the state to each unemployed worker and 
                                                          
33
 Like it was previously seen, the unemployment can lead to individual, social and governmental costs such as 
more crime, manifestations and even revolutions. Besides, like mentioned by Dr. Banha (see interview 2 in 
Appendix 2) there is still another important indirect cost of the failure of companies which is the demonstration 
effect. 
34
 From this point forward the abbreviation UC (displayed in brackets) will be used when referring to 
Unemployment Costs. All abbreviations can be seen on the list of abbreviations. 
CIT + SC Received CIT + SC to be Received CIT + SC Lost Total Difference to No Model
No Model 8.498.707.488,80 €    -  €                                  -  €                       8.498.707.488,80 €    -                                  
Realistic Model 8.438.409.430,85 €    3.905.426.482,02 €            864.014.039,40 €    11.479.821.873,47 €  2.981.114.384,67 €           
Optimistic Model 13.473.108.420,33 €  4.397.305.564,24 €            -  €                       17.870.413.984,57 €  9.371.706.495,77 €           
Pessimistic Model 5.225.917.253,91 €    3.272.790.234,89 €            1.751.874.195,40 €  6.746.833.293,41 €    1.751.874.195,40 €-           
Resumed Table (CIT + SC)
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the loss of buying power (LBP35) that those workers have with the change from being 
employed to being unemployed, with this loss measured by the difference between the 
average payment received while working and the average subsidy received while 
unemployed. These are the only costs considered (although the others are recognized) 
because these are the only two possible to measure with evidence and are the ones that are a 
direct result of the failing of the companies. 
 
Unemployment Costs & Loss of Buying Power 
Table 4 and 536 show the additional unemployed subsidy costs borne by the state and the loss 





Once again, the optimistic situation assumes no failure, therefore there is no unemployment 
costs and loss of buying power resultant.  
The “no model” and the “pessimistic model” since they are built under the same 
assumptions will have equal values.  
                                                          
35
 From this point forward the abbreviation LBP (displayed in brackets) will be used when referring to Loss of 
Buying Power. All abbreviations can be seen on the list of abbreviations. 
36
 These are the final values that were achieved after an intense process of calculation which is explained in 
detail on Appendix 3, Part 4 – Model for the Impact caused by the Unemployment 
No Model 742.095.923,25 €          
Realistic Model 342.726.461,42 €          
Optimistic Model -  €                             
Pessimistic Model 742.095.923,25 €          
Resumed Table (Unemployment Costs)
Total Unemployment Costs
No Model 2.006.563.126,98 €      
Realistic Model 950.646.984,13 €         
Optimistic Model -  €                            
Pessimistic Model 2.006.563.126,98 €      
Resumed Table (Loss of Buying Power)
Total Loss of Buying Power
Portuguese Startups: Benefits and Consequences of a Model of Tax Deferral 
 
 
CATÓLICA-LISBON School of Business & Economics                     Page 50 
by Pedro Filipe Abreu 
The values displayed on the LBP are considerably higher than the UC, which can be 
somewhat biased since it is assumed that the earnings of the workers would be totally 
invested in the economy. Nevertheless, even if they weren’t, the loss of the workers would 
be the one presented. This means that the workers support a higher total cost than the state, 
but in the end both entities are prejudiced. 
The total cost of unemployment and loss of buying power are shown on table 6. 
Table 6 
 
This sixth table shows how much money is lost as result of the failure of the companies. It 
comprises the subsidy paid by the state (an actual cost for the state) and the money that will 
not be present in the economy which could foster the economic development, allow the 
survival of more companies and jobs and would inevitably increase the state’s revenues 
(because an increase in consumption also increases the tax revenue). 
Finally, to understand what the global impact might be on the state’s side, image 7 shows the 
impact of the CIT, SC, UC and LBP37. 
Table 7 
 
                                                          
37
 Although the LBP does not impact directly the government it will affect the economy as a whole, therefore to 
calculate the effect to the government it is calculated the taxation value based on the average value of the 
normal VAT practiced in Portugal from 2004 to 2009 (which is equal to 20,5%) (Wikipedia, 2012) (95), assuming 
that all the money would be spent and spent within the Portuguese economy.  
No Model 2.748.659.050,24 €  
Realistic Model 1.293.373.445,55 €  
Optimistic Model -  €                       
Pessimistic Model 2.748.659.050,24 €  
Resumed Table (UC + Loss of BP)
Total UC + Loss of BP
Total % of 2010 GDP Difference to No Model % of 2010 GDP
No Model 7.345.266.124,52 €    4,53% -                                               0,00%
Realistic Model 10.942.212.780,31 €  6,75% 3.596.946.655,79 €                  2,22%
Optimistic Model 17.870.413.984,57 €  11,02% 10.525.147.860,05 €               6,49%
Pessimistic Model 5.593.391.929,12 €    3,45% 1.751.874.195,40 €-                  1,08%
Total Effect (CIT + SC - UC - VAT*LBP)
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In global terms the actual risk for the state would be of losing 1.751.874.195,40€, a value that 
is maintained from the impact of the CIT and SC because the impact of the UC and the LBP 
is calculated under the same assumptions (same failure rate and same number of workers) 
therefore its impact is null. On the best scenario, the state receive on addition up to 
10.525.147.860,05€ (these values already account for the difference to the no model situation).  
In terms of the percentage of the 2010 GDP38, all situations show a considerable weight of the 
total, with the optimistic situation actually surpassing the two digit barrier. Although there is 
a big discrepancy on the extreme values (which can be justified by the fact that these are the 
best and worst scenarios possible), however the optimistic model might be subject to some 
criticism for being much optimistic and never actually achievable.  
Therefore, considering only the realistic and pessimistic models as plausible alternatives, the 
gain or loss the government could obtain would vary between the gain of 3.596.946.655,79€ 
and the loss of 1.751.874.195,40€.  
Deducing the possible loss to the plausible gain, the expected value is 1.845.072.460,40€ of 
additional gain, representing 1,14 p.p. of GDP in 2010. On the worst scenario the loss would 
be 1.751.874.195,40€ equivalent to 1,08 p.p. of the GDP in 2010.  
So, the state does incur in some risk and can lose revenue, but it can also gain an expected 
amount higher than the possible loss. This loss represents around 1,08 p.p. of the GDP in a 7 
year period (from 2004 to 2010) and in fact, each year that percentage is considerably lower. 
Nevertheless this is the cost that the state must incur in to support the startups and be a 
stakeholder in the business. 
Finally, to better understand the impact on the state, society and individuals, table 839 shows 
the resumed situation (of all the years and models) regarding the number of companies 
failed and the unemployment resultant.  
                                                          
38
 The value of the GDP in 2010 is 162.097.605.500,00€ (PORDATA, 2012) (61) 
39
 These are the final values that were achieved after an intense process of calculation which is explained in 
detail on Appendix 3, Part 5 – Resumed Impact on the Number of Companies and Unemployment 
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Table 8 
 
Once again the “no model” case will share the same values of the “pessimistic model” (for 
sharing the same assumptions) while the “optimistic” model will assume no failure at all. 
There is a big difference in terms of the number companies failed from the “realistic” case to 
the “no model” one, clearly seen by the percentage of still remaining companies that goes 
from 52,20 p.p. (barely more than half) to 79,23 p.p.  
The number of unemployed workers is also considerably smaller on the “realistic” situation, 
accounting for less than half than the unemployment verified on the “no model” situation. 
This relation was expectable once they are the basis from the unemployment costs and loss of 
buying power seen before, having the same proportionality.  
Year of Creation Companies Created Companies Failed Existent Existent (%) Unemployment
No Model 155.709                      74.436                     81.273     52,20% 375.427             
Realistic Model 155.709                      32.340                     123.369  79,23% 170.952             
Optimistic Model 155.709                      -                            155.709  100,00% -                       
Pessimistic Model 155.709                      74.436                     81.273     52,20% 375.427             
Companies Dissolved / Unemployment
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Startups’ Impact 
In this section, real startup cases are meant to be addressed. The startups analyzed were 
seven, four failed companies and three still existent. Although it is important to see the 
impact that a model of deferral would have on the companies, it was difficult to obtain the 
necessary information because, like mentioned before, people tend to avoid talking about 
their failures or in some cases they cannot do it for confidentiality reasons, resulting in a 
small sample of companies available. 
The number of employees and the effect of the unemployment were excluded of this analysis 
for difficulties accessing information (for confidentiality reasons) and because the main goal 
was to assess the impact that taxes have on the firms’ survival, while the effect of the 
unemployment is only an indirect consequence. 
Other than failed companies, the (still) existing companies are interesting to study because 
they will allow us to see if in fact this deferral would help them not only to survive (they 
already did it) but also to expand because these companies also face difficulties on the initial 
years of activity. 
Nevertheless, the failed companies are more relevant to be analyzed because by having 
already failed, they allow us to have the possibility to see in what way the taxes influenced 
their survival. Although the causes of failure of the companies were not analyzed 
individually the results achieved are conclusive enough regarding the weight taxation had. 
Appendix 3, Part 6 – Startups’ Analysis displays all the information regarding the 
companies’ performance and all the calculations made in order to see the impact of the taxes 
on this sample of companies.  
Table 9, in its turn, shows the resumed scenario of the savings companies would have with 
the deferral. It shows the absolute values of the savings by company and the values in 
percentage of the Net Income.  
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Table 9 
 
It is interesting to see that the higher value of taxes is paid by failed companies, while in 
percentage the values paid by existing companies represent much higher values. This 
situation is justifiable by the fact that failed companies show a much higher value (but 
negative) of the net income while the existent companies show a smaller net income (but 
positive). This is why the percentage of taxes paid by existent companies account for a much 
higher value.  
In the face of these values it is difficult to see in what companies the deferral would have a 
higher impact. If, for the failed companies the value seems only account for a small 
percentage of the negative results, on the existing companies side, it seems that a smaller 
value accounts for a higher percentage of the net income. So, it is difficult to distinguish what 
companies would benefit the most, but what is observable is that all companies tend to gain 
with the deferral, some more than others depending on each case. 
In total terms (considering all the taxes paid and all the net incomes), it can be seen that the 
savings will represent between 7,17 p.p. to 9,29 p.p per year, with the average per year of 
8,15 p.p. This average does not include the SMART Advertising company because it did not 
paid any taxes nor does social charge therefore its inclusion would be biasing the results. 
The main finding in percentage speaking terms is that the deferral of the CIT and SC would 
represent a financing of 8,15 p.p. per year of the net income, which is already a considerable 
value40. 
                                                          
40
 In Dr. Banha’s opinion, this value is an interesting value which can be used as a stimulus for the Portuguese 
to create their own business as well (see interview 2 in Appendix 2). 
Year 1 Year 2 Total Year 1 Year 2 Total
MTB 11.585,06 €          16.666,67 €  28.251,73 € 10,72% 7,02% 8,18%
OON 30.424,95 €          -  €            30.424,95 € 7,22% 0,00% 7,22%
SATELLITE -  €                    19.223,98 €  19.223,98 € 0,00% 6,00% 6,00%
SMART ADVERTISING -  €                    -  €            -  €            0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
MOVE 4.771,61 €            6.886,13 €    11.657,74 € 26,99% 9,04% 12,42%
WIDESCOPE 3.338,87 €            1.540,16 €    4.879,03 €   86,90% 307,90% 112,35%
LUFTHAFEN 1.200,63 €            1.876,32 €    3.076,95 €   87,42% 17,08% 24,89%
51.321,12 €          46.193,26 €  97.514,38 € 9,29% 7,17% 8,15%
Savings by Company per Year
(CIT + SC) Savings
Existent Companies
Total
(CIT + SC) Savings (%)
Failed Companies
Companies
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But, would this value of 8,15 p.p. of the net income, if deferred, be determinant for a firm’s 
survival? This is an important question that has no direct answer, being dependent from case 
to case and would require the implementation of the model to be answered, but undoubtedly 
it is another source of funding (without interest attached) that the companies would have at 
their disposal, effortless. 
Trying to understand until where taxes can be held responsible for a firm’s failure and some 
other important indicators of the Portuguese reality two surveys were made (see Appendix 4 
for detailed information about these surveys) with the interviews also comprising some 
specificities related with this subject. 
In the opinion of Dr. José Silva Jorge, taxes are not the main cause of failure among 
companies but instead the market acceptance is. Still, he recognized that taxes could indeed 
increase the time of a company in the marketplace and therefore being able to understand 
their clients better, adapting their offer accordingly and consequently increase their chances 
of survival. 
Dr. Banha’s opinion also does not recognize taxes as the main cause of failure but instead, 
Dr. Banha points four main causes of failure being the market acceptance, the management 
team, financing issues and the size of the Portuguese market. The financing issues are 
mentioned as a cause of failure and accordingly to what was previously seen, taxes could 
indeed act as a source of funding. 
The surveys made (that are divided in an open survey and a survey to entrepreneurs) show 
some interesting results. For this specific issue, only the first survey (displayed on appendix 
4, survey 1) has useful data.  
Question 5, from survey 1, asked the respondents to rate from 1 (very important) to 5 (less 
important) the five causes of failure presented, with these being “competition, taxes, high 
costs, low sales and lack of knowledge/expertise”. The results demonstrate that taxes are in 
the third position (with the average value of 2,74) which shows that the entrepreneurs of this 
sample consider taxes as an important cause of failure of their company. Moreover 10 
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considered that this cause was very important, an equal value to the one that stayed in the 
first place as the main cause of failure. 
This main cause of failure is occupied by the “low sales”, which corroborates what was 
referred by Dr. Jorge and Dr. Banha that the market acceptance plays the main role on a 
firm’s survival. 
Question 6 and 7 aimed to understand if with the deferral of the CIT and SC, the company 
would have had more time to implement itself in the marketplace and survived/expanded.  
The answers on question 6 show that almost 2/3 of the validated sample agreed that the 
company would had survived with more time. Regarding the answers on question 7, it is 
seen once again that more than 2/3 of the respondents agreed that the deferral of the taxes 
would help the company survive. 
The interviews and the survey made do corroborate the initial predictions, showing that 
although the taxes in question are not crucial nor the main cause of failure of the companies, 
they still play an important on the company’s survival. 
A conclusion that can be easily derived is that, more than the contribution for the firms’ 
survival, this deferral might act as an incentive for people to start their own business and 
engage in the entrepreneurial activity (so important for the economic development of a 
country). This hypothesis emerged from the obvious verification that not paying any taxes 
while starting a business could be more than enough to encourage people to do it. 
A hypothesis confirmed by Dr. Banha that even considered it as a positive discrimination41 
for those who engage in entrepreneurial activities (having to bear the associated risk) and 
should be rewarded by it. Dr. José also recognizes that more than an advantage for the 
companies this model would be an incentive for the people to start their own business. 
The second survey, targeted to the general public, does confirm this hypothesis as well. From 
the sample collected, 82,19 p.p. admitted that intend to created their own business one day, 
                                                          
41
 A positive discrimination is a set of “policies and practices which favour groups (mainly ethnic groups and 
women) who have historically experienced disadvantages (usually in the fields of employment and education)” 
(Dictionary of Sociology, Positive discrimination, 2012) (98). 
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but 83,56 p.p. consider it is risky to start it in Portugal with 60,27 p.p. considering that that 
risk is a real inhibitor for that creation to succeed. This means that most of the people do 
have the desire to engage in entrepreneurial activities but the risk associated is a factor that 
inhibits them of doing so.  
More clear is the recognition that the deferral of the CIT and SC would indeed be an 
incentive for the creation of a new businesses, with 84,93 p.p. sharing this opinion, an 
undoubtedly proof that this model might be used as an incentive for the fostering of 
entrepreneurship. 
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Evidences from the Model 
The Risk 
The risk could eventually be divided and analyzed separately between the risk for the state 
and the risk for the companies, but like mentioned before, the companies have nothing to 
lose with this model and so they have no risk associated. 
Therefore, the only risk to be considered is the risk for the state and like it was previously 
seen, the risk will be basically the possibility of tax default by the failed companies. Still, this 
risk is reduced, not only because in a seven year period the possible loss on average per year 
is of 250.267.742, 20 € but because the possible gains more than surpass the risk of loss. 
To better understand what is the actual level of risk for the state, knowing that the cost 
would at the most be equal to 250.267.742,20€, a value close to the line of credit created for 
SMEs, announced by Carlos Oliveira (the Portuguese secretary of state for entrepreneurship) 
which was set at 190.000.000,00€ and lower than the reinforcement made by the state in the 
insurance of credit lines for exportation, valued at 400.000.000,00€, both incorporated in the 
NSRF program (Dinheiro Vivo, Empresas, 2012) (52). 
Recently42, the Portuguese Government announced the creation of a fund to help the 
companies that are in difficulties due to the economic crisis, solve their credit problems. This 
program created to “revitalize the companies” (in Portuguese, Programa de Revitalização 
das Empresas) comprises a total of 220.000.000,00€, a value really close to what was needed 
to implement the model of tax deferral (Diário Notícias, 2012) (53). 
This, besides confirming the recognition by the state that the SMEs already need some extra 
support, also shows that the eventual losses in taxation the state might have are not high in 
comparison to the ones already spent in programs supporting SMEs.43 
The idea of low risk is corroborated by Dr. José Silva Jorge and Dr. Banha who both agreed 
that the risk is reduced and even mentioned that the state has more to win than to loose. This 
                                                          
42
 The information was disclosed on the 20
th
 of May of 2012. 
43
 Notice that this point of view does not intend to defend that the programs within the NSRF should be 
substituted by this model but that the possible cost of the model is close to the costs of the programs already 
defined within the NSRF. 
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happens because even if the companies do not contribute directly for the CIT and SC, they 
are indirectly contributing for the economy, through the creation of jobs, acquisition of goods 
and services that will also increase the tax revenue (from VAT for example) that otherwise 




Although confirmed that the risk is reduced for the state, it still might not be sufficient for 
creating the necessary incentive to be implemented (especially in times of crisis where the 
budget availability is scarce).  
Nevertheless, the evidence collected refute this possibility. Firstly and once again Dr. José 
Silva Jorge and Dr. Francisco Banha agreed that there is incentive for the state because in a 
similar reasoning as for the risk, if the state does not do nothing it will not gain nothing 
while the model will be contributing indirectly for the economic development and for the 
increase in revenues of other taxes as well. 
This reasoning can be done for example, when considering the costs of unemployment 
resultant of the failure of the companies. Considering that the failure of companies will 
increase the unemployment levels that for its turn will increase the subsidy costs borne by 
the state and reduce the income level of the workers, there will be a decrease in consumption 
and consequently a decrease in the taxation revenues of the government.  
These findings can lead to the opposite reasoning, that if the state abdicates of some part of 
the taxation revenues charged to the companies in their initials years of existence, then those 
companies could eventually survive, maintain more jobs, which would allow the 
unemployment costs not to increase nor affect the buying power of consumers, resulting in 
an increased taxation revenue for the state in the medium/long term. Exactly what was 
mentioned by Dr. Jorge and Dr. Banha, but seen in a macroeconomic perspective where 
many other entities directly or indirectly benefit from the startups’ survival which in the end 
will be converted in benefits for the state.  
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Another incentive for the state is the incentive a model like this could have on the 
individuals. Like it was mentioned before, the deferral of taxes reduces the risk of starting a 
new business which could eventually result in the creation of new businesses by whom 
otherwise wouldn’t do it due to the inherent risk.  
This reasoning briefly resumes what the state have to gain in opposition to what it might 
lose, justifying the existence of a real incentive to the implementation of a model of tax 
deferral. 
For the startups the incentive to adhere to the model is unquestionable since they do not 
have the minimum possibility of being prejudiced in any manner and the tax deferral is a 
clear way of being favored. Besides, the startups have the possibility of not deferring their 
taxes, being that way in the same situation they were. 
So, there are clear incentives for the implementation of this model of tax deferral with all the 
intervenient (state, companies, individuals and the society as a whole) having something to 
gain with it. 
 
The Benefits 
For the startups the benefits are many, beginning with the incentive for entrepreneurs to 
start a business that wouldn’t be started otherwise, lowering the risk and maybe solving the 
problem noticed by Valente (2011) (41) where the Portuguese entrepreneurs only bet on low 
risk business. The possibility of deferring the CIT and SC will obviously smooth the financial 
pressure acting as another source of funding (without interest) and therefore being able to 
eventually survive or even expand.  
Other indirect benefits can be noticed such as the maintenance of the working force, the 
possibility to acquire new equipment, among others directly related with the company but 
there are also benefits to be extracted from a better financial liquidity such as the 
engagement on other actions like exportations, technological development and eventually 
increased brand value (nationally and internationally) and many other related benefits. 
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The benefits for the state will be related with the benefits associated with the firms’ survival 
and although the state might have to abdicate of part of the revenues prevenient from the 
CIT and SC in the first years it is expected that this initial loss will be more than 
compensated from the increase of revenues from other sources and also the future revenues 
of CIT and SC. 
There is also a decrease in the costs of unemployment which benefits the state as well. The 
referred positive discrimination will create incentive for the creation of new companies 
among entrepreneurs which will foster the economic development along with survival of the 
startups. 
Economically the state will also benefit with the fostering of the companies, having less 
dependency from the outside, less importations and eventually less debt. 
Bureaucratically, the benefits are also relevant. Currently the Portuguese government has 
acknowledged the necessity and interest in supporting SMEs through the creation of funds 
to support them (like with NSRF). But the evidence shows that the funds to do so are created 
and operated as they always were, firstly through the need of application by the companies 
and only after these are possible granted access to the fund, which increases the bureaucracy 
and complexity of the fund and also will not comprise all the companies that might have the 
necessity for support. With this model startups are allowed to keep the tax amounts that they 
otherwise would have to pay. Therefore, there is a simplicity benefit adjacent to this model.  
Nonetheless, what typically happens in these cases is that after receiving the taxes the state 
will create funds to help the companies and only then the most promising ones will be 
helped, leaving the ones with difficulties the same way. For example, the SMEs credit line 
created within the scope of the NSRF states clearly that for the companies being eligible, they 
must have their fiscal and social security situations regularized (IAPMEI, 2010) (54). With 
this model all the companies would receive the help no matter their current state. This is a 
benefit if seen in the perspective that there is no relocation of the subsidies with these 
remaining with the companies being only dependent on their capabilities to survive, 
otherwise other companies might receive help instead, interfering with the natural course of 
the economy. 
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For the society (which will also impact the state), benefits related with less crime, less 
manifestations and better life quality might arise, among others.  
Overall, knowing the risks, the benefits and the existence of incentives to create this model, 
apparently there are enough reasons for it to be implemented and all the intervenient tend to 
gain with it, having a very reduced or even no risk. 
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Conclusions 
Summary 
This study aimed to understand what would be the impact of a model of tax deferral within 
the Portuguese context, from two perspectives, on the startups’ and on the government side. 
It was proposed a model of tax deferral and its outcome was assessed. However, more than 
this assessment, the study allowed a comprehensive understanding of the startups and their 
environment.  
Starting by understanding what a startup is, it was rapidly seen that they play a vital role in 
every country and that nowadays, more than ever, entrepreneurship is embedded within the 
concept of startup, with the recognition that entrepreneurship is crucial for the economic 
development. 
Other than entrepreneurship, it was seen that bankruptcy is a concept associated with 
startups, with these fading at a fast rate during their initial years of existence, many due to 
inadequate financial resources and lack of funding. This notion of inadequate financial 
resources along with the evidence that taxes have economic effects corroborated the initial 
assumptions that tax deferral could indeed be used as a source of funding.  
Moreover, within the Portuguese context, it was seen that, with a decreasing FDI, a 
demographic scenario where the consumption will be reduced, where the unemployment, 
the failure of companies, the increasing taxes and the difficulties accessing credit are a 
reality, all indicators tend to be favorable to the improved support of startups. 
The application of the model validated its relevance, important contributions for the 
companies and little risk for the state being the main findings. In other words, it was 
confirmed that startups would benefit with the model and although not necessarily crucial 
for their survival, the deferral of taxes might have its importance. For the state, the risk 
would be reduced and it has more to win than to lose since, more than the possible gain with 
the survival of companies there are many other related benefits. The state does not only gain 
in future taxes but also on increased consumption by companies and individuals (that don’t 
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get fired and loose buying power) and gain from less subsidy costs, among other sources of 
benefits. 
Another important finding is that this model could also be used as an incentive for the 
creation of new companies by individuals that otherwise wouldn’t consider it due to the 
inherent risk which is, this way, lowered. 
The tendency verified in the Portuguese governments is of engagement in initiatives to 
support the companies, which confirms the necessity and interest in creating conditions for 
these to survive. Nevertheless the evidence shows that the ways created are the same as 
always, which are bureaucratic and based on criteria that will ultimately exclude some of the 
companies that also need support. With the model of tax deferral proposed, this does not 
happen, since there isn’t a significant increase in bureaucracy and all startups are meant to be 
beneficiaries of this model. 
The application of a model such as this one would certainly impact the enterprise sector, 
hopefully in a positive manner, contributing for the establishment of favorable environment 
for the creation of new startups and their survival. Nonetheless it would certainly be a 
controversial issue, criticized by the existing companies that don’t fit the model, by the 
opposition parties that wouldn’t conceive the idea of possible loss of tax revenues and 
probably from some individuals and entities.  
Therefore, knowing the risks, the incentive and the benefits, the posing question is related to 
whether or not there is or will be a government that attempts to implement a model of tax 
deferral such as this one that certainly would create a new paradigm within the Portuguese 
enterprise sector. 
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Limitations 
Although intend to comprise all the relevant aspects and be as detailed as possible, this 
dissertation faced some limitations that conditioned its development, namely: 
 Lack of previous studies and theoretical reasoning 
 Lack of detached information regarding startups and inconsistency across different 
sources of information 
 Limited sample of real companies and information from these 
The first limitation was felt at the beginning of the study, with the difficulty in finding 
previous studies. The topic in analysis seemed not to be covered in the past academic 
literature, therefore the development of the model of tax deferral was made from basis 
without no similar source for ideas or comparison. Within this lack of information, there was 
also a lack of theoretical background for the study. Being a practical model, there was not 
much theory to be used or developed. Moreover and once again for being practical, the 
model is difficult to be study in a general context, since its significance and importance are 
dependent on the reality of each country and the situation of the companies. 
When searching for data and information regarding the startups in Portugal, the difficulties 
and limitations found were many. On general terms these could be categorized into two, the 
lack of detached information, being extremely difficult to find information regarding only 
startups (usually the data found was referent to the all companies) and some inconsistence 
found between different sources regarding the same information. The methods used to 
diminish these asymmetries and inconsistencies are explained in the appendixes but were in 
general the use of the most reliable sources and the use of assumptions based on the average 
of past data. 
The application of the model to the companies was made using real data. Nevertheless this 
data was, in some cases incomplete and, more than that, it was only applied to seven 
companies, a very small sample when comparing to the number of existent companies, 
which must necessarily be recognized as a significant limitation of the study. 
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Future Research 
Regarding the future research, some recommendations will obviously be based on the 
limitations recognized above in order to diminish their impact on future studies, while 
others will be made in order to expand the scope of the study. 
Some of the main limitations were related with the lack of data, of previous studies and of 
detached information. About these there isn’t much to be done since they are dependent on 
external factors. However, the search for similar practices outside Portugal could be 
important to find a source of comparison. 
Concerning the sample size of real companies, there is space for improvement and increasing 
the sample to a more significant number is a clear recommendation for future researches. 
The calculation of the model was made according to three different scenarios made under 
different assumptions. Future researches could incorporate more scenarios with different 
assumptions, this way more possibilities could be assessed and lower the uncertainty 
regarding the impact of the model for the state. 
For future researches, other possibilities could rely on the alteration of the eligibility criteria, 
understanding if there were any benefits for the companies and the state with the change. 
For example, studying the application of the model only to companies financed with venture 
capital or, in the other hand, the application of the model to all the companies in difficulties.  
Other than the eligibility criteria, another interesting development of the study would be to 
analyze if an increase of the years of deferral would have any impact on the firms’ survival 
as so as a change in the repayment method. 
In short, the future studies could focus on: 
 Investigate similar practices outside Portugal 
 Increase the real companies’ sample size 
 Increase the simulation of scenarios under different assumptions 
 Estimate the impact of different eligibility criteria 
 Assess the impact of increasing the years of deferral and the impact of a different 
repayment method.  
Portuguese Startups: Benefits and Consequences of a Model of Tax Deferral 
 
 
CATÓLICA-LISBON School of Business & Economics                     Page 67 
by Pedro Filipe Abreu 
Exhibits 
Appendix 1 - Figures 
Figure 1 – Firms’ Sources of Finance 
Source: (Berger & Udell, 1998) (2) 
  
Firm Continuum and Sources of Finance
Source: Berger & Udell (1998)
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Figure 2 – Measures to be taken by European Governments to stimulate attractiveness 
Source: (Ernst & Young , 2011) (30) 
 
Figure 3 – FDI in Percentage of GDP in Europe and Portugal 
Source: (Ernst & Young, 2011) (31) 
 
Lower taxation 34%
Lower labor costs 28% 28%
Support small and medium enterprises 21% 21%
Support high-tech industries and innovation 16% 16%
Relax competition rules 12% 12%
Invest in major infrastructure and urban projects 10% 10%
Facilitate access to credit 9% 9%
Encourage environmental policies and attitudes 6% 6%
Support Sstruggling industries 6% 6%
Set up the same rules in general and regarding the tax system 3% 3%
Relax labor laws 2% 2%
Support for the euro 1% 1%
Reduce bureaucracy 1% 1%
Stabilize the political environment 1% 1%
Encourage education 1% 1%
Focus on research and development 1% 1%
Other 3% 3%
Can't say 5% 5%
What measures should be taken by European governments to stimulate European 
attractiveness?
Source: Ernst & Young's European Attractiveness Survey (2011)
Portugal
FDI in % of GDP in Europe and Portugal per Year
Europe
Source: Ernst & Young's Portuguese Attractiveness Survey (20 1)
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Figure 4 - Measures to be taken by the Portuguese Government to stimulate growth 
Source: (Ernst & Young, 2011) (31) 
 
Figure 5 – Total Population in Portugal 
Source: (PORDATA, 2011) (55) 
 
Figure 6 –Population in Portugal by Age 
Source: (PORDATA, 2011) (56) 
 
Support small and medium enterprises 33%
Lower taxation 31% 31%
Support high-tech industries and innovation 24% 24%
Facilitate access to credit 19% 19%
Invest in major infrastructure and urban projects 13% 13%
Encourage education 12% 12%
Lower labor costs 10% 10%
Relax competition rules 6% 6%
Support Sstruggling industries 6% 6%
Stabilize the political environment 6% 6%
Relax labor laws 6% 6%
Other 3% 3%
Can't say 4% 4%
What measures should be taken by the Portuguese government to stimulate growth on the 
following two years ?
Source: Ernst & Young's Portuguese Attractiveness Survey (2011)
Source: PORDATA, População residente: total e por sexo - Portugal (2011)
Total Population in Portugal per Year (in units)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010









Absolut Value Percentage Absolut Value Percentage Absolut Value Percentage
2000  10.225.836          1.647.677   16,11%        6.922.078   67,69%        1.656.082   16,20%
2001  10.292.999          1.640.418   15,94%        6.959.653   67,62%        1.692.929   16,45%
2002  10.368.403          1.642.957   15,85%        7.003.390   67,55%        1.722.057   16,61%
2003  10.441.075          1.647.375   15,78%        7.045.232   67,48%        1.748.469   16,75%
2004  10.501.970          1.648.217   15,69%        7.077.786   67,39%        1.775.968   16,91%
2005  10.549.424          1.645.834   15,60%        7.103.270   67,33%        1.800.320   17,07%
2006  10.584.344          1.640.934   15,50%        7.124.051   67,31%        1.819.359   17,19%
2007  10.608.335          1.633.245   15,40%        7.135.867   67,27%        1.839.224   17,34%
2008  10.622.413          1.625.922   15,31%        7.134.471   67,16%        1.862.020   17,53%
2009  10.632.482          1.619.804   15,23%        7.124.997   67,01%        1.887.681   17,75%
2010  10.637.346          1.612.176   15,16%        7.108.866   66,83%        1.916.305   18,01%
Source: PORDATA, População residente: total e por grupo etário  - Portugal (2011)
Year
Total Population in Portugal by Age per Year (in units)
Total
0-14 15-64 65 +
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Figure 7 – Total Population in Portugal by Gender 
Source: (PORDATA, 2011) (55) 
 
Figure 8 – Economically Active Population in Portugal 
Source: (PORDATA, 2012) (57) 
 
Figure 9 – Unemployment Rate in Portugal and Europe 
Source: (PORDATA, 2012) (58) ; (Eurostat, 2012) (59) 
Absolut Value Percentage Absolut Value Percentage
2000  10.225.800          4.934.500   48,26%        5.291.400   51,75%
2001  10.293.000          4.969.800   48,28%        5.323.200   51,72%
2002  10.368.400          5.009.600   48,32%        5.358.800   51,68%
2003  10.441.100          5.048.300   48,35%        5.392.800   51,65%
2004  10.502.000          5.080.300   48,37%        5.421.600   51,62%
2005  10.549.400          5.105.000   48,39%        5.444.400   51,61%
2006  10.584.300          5.122.800   48,40%        5.461.500   51,60%
2007  10.608.300          5.134.400   48,40%        5.474.000   51,60%
2008  10.622.400          5.140.700   48,39%        5.481.700   51,61%
2009  10.632.500          5.145.400   48,39%        5.487.100   51,61%
2010  10.637.300          5.147.400   48,39%        5.489.900   51,61%
Total Population in Portugal by Gender per Year (in units)
Source: PORDATA, População residente: total e por sexo - Portugal (2011)
Year Total
WomenMen
Absolut Value Percentage Absolut Value Percentage
2000    5.226.400        2.854.500   54,62%      2.371.900   45,38%
2001    5.325.200        2.901.300   54,48%      2.423.900   45,52%
2002    5.407.800        2.937.800   54,33%      2.470.000   45,67%
2003    5.460.300        2.947.900   53,99%      2.512.300   46,01%
2004    5.487.800        2.957.000   53,88%      2.530.800   46,12%
2005    5.544.900        2.963.500   53,45%      2.581.300   46,55%
2006    5.587.300        2.984.400   53,41%      2.602.900   46,59%
2007    5.618.300        2.986.000   53,15%      2.632.200   46,85%
2008    5.624.900        2.991.400   53,18%      2.633.400   46,82%
2009    5.582.700        2.948.900   52,82%      2.633.900   47,18%
2010    5.580.700        2.931.800   52,53%      2.648.900   47,47%
Source: PORDATA, População activa: total e por sexo - Portugal (2012)
Year
Economically Active Population in Portugal by Gender per Year (in units)
Total
Men Women
Source (for Portugal): PORDATA,  Taxa de desemprego: total e por sexo (%) - Portugal (2012)
Source (for Europe): Eurostat, Unemployment Statistics (2012)
Unemployment Rate in Portugal and Europe per Year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Portugal 3,90% 4,00% 5,00% 6,30% 6,70% 7,60% 7,70% 8,00% 7,60% 9,50% 10,80% 12,70%
EU - 27 8,70% 8,50% 8,90% 9,00% 9,10% 9,00% 8,20% 7,20% 7,20% 9,00% 9,60%
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Figure 10 - Unemployment in Portugal 
Source: (PORDATA, 2012) (60) 
 
Figure 11 – Portuguese GDP per capita 
Source: (PORDATA, 2012) (61) 
 
Figure 12 – Inflation Rate in Portugal and Europe 
Source: (Triami Media BV, 2012) (62) (Triami Media BV, 2012) (63) 
Absolut Value Percentage Absolut Value Percentage
2000       205.500              89.300   43,45%          116.200   56,55%
2001       213.500              91.600   42,90%          122.000   57,14%
2002       270.500            121.400   44,88%          149.100   55,12%
2003       342.300            160.900   47,01%          181.400   52,99%
2004       365.000            172.900   47,37%          192.200   52,66%
2005       422.300            198.100   46,91%          224.100   53,07%
2006       427.800            194.800   45,54%          233.100   54,49%
2007       448.600            196.800   43,87%          251.800   56,13%
2008       427.100            194.300   45,49%          232.700   54,48%
2009       528.600            261.300   49,43%          267.400   50,59%
2010       602.600            287.300   47,68%          315.300   52,32%
Source: PORDATA, População desempregada: total e por sexo - Portugal (2012)
Unemployment in Portugal by Gender per Year (in units)
Year Total
Men Women
Source: PORDATA, PIB e rendimentos per capita em Portugal (2012)
Portuguese GDP per Capita per Year (in units €)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010











Source (Portugal): Triami Media BV, Historic harmonised inflation Portugal (2012) 
Source (Europe): Triami Media BV, Historic harmonised inflation Europe (2012)
Inflation Rate in Portugal and Europe per Year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Portugal 2,80% 4,41% 3,68% 3,27% 2,51% 2,13% 3,05% 2,42% 2,66% -0,90% 1,39% 3,56%
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Figure 13- Existent Companies in Portugal 




Figure 14 – Portuguese Government’s Sources of Revenues 




2 -  This value was calculated based on the average of the two preceding years
Existent Companies in Portugal per Year (in units)
1 - Because the sample was limited to October of 2009, this value was proportinally changed to incorporate the 
number of new companies created (displayed on the previous table)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 (1) 2010 (2)












Source: PORDATA, Receitas do Estado: execução orçamental (2011)
Portuguese Government's Sources of Revenues
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Direct Taxes 11.316,20 € 11.337,60 € 11.897,90 € 11.255,10 € 11.307,90 € 11.519,20 € 12.610,50 € 14.763,10 € 15.305,30 € 13.489,40 € 13.569,20 € 
Indirect Taxes 14.373,30 € 14.842,90 € 16.611,00 € 17.338,10 € 17.074,50 € 18.916,50 € 20.016,20 € 20.875,20 € 20.291,00 € 17.163,60 € 18.720,50 € 
Other Taxes 1.252,50 € 1.530,70 € 1.786,40 € 2.057,00 € 2.312,70 € 1.762,70 € 2.480,20 € 2.806,00 € 2.884,60 € 3.145,70 € 2.904,70 € 
Liabilities 10.289,20 € 15.604,40 € 21.310,00 € 34.357,30 € 38.026,40 € 54.735,10 € 57.245,80 € 91.134,60 € 91.986,80 € 87.936,60 € 131.801,90
Others 4.535,60 € 2.050,10 € 2.953,90 € 1.031,10 € 1.989,40 € 1.163,40 € 2.359,60 € 2.494,70 € 2.375,50 € 1.027,60 € 1.915,20 € 
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Figure 15 – Rates for the 30 Year Generic Portuguese Government Bond 
Source: (Bloomberg Finance L.P., 2012) (66) 
 
Figure 16 - Rates for the 10 Year Generic Portuguese Government Bond 
Source: (Bloomberg Finance L.P., 2012) (67) 
 
Figure 17 - Rates for the 5 Year Generic Portuguese Government Bond 
Source: (Bloomberg Finance L.P., 2012) (68) 
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., GSPT30YR Index (2012)
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Figure 18 – Portuguese Failed Companies 




Figure 19 – World’s Bank Ease of Doing Business Rank 
Source: (The World Bank, 2011) (39) 
Portuguese Failed Companies per Year (in units)
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Figure 20 – Forbes’ Best Countries for Business Rank 
Source: (Forbes, 2011) (40) 
 
Figure 21 – Startups Creation in Portugal 
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Figure 22 – Rate of Startups Creation Growth in Portugal 
Source: (PORDATA, 2011) (70) 
 
Figure 23 – Portuguese Startups Survival Rate 
Source: (INE, 2011) (71) 
 
Figure 24 – Portuguese Companies Credit Usage 
Source: (AIP-CE, 2009, p. 2) (72) 
Source: PORDATA, Sociedades constituídas: total e por sector de actividade económica principal (2011)
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Figure 25 – Portuguese Companies Difficulties Accessing Credit 
Source: (AIP-CE, 2009, p. 5) (72) 
 
Figure 26 – Portuguese Companies Credit Necessity 
Source: (AIP-CE, 2009, p. 9) (72) 
 
Figure 27 – Evaluation of the Portuguese Companies Financial Situation 
Source: (AIP-CE, 2009, p. 10) (72) 
Source: AIP-CE, Inquérito ao Crédito, p. 9 (2009)
Portuguese Companies Credit Necessity in 2009 (against 2008)
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Figure 28 – World’s Bank Getting Credit Rank 
Source: (The World Bank, 2011) (39) 
 
Figure 29 – Uncertainty Aoidance Rank 
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Figure 30 – FORTUNE’s Who in the world is entrepreneurial Rank 
Source: (Fortune Small Business, 2007) (44) 
 
Figure 31 – Deferral Scenarios 
 
The previous table tries to illustrate possible scenarios of the startups on their initial two years of 
activity. 
The table shows various ranges of tax base44 values of the startups, the correspondent tax and the net 
income remaining. What is seen is that an acceptable maximum value of the tax base would be 100.000 
€ (range in green), because in one year period the company would have a net profit of 75.000 € a 
considerable value that should guarantee the company’s survival and where an extra 25.000 € (that 
would be saved by the tax) are not that relevant. 
It should be clear that the notion in here is tax base, not taxable profit, business volume or any other 
type of measurement. This notion is extremely important because the tax base already comprises the 
possible deferral of negative results that lower the company’s tax base. Therefore, a company is 
excluded of the deferral benefit if at least in one of the initial two years it has a tax base value equal or 
higher than 100.000 €.  
                                                          
44
 Tax base is “the assessed value of a set of assets, investments or income streams that is subject to taxation, 
or the assessed value of a single asset that is subject to taxation. Anything that can be taxed has a tax base”. 
(Investopedia ULC., 2012) (99) 
Tax Base <0€ [0€-100€] [100€-500€] [500€-1.000€] [1.000€-5.000€] [5.000€-10.000€] [10.000€-50.000€] [50.000€-100.000€] [100.000€-250.000€] [250.000€-500.000€] [500.000€-1.000.000€]
Income Tax 0 € 0€-25€ 25€-125€ 125€-250€ 250€-1.250€ 1.250€-2.500€ 2.500€-12.500€ 12.500€-25.000€ 25.000€-62.500€ 62.500€-125.000€ 125.000€-250.000€
Net Income 0 € 0€-75€ 75€-375€ 375€-750€ 750€-3.750€ 3.750€-7.500€ 7.500€-37.500€ 37.500€-75.000€ 75.000€-187.500€ 187.500€-375.000€ 375.000€-750.000€
Income Tax 2 Years 0 € 0€-50€ 50€-250€ 250€-500€ 500€-2.500€ 2.500€-5.000€ 5.000€-25.000€ 25.000€-50.000€ 50.000€-125.000€ 125.000€-250.000€ 250.000€-500.000€
Net Income 2 Years 0 € 0€-150€ 150€-750€ 750€-1.500€ 1.500€-7.500€ 7.500€-15.000€ 15.000€-75.000€ 75.000€-150.000€ 150.000€-375.000€ 375.000€-750.000€ 750.000€-1.500.000€
Deferral Scenarios
Rank Country Score
1 New Zealand 2.03




6 Hong Kong, China 1.86





















FORTUNE'S Who in the world 
is entrepreneurial Rank
Source: FORTUNE Small Business, 
Who in the world is entrepreneurial? 
(2007)
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Appendix 2 - Interviews 
Interview 1 - Interview with Dr. José Silva Jorge 
 
Previous note: Dr. José Silva Jorge is an ‚experienced Tax Consulting Professional specialized in Corporate 
Taxation (including indirect taxes relevant for corporations)‛ his areas of expertise are Tax planning, 
Accounting, Tax compliance and Mergers & Acquisitions (LinkedIn, 2012) (74). 
 
Dr. José Silva Jorge’s opinion about a model of tax deferral 
The following notes were transcript after a recorded semi-structured45 interview made to Dr. José Silva 
Jorge. The meeting took place on the 10th of April of 2012 in Mazar’s office, comprising many topics 
and lasting for 1 hour and 8 minutes with Portuguese being the spoken language. Because of that and 
in order to establish a precise line of though I will adapt the content of the interview without 
jeopardizing the reasoning of Dr. José Silva Jorge. 
The topics set for discussion were related with the scope of this thesis, being the deferral of taxes, the 
survival of the startups, the role of the government supporting the startups and other subjects related 
with these. 
After the initial greetings and thanks I started by introducing the thesis theme reporting the problem 
verified by the evidence that the deferral of the Corporate Income Tax in startups with no profits was 
not meaningful because they already have that tax deferred. Therefore I asked him what the 
possibility of deferring Social Charges was and if it was legal to which he answered that in a legal 
point of view no, it was not possible. It would oblige to create some kind of legislation to do that but 
there are already some kind of incentives where companies do not need to pay the social security of 
their workers in special cases such as first job or unemployed workers. 
He then added that deferring the Social Charges does make sense and even more sense would be 
probably the exemption instead of just a deferral because with the deferral the state would be creating 
an expected income that might not be received in the future if the companies did not survived but 
always limiting these incentives with a maximum plafond allowed regarding the companies’ profits. 
In here Dr. José Silva Jorge also suggested a mixed mechanism where not all the companies should be 
completely exempted from paying the Social Charges and some might pay a percentage (for example, 
50 p.p.) which would be a fairer solution.  
For the company side, Dr. José Silva Jorge noticed that in legal terms, what is happening in Portugal is 
that some companies in difficulties do not even pay the salary to the workers or the Social Charges. 
This happens because if the firm does pay the salary but not the Social Charges to the state then the 
firm is incurring in a crime, while if it does not pay anything (neither salary nor Social Charges) there 
is no criminal activity once it simply has not been processed yet. 
Back to the Corporate Income Tax, Dr. José Silva Jorge indeed considered the idea of a deferral of this 
tax could be an incentive that already exists in some countries. Once again he suggested that the 
model would have to have a limit, a plafond according to the companies’ profits and it should be only 
applied to ‚genuine startups‛, this is, the startups created by individuals and not by other companies 
for the reason that it would give liberty for some companies, specially big multinationals to create this 
companies and spread their profits among them in order to do not pay any taxes.  
For the state the impact would be reduced because in most cases the companies do not show positive 
results and already do not pay this tax, in fact he pointed, that the reporting of negative results could 
                                                          
45
 The interview is considered semi-structured because although there was a guideline pre-determined, the 
answers were open which could originate new questions not defined earlier. This concept will also be applied 
on the second interview.  
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be done for a five year period (for example, a company with negative results in the first year could 
continue to operate with negative results until the sixth year). 
Nevertheless Dr. José mentioned that there is another tax that is charged at the third year of reporting 
negative results. The tax is called Special Payment on Account (in Portuguese, Pagamento Especial 
por Conta) and is charged at 1 p.p. of the business volume of that year with a maximum of 70.000 € 
payable per year. This tax can be deduced from future profits and is aimed to fight artificial 
companies that are maintained only for heritage purposes. 
I then introduced the CIT range of values (see figure 31 in appendix 1) asking if it makes sense to have 
a deferral model for higher profits. Dr. José referred the situation of CIT where previously the profits 
were taxed at a 12,5 p.p. rate until 12.500 € and after that, the difference taxed at 25 p.p. in Dr. Jose´s 
opinion this mechanism was wrongly created because it was implemented equally for all the 
companies. For example a company with a 100.000.000,00 € in profits would pay a tax of 12,5 p.p. out 
of the initial 12.500,00 € and 25 p.p. out of the remaining. This means that the overall percentage paid 
would tend to be of 25 p.p., with the difference of the two taxes being almost irrelevant in this case. 
While a small company with profits of 25.000,00 € would pay 12,5 p.p. on the initial and 25 p.p. on the 
remaining resulting in a huge discrepancy of proportional values when comparing to the previously 
big company, this is, the tax of 12,5 p.p. is indifferent for the big company while the 25 p.p. make a 
huge impact in the small company. What Dr. José recommended is that the mixed tax should be used 
for lower profits and a fixed tax for companies with higher profits, which would help smaller 
companies with lower profits and even more if there was an initial exemption from the CIT for smaller 
companies. 
Introducing the possibility of “manipulating” the taxable profits, I asked if that would weaken the 
model of tax deferral. Dr. José replied stating that it is relative, to “manipulate” the profit there are 
two ways, by the amortizations or through costs.  
In what concerns the amortizations, the possibility is to amortize the good faster or slower, which will 
affect the profits (for example, a good can be amortized in three years and be used for eight). In fact, 
there are some countries already giving incentives to this and Portugal already have some incentives 
as well but there are some other countries more aggressive, like United Kingdom for example. 
On the costs side, there is a limited scope, because the costs are incurred when they have to be with 
most companies trying to do a “matching” this is, to incur in expenses when they receive the income. 
But what happens in many cases is that the company has to incur in expenses first to receive the 
money later (for example, a software company might need to develop the product first and only after 
receive the payment), which gives space for some manipulation reporting high expense at the end of 
the year and low expenses at the time of receiving the payment, for example. But, like Dr. José said 
‚these manipulations are against the law, which does not mean that they do not happen but can only be 
discovered after an investigation and not all companies are investigated‛.  
Dr. José introduced another possibility, related with the VAT, he noticed although the VAT was a 
neutral tax, many capital based companies needed to invest higher amounts in acquiring goods and 
materials for doing business, paying the correspondent VAT, which is deductible when the company 
starts selling their goods and/or services but what happens is that the period after the investment until 
starting the business, might not be so reduced, with the firm having some capital tied up until being 
able to get it back. Although there are mechanisms to ask for the reimbursement before deduct it from 
sales, it is a very slow process with a maximum plafond and many companies do not do it. It is in this 
sense that in Dr. José’s opinion there is here the possibility for introducing a tax deferral as well. 
The next step of the meeting was characterized by some specific questions I made related with the 
effects of the model. 
First, concerning the government, if in the current Portuguese situation, does it have the incentive to 
apply measures like these? Dr. José noticed that the problem was not in the incentive of the state but if 
there was any margin in the state budget to do it but in fact that concern was a fallacy because most of 
the companies in difficulties are not generating profits and therefore not paying taxes already, with 
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the model acting as more of an incentive for the persons to engage in entrepreneurial activities than 
for the companies to take advantage of it. In his words, “the reality is if the state does not do anything 
what does it gain in taxes? Nothing, because the companies are already not paying those taxes. And if it does 
give these incentives what does it gain? The state gains a lot, it will gain in VAT, in more Social Charges, and it 
will reduce unemployment which reduces the unemployment subsidy, among others‛. 
He continued ‚The risk for the state is reduced because it already does not receive the tax in many cases. These 
are strong arguments because it will indirectly affect other sources of taxes that otherwise wouldn’t appear. The 
Irish reality is a good example, where even with the bailout and the consequent restrictions on the economy, they 
struggled to maintain a fixed CIT tax at 12,5 p.p. for smaller and bigger companies acting as an incentive for 
companies to keep their businesses there which wouldn’t probably happen with an increase of the taxes. Which is 
in contrast to what happens in Portugal that increased the CIT and it is relevant even for bigger companies 
because these companies create a lot of smaller businesses dependent on their core business and therefore have a 
bigger effect on the economy‛. 
I then asked the possibility of the implemented firms feel that this incentive would be somewhat a 
distortion on the competition and try to act against it. Dr. José replied that it is not an illegal 
competition because the big companies are not competing against small companies but with other big 
companies (for example the three big phone operators will not compete against a startup, they 
compete amongst themselves). What could in fact happen is an illegal competition among countries 
specially within the European Union, but it is already regulated by the European Commission.  
The following question was directly aimed to know Dr. José’s personal opinion on why does the 
startups fail? He answered that in his opinion it is not related with the tax itself, but with the market, 
the companies being able or not to satisfy the needs of the market. 
I let him know what I found in the Literature Review that tells us that companies do not fail for being 
young but for not creating value. And based on this I asked that if with more time gained with the tax 
saved the companies would be able to survive more? In Dr, Josés words, “yes, if they had more time and 
resources the companies would be able to adapt to the market. In many cases the companies before entering the 
market do not have the capacity to understand what customers want while bigger companies have greater 
capacities and better access to reach that kind of information thanks to their size and resources availability. There 
could be some mismatch with the product and consumer, especially for smaller companies while bigger ones have 
higher facilities in adapting the product, to study and understand the consumer.‛ 
Dr. José suggested that startups should be supported by the big companies, which is a lack in the 
Portuguese enterprise sector. Big companies would gain through complementarity or could absorb 
them into their operations. Also in exportations, smaller companies have several difficulties going 
abroad on their own, they need networking and bigger companies have the possibility to provide it. 
He pointed precisely that many startups might fail because of being alone. 
Another aspect noticed by Dr. José is that the Portuguese culture does not accept failure. “Who fails 
once is marked. But failure is normal, like while learning to walk, we fall many times until start walking. In 
Portugal people are marked at the first failure, while it should be given opportunities to whom who fail, because 
we learn with the mistakes. Doing different is incurring in mistakes, doing always the same does not lead us to 
mistake‛. 
Finally, I expressed some doubts about the five companies analyzed, more speficially what might be 
the reasons for the values of the CIT of those companies. The explanation given was different 
according to the company but the reasons were based in the Autonomous Taxation (in Portuguese, 
Tributações Autónomas), another tax introduced in order to tribute expenses (usually this tax is 10 
p.p.) such automobile transportation, expenses with representations like lunches with clients and 
kilometers paid for the staff with dislocations made on their own automobile, because these types of 
expenses can be forms of disguised salary payment – known as fringe benefits and this way there is no 
tax avoidance.  
With no more subjects to be discussed I thanked Dr. José for his time and concluded the interview. 
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Interview 2 - Interview with Dr. Francisco Banha 
 
Previous note: Dr. Francisco Banha is a Portuguese expert in entrepreneurship, founder and president 
of FNABA46 being ‚an unquestioned reference in the Portuguese enterprising environment‛ with ‚a solid 
management academic background and two published books on the venture capital subject, Francisco Banha 
continues to influence many young entrepreneurs and to support them in raising venture capital for their 
projects‛. His areas of expertise are fund raising, venture capital, business management, 
entrepreneurship and accounting (LinkedIn, 2012) (75). 
 
Dr. Francisco Banha’s opinion about a model of tax deferral 
The following notes were also transcript after a recorded semi-structured interview made to Dr. 
Francisco Banha. The meeting took place on the 1st of May in Gesbanha’s headquarters, comprising 
many topics and lasting for 42 minutes with Portuguese being the spoken language. Because of that 
and in order to establish a precise line of though I will adapt the content of the interview without 
jeopardizing the reasoning of Dr. Francisco Banha. 
The topics set for discussion were the same as the previous interview and related with the scope of 
this thesis, being the deferral of taxes, the survival of the startups, the role of the government 
supporting the startups and others subjects related with these. 
Dr. Francisco Banha was already aware of the subject of my thesis once I have reached him by e-mail 
asking for information for my thesis. Therefore I started by asking him if it made sense, the companies 
being able to defer their taxes on the first two years of activity or if it should be more years.  
Dr. Francisco Banha replied stating that by his experience on the first two years the startups don’t 
have positive results, which would somehow compromise the pertinence of the deferral of the CIT but 
for the SC indeed it made sense and that two years also makes sense because it already provides 
enough insights if the company will have or not the conditions to survive. 
Having this established I asked about the method of repayment, if it makes sense for the companies to 
repay the taxes from the third year on at a rate of 25 p.p. per year. Dr. Banha totally agreed, stating 
that it was a good model and that by his experience companies tend to do not pay the CIT on the first 
years and that the opportunity of deferral will remain mostly on the deferral of the social security 
charges because the personal income tax is not charged at the company but to the employees, with the 
companies only retaining its value, acting only as an intermediary. Clarifying the social charges rubric 
that appears on the income statement is only referent to the social security and the insurance of the 
employees. 
After, I asked if, based on Dr. Banha’s experience, the taxes had any weight on the failure of the 
startups. On his opinion, if the startups could be exempted from the social charges for a two year 
period it would make sense but regarding the failure it does not play a significant role because the CIT 
is already possible to defer. While, according to Dr. Banha, the common causes of failure are firstly (on 
the startups of opportunity and not of necessity47) the market acceptance (because its new concepts 
that might not be accepted by the market), secondly the management team (that might not have the 
necessary knowledge to implement the business successfully), thirdly the capital structure of the 
                                                          
46
 FNABA (in Portuguese Federação Nacional de Associações de Business Angels) is a Portuguese federation 
that plays a “key role in the Portuguese entrepreneurship ecosystem adding management knowledge and 
experience, direct access to the international network of Business Angels and open doors for the commercial 
development of new projects” (FNABA, 2010) (100). 
47
 Dr. Francisco Banha divided the startups in opportunity startups which are startups created with the goal of 
fulfilling an opportunity or the introduction of an innovation that tends to be disruptive and necessity startups 
which are created out of necessity and typically created as a replication of an existing successful business (for 
example, restaurants, hairdressers, etc). This concept is similar to the one described on the Literature Review 
under the Entrepreneurship topic. 
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company and financing issues (that in many cases face liquidity problems) and fourthly the dimension 
of the Portuguese market that although is good as an early adopter market is small when trying to 
increase the scale which forces the companies to go outside (that is not always feasible).  
I asked, based on my calculations, if the deferral of 7 to 8 p.p. per year of the net income would be 
relevant for the companies. Dr. Francisco Banha considers it an interesting value, which can be used as 
an incentive, a stimulus for the Portuguese to create their own business, acting as a positive 
discrimination for who engages in entrepreneurship (those who creates their own business deserve to 
be compensated by the risk taken). 
Based on the possible indirect costs for the state and the society, I asked what other costs the failure of 
startups could bring. Dr. Banha was very clear pointing the demonstration effect as the other possible 
cost for the society and the state in general. By this demonstration effect Dr. Banha considers the effect 
that especially for entrepreneurs, other companies have. If companies fail but others succeed, there 
could be a replication by other entrepreneurs trying to achieve that success, for example ‚in 2004 and 
2005 there about 56 startups created by venture capital, but after 2005 until 2012 there were no companies 
created by venture capital but one, in 2007. While in 2004 as there were investment, youngsters in many areas, 
especially scientific ones, began to apply to venture capital funds in a clear demonstration effect‛. This 
demonstration effect is supposed to be a virtuous cycle but if most of the companies fail the 
demonstration effect will be negative, with no one having the courage to create a business. On other 
words, this demonstration effect would be an inhibitor of entrepreneurship. 
In terms of funding, I asked if it is difficult for the startups to received bank credit. Once again, Dr. 
Banha divided between opportunity startups and necessity startups. The innovative businesses have 
indeed more difficulties accessing credit from the banks because they are considered more risky, being 
forced to used venture capital, business angel or other entrepreneurial funds. In the business models 
replicated the access to bank credit is easier as long as there is a strong management team behind 
typically with experience in the area, because if not, then the access to that credit will also be difficult. 
Regarding the taxable base defined on figure 31 appendix 1, I asked if, in Dr. Banha’s opinion it would 
make sense to limit the companies eligible to defer their taxes at a maximum of 100.000,00€ of taxable 
base. In Dr. Banha’s opinion that value is interesting and reasonable and in fact if the companies have 
that value of taxable base then they theoretically already have the conditions to survive. 
In this sense, based on Dr. José Silva Jorge’s opinion, I asked if Dr. Francisco Banha agreed that the 
companies eligible for this deferral should also be limited to be genuine startups and not startups 
created by other companies. An argument that Dr. Banha totally agreed on. 
Based on previous conversations, Dr. Banha had told me that he though this deferral would make 
more sense applied to startups financed by venture capital only because these would be the truly 
innovative startups. I asked him if he still shared this opinion knowing that the other companies 
created also contributed for employment and could eventually achieve more success than those 
startups financed by VC. Dr. Banha clarified that he thinks that indeed all companies should be 
covered by this model of deferral but if that is not possible (for state restrictions, etc) than the startups 
financed by VC should be the primary focus of that model “because these are innovative businesses with 
the potential to go international and truly create value‛. 
Regarding the possibility of an unfair competition, Dr. Banha stated that is an argument validating his 
position defending that the deferral should primary focus on the startups financed by VC because 
these are innovative companies that will create new markets where there is no competition using as an 
example the concept created by A Vida é Bela48. 
This led to the question if Dr. Banha knew about other similar models in other countries to this model 
of deferral. The answer was no, but he stated that it should not be a limitation to its implementation 
just because it is not done elsewhere. In his words, ‚if it is interesting, it should be applied‛. 
                                                          
48
 A Vida é Bela is a Portuguese company that created a new concept in Portugal based on the 
commercialization of experiences through gift certificates being present in Portugal, Brasil, Spain and Italy.(A 
Vida é Bela , 2009) (104). Its volume of business in 2011 was of 50 million euros (Diário de Notícias, 2012) (105). 
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The following question was to understand if the government has any incentive to create this model on 
the current crisis and cut of expenses environment that we live in. Dr. Banha said that there is 
incentive, with entrepreneurship the creation of new businesses there will be always capital 
movement, the companies have to acquire new equipment, have to pay for employees, electricity, 
water, etc. and this movement of capital is better for the state because all these transactions are taxable 
which means that there is money going in as well.  
The final question was related with the risk for the state not receiving some of the deferred taxes. Dr. 
Banha said that the state always wins, has nothing to lose because those companies were doing 
something: employing workers that otherwise would be receiving unemployment subsidies, there is 
acquisition of goods and services, there is value creation and the state benefits with all this. Also, the 
main goal of the companies is to provide services or products and the taxes are only indirect revenue 
of the companies to the state. Moreover Dr. Banha recognized that, ‚in Portugal there are no role models 
on entrepreneurship like there is on football and other areas, no one wants to create their business in Portugal 
because they are afraid of doing so but everyone wants to be a famous footballer‛ which could be attenuated 
by incentives to entrepreneurship. To finalize, Dr. Banha gave the example of the United States where 
NASA49 is obliged to have part of its budget spent in startups which creates an incentive for the 
startups to develop products and sell them to NASA, while in Portugal there is not a favorable 
environment for startup creation and people only want to invest in successful businesses. 
  
                                                          
49
 The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) “is the agency of the United States government 
that is responsible for the nation's civilian space program and for aeronautics and aerospace research. Since 
February 2006, NASA's mission statement has been to pioneer the future in space exploration, scientific 
discovery and aeronautics research” (Wikipedia, 2012) (106). 
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Appendix 3 – The Model of Tax Deferral Explained 
Part 1 – The Basis for the Model 
This third appendix is meant to explain in detail the calculation process of the model. The use of tables 
will be constant and every detail of the model is meant to be addressed. The final goal is to assess, 
under three different scenarios, the expected CIT and SC to be received by the government as well as 
the impact that the deferral might have on the unemployment and buying power. 
There will be 6 parts, one for each matter (CIT, SC, UC and LBP), a resumed part and the sixth part 
being the application to real companies. The current is meant to be an introduction and where the 
basis for the model are explained. 
The model is comprised in a 7 year period, from 2004 to 2010 whatever the issue it covers. The reason 
for the model did not started in a previous year remains in the fact that the data available is restricted 
and would oblige to make more assumptions that would eventually distort the model even more. 
Predictions could be made to assess the incoming years but the goal was to evaluate the impact it 
might have on the government side and past data is more viable than predictive data. Moreover, the 
period in study already allows the reaching of some conclusions. 
One characteristic of this model is that it is based on real data in order to be as reliable as possible. 
Nevertheless it was constructed with limited access to information, because typically there is no 
information solo regarding startups but mostly about companies as a whole. These limitations forced 
the model to be constructed under several assumptions that indeed affect its final output, but all the 
efforts were made to keep the model as reliable as possible. 
The first 4 tables are the basis of the models, after these initials tables I will start by explaining the 
model for the CIT (part 2), then the model for the SC (part 3), the impact the tax deferral on the 
unemployment and loss of buying power (parts 4) and finally a resumed situation (part 5) and the real 
startups cases (part 6). 
Once these have been explained, I will focus on the agglomerated results and see their impact. 
 
The basis for the model: 
 
The first steps of the model were based on the gathering of information that will be crucial for the 
future calculations. 
The first step was to assess the number of companies created on the Portuguese territory. Table 10 




Source: (PORDATA, 2011) (70) 
 
The second step was to find the same information regarding the existent companies. Table 11 displays 
this information, with already some assumptions being made as explained on the notes. 
 
Year Total 2009 Variation
2004  23.556   -8,96%
2005  22.059   -14,75%
2006  25.651   -0,87%
2007  28.911   11,73%
2008  29.657   14,62%
2009  25.875   0,00%
2010  28.001   8,22%
Companies Created
Source: PORDATA, Sociedades 
constituídas: total e por sector de 
actividade económica principal 
(2011)
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Table 11 
 
Source: (Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeamento (GEP), 2011, p. 7) (64) 
 




Source: (PORDATA, 2011) (69) 
 
Table 13 shows the survival and failure rate of the Portuguese companies from 2004 to 2010. Like it 
was already explained, the survival rate is the percentage of remaining companies out of the ones 
created two years earlier. The failure rate on the other hand gives us the percentage of companies that 




Source: (INE, 2011) (71) 
 
These four tables will be used as the basis of the model, comprising crucial data for the future 
calculations.  
Year Total 2009 Variation
2004  300.850   -16,28%
2005  328.230   -8,66%
2006  330.967   -7,90%
2007  341.720   -4,90%
2008  343.663   -4,36%
2009 (1)  359.341   0,00%
2010 (2)  351.502   -2,18%
1 - Because the sample was limited to October of 
2009, this value was proportinally changed to 
incorporate the number of new companies created 
(displayed on the previous table)
2 -  This value was calculated based on the average 
of the two preceding years
Existent Companies
Year Total
% of Existing 
Companies
2004       13.365   4,44%
2005       15.464   4,71%
2006         8.712   2,63%
2007       11.889   3,48%
2008       41.248   12,00%
2009       30.135   8,39%
2010       21.878   6,22%
Companies Dissolved
Source: PORDATA, Sociedades dissolvidas: 











* the values were calculated based on the average 
of the two preceding or proceeding years
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Part 2 - Model for the CIT, Government Side 
Now, the data for the CIT model starts with the total CIT received by the government from 2004 to 




Source: (PORDATA, 2011) (65) 
 
Instituto Nacional de Estatística (2011) (76) gives us the CIT by company age and size (measured in 
number of employees – a concept that will remain constant for the rest of the model), with the 
percentage being easily calculated over the total, giving the following distribution of values (table 15), 
with some assumptions being made for some of the years, but always based on the average of the 
preceding or proceeding years. 
 
Table 15 
Source: (INE, 2011) (76) 
 
Table 16 displays the number of companies distributed by age and size (once again measured in 
number of employees) in 2009. These values were referent to period until October 2009 and so in order 
to align them with the evidence from the companies created in 2009 (table 10) the values were 
adjusted, but always maintaining the proportionality among the companies with less than one year. 
There is a row named “ignored” that accounts for some ignored companies from the sample that was 
extracted from the sources this way and therefore was maintained for this study as well, nevertheless 
its value tends to be very small, not influencing significantly the model (for 2009 it represents 0,35% of 
the total). 
This distribution was only available for the year of 2009. For the rest of the years, it had to be deduced. 
From now on and until the finish of this reasoning the tables will look similar and the row where the 
year in question is displayed will be followed by the letters of the alphabet just to reinforce the logical 
steps that were taken – the goal is to reach the tables “C” and “D” for each year (except for 2009 that is 
represented by the tables “B” and “C”), that will display the percentage of and the number of 
companies existent respectively. 
 
Year Total
2004    3.891.800.000,00 € 
2005    3.721.300.000,00 € 
2006    4.333.000.000,00 € 
2007    5.689.400.000,00 € 
2008    5.952.000.000,00 € 
2009    4.540.300.000,00 € 
2010    4.591.600.000,00 € 
Source: PORDATA, Receitas do 
Estado: execução orçamental 
(2011)
CIT Received by the 
Government
Size / Year 2010* 2009 2008 2007 2006* 2005* 2004*
< 10 26,62% 27,16% 26,08% 28,13% 27,11% 27,62% 27,36%
10 to 49 18,87% 20,08% 17,66% 18,19% 17,92% 18,06% 17,99%
50 to 249 19,22% 18,24% 20,19% 18,03% 19,11% 18,57% 18,84%
> 250 35,29% 34,52% 36,07% 35,65% 35,86% 35,75% 35,81%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
CIT Payed by Size (%)
* the values were calculated based on the average of the two preceding or proceeding years
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Table 16 
 
Source: (Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeamento (GEP), 2011, p. 80) (77) 
 
Table 17 shows the situation already changed, where we can see that the number of companies with 
less than one year is already equal to the number of the table 10. This also increases the total number 




The next step was to calculate the percentage of the total of each cell in the table, with the result being 
displayed on table 18. These percentages were the main goal in this phase once they will be crucial on 
the following developments of the model. The following calculations will be focusing on the same 




For 2010 (and also for the remaining years), the only data available was the total of companies by size, 




Age / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL %
< 1 Year 15.524      725        98         4       16.351      4,67%
1 to 4 Years 71.689      5.788      602        75     78.154      22,34%
5 to 9 Years 73.436      8.506      841        110    82.893      23,70%
10 to 19 Years 77.297      13.202    1.765     290    92.554      26,46%
20 to 49 Years 55.600      13.068    2.760     323    71.751      20,51%
> 50 Years 4.120        1.853      793        127    6.893        1,97%
Ignored 1.201        19          -         1       1.221        0,35%
TOTAL 298.867    43.161    6.859     930    349.817    100,00%
% 85,44% 12,34% 1,96% 0,27% 100,00%
Number of Companies by Age and Size (in units)
2009 - A
Source: Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeamento, Quadros de Pessoal 2009, p. 80 (2011)
Age / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL %
< 1 Year 24.566      1.147      155        6       25.875      7,20%
1 to 4 Years 71.689      5.788      602        75     78.154      21,75%
5 to 9 Years 73.436      8.506      841        110    82.893      23,07%
10 to 19 Years 77.297      13.202    1.765     290    92.554      25,76%
20 to 49 Years 55.600      13.068    2.760     323    71.751      19,97%
> 50 Years 4.120        1.853      793        127    6.893        1,92%
Ignored 1.201        19          -         1       1.221        0,34%
TOTAL 307.909    43.583    6.916     932    359.341    100,00%
% 85,69% 12,13% 1,92% 0,26% 100,00%
2009 - B
Number of Companies by Age and Size (in units)
Age / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 7,98% 2,63% 2,24% 0,68%
1 to 4 Years 23,28% 13,28% 8,70% 8,04%
5 to 9 Years 23,85% 19,52% 12,16% 11,80%
10 to 19 Years 25,10% 30,29% 25,52% 31,10%
20 to 49 Years 18,06% 29,98% 39,91% 34,64%
> 50 Years 1,34% 4,25% 11,47% 13,62%
Ignored 0,39% 0,04% 0,00% 0,11%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100%
Number of Companies by Age and Size (%)
2009 - C
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Table 19 
 
Knowing the percentage distribution for 2009, the calculations for 2010 were made as following: 
From table 10, we can see that the new companies created increased by 8,22% in relation to the 
year of 2009 while the existing companies (in table 11) decreased by 2,18%. This means that 
there was an increase in the number of companies with less than one year but an average 
decrease on the remaining ones. 
From table 17, we have that the percentage of companies with less than one year in 2009 was 
7,20%, increasing in 2010 to 7,79% (0,0720*(1+0,0822)) with the remaining companies 
accounting for 92,80%. 
So we have the following equation: 0,0720*(1+0,0822) + 0,928*(1+X) = 1*(1+(-0,0218)), this 
means that 7,20% of companies (the ones with less than one year) increased by 8,22% plus the 
remaining companies (92,80%) that increased or decreased by a value represented by X. Each 
will be equal to the total variation of -2,18%. The answer trying to be found is that given the 
variation of the created companies, and the total variation of the companies by how much did 
the older companies varied. 
By solving it, we’ll have X+1 = 0,9701 and X = -0,0299, meaning that for an increase of the new 
companies in 8,22% the remaining number of companies have to drop by 2,99% so that the 
overall decrease is equal to the decrease of the existing companies (2,18%), giving the 




These results are in percentage of the values of 2009 and that is why the total values never reach 100%. 
To correct this situation it was used a simple rule, called the rule of three50, and the final percentages 






                                                          
50
 The rule of three is “a shorthand version for a particular form of cross multiplication, often taught to students 
by rote” and cross multiplication is “In mathematics, specifically in elementary arithmetic and elementary 
algebra, given an equation between two fractions or rational expressions, one can cross-multiply to simplify the 
equation or determine the value of a variable” (Wikipedia, 2012) (107). 
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
TOTAL 300.153    43.539    6.878     932    351.502    
% 85,39% 12,39% 1,96% 0,27% 100,00%
Number of Companies by Size (in units)
2010 - A
Age / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 8,63% 2,85% 2,43% 0,73%
1 to 4 Years 22,59% 12,88% 8,44% 7,80%
5 to 9 Years 23,14% 18,93% 11,80% 11,45%
10 to 19 Years 24,35% 29,39% 24,76% 30,18%
20 to 49 Years 17,52% 29,09% 38,71% 33,61%
> 50 Years 1,30% 4,12% 11,12% 13,21%
Ignored 0,38% 0,04% 0,00% 0,10%
TOTAL 98% 97% 97% 97%
Number of Companies by Age and Size (%)
2010 - B
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Table 21 
 
Finally, to conclude the reasoning for this year, it was made an easy multiplication with the values of 
table 21 times the values of the table 19. It is understandable that for example the companies with less 
than one year and less than 10 employees with the value of 8,82% will be multiplied by the total value 
of the companies with less than 10 employees (300.153), while for example the companies with 1 to 4 
years and more than 250 employees (8,04%) will be multiplied by the total value of the companies 
with more than 250 employees (932). That is why for the first example the number is of 26.469 and for 
the second example the number is 75. These multiplications will lower the bias in the model once they 




The method used for 2010 will be the same for the following years, with the year of 2009 used as the 
basis for any calculation. Once the logic is the equal, I will only introduce the tables and the calculus 
without the need to explain the same again. 
 




Using the variations from table 10 and 11, we have the information about the companies created 
(14,62%) and the change in existent companies (-4,36%), which will lead to the following equation: 
0,0720*(1+0,1462) + 0,928*(1+X) = 1*(1+(-0,0436)), with X+1 = 0,9416 and X = -0,0584. The table 24, shows 




Age / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 8,82% 2,93% 2,49% 0,76%
1 to 4 Years 23,07% 13,24% 8,68% 8,04%
5 to 9 Years 23,63% 19,46% 12,13% 11,79%
10 to 19 Years 24,87% 30,20% 25,45% 31,08%
20 to 49 Years 17,89% 29,89% 39,80% 34,62%
> 50 Years 1,33% 4,24% 11,44% 13,61%
Ignored 0,39% 0,04% 0,00% 0,11%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100%
Number of Companies by Age and Size (%)
2010 - C
Age / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 26.469      1.275      172          7       27.923      
1 to 4 Years 69.245      5.765      597          75     75.682      
5 to 9 Years 70.933      8.472      834          110    80.348      
10 to 19 Years 74.662      13.149    1.751        290    89.851      
20 to 49 Years 53.705      13.015    2.738        323    69.780      
> 50 Years 3.980        1.846      787          127    6.738        
Ignored 1.160        19          -            1       1.180        
TOTAL 300.153    43.539    6.878        932    351.502    
Number of Companies by Age and Size (in units)
2010 - D
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
TOTAL 292.397    43.495    6.840     931    343.663    
% 85,08% 12,66% 1,99% 0,27% 100,00%
Number of Companies by Size (in units)
2008 - A
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Table 24 
 




And in the end by multiplying the total values of table 23 with the correspondents in table 25, we have 








The equation used to calculate the next table will be as following: 0,0720*(1+0,1173) + 0,928*(1+X) = 
1*(1+(-0,0490)), with X+1 = 0,9381 and X = -0,0619. 
Age / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 9,14% 3,02% 2,57% 0,78%
1 to 4 Years 21,92% 12,51% 8,20% 7,57%
5 to 9 Years 22,46% 18,38% 11,45% 11,11%
10 to 19 Years 23,64% 28,52% 24,03% 29,29%
20 to 49 Years 17,00% 28,23% 37,58% 32,62%
> 50 Years 1,26% 4,00% 10,80% 12,83%
Ignored 0,37% 0,04% 0,00% 0,10%
TOTAL 96% 95% 95% 94%
Number of Companies by Age and Size (%)
2008 - B
Age / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 9,55% 3,19% 2,72% 0,83%
1 to 4 Years 22,89% 13,20% 8,66% 8,03%
5 to 9 Years 23,44% 19,41% 12,10% 11,78%
10 to 19 Years 24,68% 30,12% 25,40% 31,06%
20 to 49 Years 17,75% 29,81% 39,71% 34,59%
> 50 Years 1,32% 4,23% 11,41% 13,60%
Ignored 0,38% 0,04% 0,00% 0,11%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100%
Number of Companies by Age and Size (%)
2008 - C
Age / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 27.912      1.386      186          8       29.491      
1 to 4 Years 66.918      5.743      592          75     73.328      
5 to 9 Years 68.548      8.441      828          110    77.926      
10 to 19 Years 72.153      13.100    1.737        289    87.279      
20 to 49 Years 51.900      12.967    2.716        322    67.905      
> 50 Years 3.846        1.839      780          127    6.592        
Ignored 1.121        19          -            1       1.141        
TOTAL 292.397    43.495    6.840        931    343.663    
Number of Companies by Age and Size (in units)
2008 - D
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
TOTAL 290.281    43.815    6.700     924    341.720    
% 84,95% 12,82% 1,96% 0,27% 100,00%
Number of Companies by Size (in units)
2007 - A
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Table 28 
 












With the equation for the variation in the number of companies being: 0,0720*(1+(-0.0087)) + 
0,928*(1+X) = 1*(1+(-0,0790)), with X+1 = 0,9156 and X = -0,0844. After the necessary calculation, the 
result is given in the table 32. 
Age / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 8,91% 2,94% 2,51% 0,76%
1 to 4 Years 21,84% 12,46% 8,17% 7,55%
5 to 9 Years 22,37% 18,31% 11,41% 11,07%
10 to 19 Years 23,55% 28,41% 23,94% 29,18%
20 to 49 Years 16,94% 28,13% 37,43% 32,50%
> 50 Years 1,26% 3,99% 10,76% 12,78%
Ignored 0,37% 0,04% 0,00% 0,10%
TOTAL 95% 94% 94% 94%
Number of Companies by Age and Size (%)
2007 - B
Age / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 9,36% 3,12% 2,66% 0,81%
1 to 4 Years 22,93% 13,21% 8,67% 8,03%
5 to 9 Years 23,49% 19,42% 12,11% 11,78%
10 to 19 Years 24,73% 30,14% 25,41% 31,06%
20 to 49 Years 17,79% 29,83% 39,74% 34,60%
> 50 Years 1,32% 4,23% 11,42% 13,60%
Ignored 0,38% 0,04% 0,00% 0,11%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100%
Number of Companies by Age and Size (%)
2007 - C
Age / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 27.172      1.367      178          7       28.724      
1 to 4 Years 66.570      5.790      581          74     73.014      
5 to 9 Years 68.192      8.508      811          109    77.620      
10 to 19 Years 71.777      13.206    1.703        287    86.972      
20 to 49 Years 51.630      13.072    2.662        320    67.683      
> 50 Years 3.826        1.854      765          126    6.570        
Ignored 1.115        19          -            1       1.135        
TOTAL 290.281    43.815    6.700        924    341.720    
Number of Companies by Age and Size (in units)
2007 - D
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
TOTAL 281.420    42.174    6.469     904    330.967    
% 85,03% 12,74% 1,95% 0,27% 100,00%
Number of Companies by Size (in units)
2006 - A
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Table 32 
 









For the year of 2005, we start again with the initial table with the total number of companies displayed 





< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
TOTAL 278.726    42.241    6.353     910    328.230    
% 84,22% 12,76% 1,92% 0,27% 99,17%
Number of Companies by Size (in units)
2005 - A
Age / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 7,91% 2,61% 2,22% 0,67%
1 to 4 Years 21,32% 12,16% 7,97% 7,37%
5 to 9 Years 21,84% 17,87% 11,13% 10,80%
10 to 19 Years 22,98% 27,73% 23,37% 28,48%
20 to 49 Years 16,53% 27,45% 36,54% 31,72%
> 50 Years 1,23% 3,89% 10,50% 12,47%
Ignored 0,36% 0,04% 0,00% 0,10%
TOTAL 92% 92% 92% 92%
Number of Companies by Age and Size (%)
2006 - B
Age / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 8,58% 2,84% 2,42% 0,73%
1 to 4 Years 23,13% 13,25% 8,69% 8,04%
5 to 9 Years 23,69% 19,47% 12,14% 11,79%
10 to 19 Years 24,94% 30,23% 25,47% 31,09%
20 to 49 Years 17,94% 29,92% 39,83% 34,62%
> 50 Years 1,33% 4,24% 11,44% 13,61%
Ignored 0,39% 0,04% 0,00% 0,11%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100%
Number of Companies by Age and Size (%)
2006 - C
Age / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 24.151      1.199      157          7       25.514      
1 to 4 Years 65.092      5.589      562          73     71.315      
5 to 9 Years 66.678      8.213      785          107    75.783      
10 to 19 Years 70.184      12.747    1.648        281    84.860      
20 to 49 Years 50.483      12.618    2.577        313    65.991      
> 50 Years 3.741        1.789      740          123    6.393        
Ignored 1.090        18          -            1       1.110        
TOTAL 281.420    42.174    6.469        904    330.967    
Number of Companies by Age and Size (in units)
2006 - D
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Once again using the equation to calculate the percentage values we have: 0,0720*(1+(-0,1475) + 
0,928*(1+X) = 1*(1+(-0,0866)), with X+1 = 0,9181 and X = -0,0819. The table 36 displays all the values for 








The table 37 is the final table in terms of percentage that once multiplied by the table 35 will deliver 




Finally, for the year of 2004, the procedures will be the same. Having the initial table displayed below 
(table 39). 
 
Age / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 6,80% 2,24% 1,91% 0,58%
1 to 4 Years 21,38% 12,19% 7,99% 7,39%
5 to 9 Years 21,90% 17,92% 11,16% 10,83%
10 to 19 Years 23,05% 27,81% 23,43% 28,56%
20 to 49 Years 16,58% 27,53% 36,64% 31,81%
> 50 Years 1,23% 3,90% 10,53% 12,51%
Ignored 0,36% 0,04% 0,00% 0,10%
TOTAL 91% 92% 92% 92%
Number of Companies by Age and Size (%)
2005 - B
Age / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 7,45% 2,45% 2,09% 0,63%
1 to 4 Years 23,42% 13,31% 8,72% 8,05%
5 to 9 Years 23,99% 19,55% 12,18% 11,80%
10 to 19 Years 25,25% 30,35% 25,56% 31,12%
20 to 49 Years 18,16% 30,04% 39,97% 34,66%
> 50 Years 1,35% 4,26% 11,48% 13,63%
Ignored 0,39% 0,04% 0,00% 0,11%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100%
Number of Companies by Age and Size (%)
2005 - C
Age / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 20.767      1.034      132          6       21.940      
1 to 4 Years 65.267      5.620      554          73     71.514      
5 to 9 Years 66.857      8.260      774          107    75.998      
10 to 19 Years 70.372      12.820    1.624        283    85.099      
20 to 49 Years 50.619      12.689    2.539        315    66.163      
> 50 Years 3.751        1.799      730          124    6.404        
Ignored 1.093        18          -            1       1.113        
TOTAL 278.726    42.241    6.353        910    328.230    
Number of Companies by Age and Size (in units)
2005 - D
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Using the equation to reach the table 40, we have: 0,0720*(1+(-0,0896) + 0,928*(1+X) = 1*(1+(-0,1628)), 












Like mentioned earlier the reasoning was equal across the years and was aimed to achieve the tables 
“C” and “D” for each year that will be extremely important ahead. These tables tended to be as less 
biased as possible but always conditioned by some subjectivity. 
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
TOTAL 278.726    42.241    6.353     910    328.230    
% 84,22% 12,76% 1,92% 0,27% 99,17%
Number of Companies by Size (in units)
2004 - A
Age / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 7,26% 2,40% 2,04% 0,62%
1 to 4 Years 21,38% 12,19% 7,99% 7,39%
5 to 9 Years 21,90% 17,92% 11,16% 10,83%
10 to 19 Years 23,05% 27,81% 23,43% 28,56%
20 to 49 Years 16,58% 27,53% 36,64% 31,81%
> 50 Years 1,23% 3,90% 10,53% 12,51%
Ignored 0,36% 0,04% 0,00% 0,10%
TOTAL 92% 92% 92% 92%
Number of Companies by Age and Size (%)
2004 - B
Age / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 7,92% 2,61% 2,22% 0,67%
1 to 4 Years 23,30% 13,28% 8,71% 8,04%
5 to 9 Years 23,87% 19,52% 12,16% 11,80%
10 to 19 Years 25,12% 30,30% 25,53% 31,11%
20 to 49 Years 18,07% 29,99% 39,91% 34,65%
> 50 Years 1,34% 4,25% 11,47% 13,62%
Ignored 0,39% 0,04% 0,00% 0,11%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100%
Number of Companies by Age and Size (%)
2004 - C
Age / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 20.110      1.041      136          6       21.292      
1 to 4 Years 59.186      5.296      531          68     65.081      
5 to 9 Years 60.629      7.782      742          100    69.253      
10 to 19 Years 63.816      12.079    1.556        264    77.715      
20 to 49 Years 45.903      11.956    2.434        294    60.587      
> 50 Years 3.401        1.695      699          116    5.912        
Ignored 992          17          -            1       1.010        
TOTAL 254.038    39.866    6.097        849    300.850    
Number of Companies by Age and Size (in units)
2004 - D
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The next step in calculating the model was to match the percentage paid by each category of 
companies with the total CIT paid. 
First, using the data available in the table 15, we have the percentage paid by each segment of 
companies (by size). So, for 2010, we know that from the total CIT paid (4.591.600.000,00 € - table 14), 
26,62% was paid by the companies with less than 10 employees (table 15). We also know that from the 
companies with less than 10 employees in 2010, 8,82% are less than one year (table 21). So, from the 
4.591.600.000,00 €, 26,62% will be referent to companies with less than 10 employees and from these 
8,82% will be referent to companies with less than one year, giving us the value of 107.786.634,76 €. 




The same calculations were made for the rest of the years and the results are as following. With each 








< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 107.786.634,76 €        25.366.481,66 €          21.413.622,32 €          11.905.406,18 €          166.472.144,93 €        
1 to 4 Years 281.973.727,59 €        114.721.705,51 €        74.517.006,24 €          126.456.260,07 €        597.668.699,41 €        
5 to 9 Years 288.845.187,67 €        168.594.130,46 €        104.101.000,42 €        185.469.181,43 €        747.009.499,98 €        
10 to 19 Years 304.031.625,79 €        261.671.727,05 €        218.475.940,23 €        488.964.205,59 €        1.273.143.498,66 €     
20 to 49 Years 218.691.002,16 €        259.015.764,97 €        341.639.430,62 €        544.604.960,02 €        1.363.951.157,76 €     
> 50 Years 16.205.160,59 €          36.727.595,08 €          98.159.445,10 €          214.132.600,38 €        365.224.801,15 €        
TOTAL 1.217.533.338,56 €      866.097.404,72 €        858.306.444,93 €        1.571.532.613,67 €      4.513.469.801,89 €     
CIT by Company Age and Size (in units €)
2010
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 98.390.325,41 €          23.997.738,45 €          18.574.886,96 €          10.639.543,04 €          151.602.493,86 €        
1 to 4 Years 287.121.190,03 €        121.066.724,23 €        72.104.198,74 €          126.063.165,37 €        606.355.278,36 €        
5 to 9 Years 294.118.089,40 €        177.918.720,85 €        100.730.284,29 €        184.892.642,54 €        757.659.737,07 €        
10 to 19 Years 309.581.757,67 €        276.144.245,55 €        211.401.845,14 €        487.444.239,41 €        1.284.572.087,78 €     
20 to 49 Years 222.683.231,26 €        273.341.387,74 €        330.577.389,57 €        542.912.032,17 €        1.369.514.040,74 €     
> 50 Years 16.500.987,64 €          38.758.921,91 €          94.981.112,29 €          213.466.960,02 €        363.707.981,86 €        
TOTAL 1.228.395.581,40 €      911.227.738,72 €        828.369.717,00 €        1.565.418.582,54 €      4.533.411.619,66 €     
2009
CIT by Company Age and Size (in units €)
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 148.164.808,10 €        33.494.252,33 €          32.645.272,69 €          17.713.700,19 €          232.018.033,31 €        
1 to 4 Years 355.220.023,83 €        138.823.916,17 €        104.110.421,35 €        172.430.485,01 €        770.584.846,36 €        
5 to 9 Years 363.876.433,90 €        204.014.552,68 €        145.443.296,27 €        252.898.044,68 €        966.232.327,53 €        
10 to 19 Years 383.007.744,31 €        316.647.087,30 €        305.240.687,19 €        666.731.208,69 €        1.671.626.727,48 €     
20 to 49 Years 275.498.797,93 €        313.433.126,56 €        477.316.881,94 €        742.600.622,10 €        1.808.849.428,52 €     
> 50 Years 20.414.659,13 €          44.443.800,39 €          137.142.133,11 €        291.982.287,94 €        493.982.880,57 €        
TOTAL 1.546.182.467,19 €      1.050.856.735,43 €     1.201.898.692,56 €     2.144.356.348,61 €      5.943.294.243,78 €     
2008
CIT by Company Age and Size (in units €)
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Having achieved these results it is important to see the impact on the state. For that another effort on 
calculations is needed. The following tables will represent these effort made in order to achieve 3 
different scenarios using the deferral of CIT, plus another scenario without the deferral. These 3 cases 
will be a realistic, an optimistic and a pessimistic model like we’ll see more ahead. 
In table 50 is shown the criteria used in the calculus. The first row (new companies) comprises the 
companies with less than one year and its values can be easily seen on the tables previously calculated 
(the “D” tables). The second row can also be seen on the previous tables (from the 43th to the 49th). 
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 149.825.449,08 €        32.280.628,55 €          27.283.772,80 €          16.380.530,80 €          225.770.381,23 €        
1 to 4 Years 367.065.325,39 €        136.722.938,22 €        88.916.779,53 €          162.943.907,70 €        755.648.950,84 €        
5 to 9 Years 376.010.395,39 €        200.926.971,75 €        124.217.627,22 €        238.984.397,96 €        940.139.392,32 €        
10 to 19 Years 395.779.665,73 €        311.854.911,94 €        260.694.544,64 €        630.049.776,43 €        1.598.378.898,75 €     
20 to 49 Years 284.685.685,27 €        308.689.591,67 €        407.658.324,77 €        701.745.095,82 €        1.702.778.697,53 €     
> 50 Years 21.095.414,09 €          43.771.182,54 €          117.127.917,23 €        275.918.350,37 €        457.912.864,22 €        
TOTAL 1.594.461.934,96 €      1.034.246.224,66 €     1.025.898.966,20 €     2.026.022.059,06 €      5.680.629.184,88 €     
2007
CIT by Company Age and Size (in units €)
Age/Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 100.792.704,96 €        22.089.065,60 €          20.069.127,02 €          11.414.996,71 €          154.365.894,29 €        
1 to 4 Years 271.653.941,38 €        102.921.446,80 €        71.951.014,02 €          124.915.141,55 €        571.441.543,75 €        
5 to 9 Years 278.273.917,04 €        151.252.561,60 €        100.516.283,71 €        183.208.874,27 €        713.251.636,62 €        
10 to 19 Years 292.904.555,88 €        234.756.209,52 €        210.952.723,83 €        483.005.214,00 €        1.221.618.703,23 €     
20 to 49 Years 210.687.262,21 €        232.373.439,33 €        329.875.080,90 €        537.967.876,28 €        1.310.903.658,71 €     
> 50 Years 15.612.077,70 €          32.949.799,75 €          94.779.325,78 €          211.522.973,03 €        354.864.176,25 €        
TOTAL 1.169.924.459,18 €      776.342.522,60 €        828.143.555,25 €        1.552.035.075,84 €      4.326.445.612,87 €     
CIT by Company Age and Size (in units €)
2006
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 76.577.431,79 €          15.078.749,46 €          14.412.777,05 €          8.391.462,08 €            114.460.420,39 €        
1 to 4 Years 240.669.289,51 €        81.926.958,41 €          60.254.442,80 €          107.080.378,85 €        489.931.069,57 €        
5 to 9 Years 246.534.195,55 €        120.399.223,95 €        84.176.057,13 €          157.051.222,31 €        608.160.698,94 €        
10 to 19 Years 259.496.074,32 €        186.869.333,95 €        176.659.620,49 €        414.044.131,54 €        1.037.069.160,30 €     
20 to 49 Years 186.656.425,63 €        184.972.614,46 €        276.249.604,85 €        461.159.498,24 €        1.109.038.143,18 €     
> 50 Years 13.831.375,42 €          26.228.516,57 €          79.371.716,18 €          181.322.774,85 €        300.754.383,02 €        
TOTAL 1.023.764.792,23 €      615.475.396,81 €        691.124.218,50 €        1.329.049.467,87 €      3.659.413.875,40 €     
CIT by Company Age and Size (in units €)
2005
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 84.299.013,04 €          18.278.698,37 €          16.307.126,39 €          9.381.164,50 €            128.266.002,29 €        
1 to 4 Years 248.099.931,16 €        93.001.734,36 €          63.841.505,24 €          112.101.981,48 €        517.045.152,24 €        
5 to 9 Years 254.145.915,62 €        136.674.628,96 €        89.187.219,12 €          164.416.239,50 €        644.424.003,20 €        
10 to 19 Years 267.507.991,17 €        212.130.078,95 €        187.176.506,24 €        433.460.995,06 €        1.100.275.571,41 €     
20 to 49 Years 192.419.425,19 €        209.976.963,47 €        292.695.273,21 €        482.785.866,91 €        1.177.877.528,77 €     
> 50 Years 14.258.417,84 €          29.774.052,14 €          84.096.866,54 €          189.826.021,97 €        317.955.358,49 €        
TOTAL 1.060.730.694,00 €      699.836.156,24 €        733.304.496,74 €        1.391.972.269,42 €      3.885.843.616,40 €     
CIT by Company Age and Size (in units €)
2004
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The survival rate and failure rate on the third and fourth row are retrieved from table 13, with the 
following two rows being the same rates divided by two because in here I make the assumption that 
the survival and failure rates for one year will be half of the survival and failure rates for two years, 
which is not necessarily true but is the best approximation possible. 
The failure rate of the market (row seven) is simply the percentage of existing companies that failed 
within the year in study. This information is seen in table 12. 
The CIT variation displayed on the rows eight and nine is the result of the calculation of the increase 
or decrease in percentage of the total CIT paid by the companies with 1 to 4 years and 5 to 9 years, 
regarding the preceding year. For 2005 for example, we see that with the information provided in 
tables 48 and 49 there was a decrease in the total CIT paid by the companies with 1 to 4 years, from 
517.045.152,24€ to 489.931.069,57€, a decreased of 5,24%. The same logic was applied for the remaining 
years. This is pertinent because in 2005, the companies created in 2004 will have more than one year 
and their contribution for the total CIT will be based on the values of that category, but if the 
companies within that segment changed their overall contribution, that change should also be 
considered for the companies that entered in this segment. 
Finally, the fast growth companies rate is a constant value of 20% and will be used for the calculation 
of the optimistic model. This rate is supposed to represent an equivalent growth to the one considered 




With the previous criteria it is possible to simulate the different cases. First the “no model” situation, 
where there is no deferral of taxes and the behavior of the companies is the normal one. Table 51, 
shows this situation with the total CIT accumulated by the state from 2004 to 2010 being of 
3.041.761.882,96 €. The values present in this table are retrieved from the previous tables, except for 
the average CIT per company that is calculated by dividing the total CIT by the number of companies. 
The assumptions made in this model are that the number of companies will fail at the failure rate of 
the startups for the first two years and at the market failure rate for the remaining years.  
The CIT will also vary in the first two years according to the failure rate. On the remaining years, it 
will vary according to the CIT variation from one year to the other (rows 8 and 9 from table 50). 
These assumptions assume that for the initial years of activity the companies tend to have a higher 
variability in its CIT contribution (related with the failure rate). From the third year on it is assumed a 
higher stability as their CIT contribution will change according to the market. For the number of 
                                                          
51
 The term “gazelle” was first used by David Birch in his 1979 report named “The Job Generation Process”. By 
gazelle, Birch considers “a high-growth company that is increasing its revenues by at least 20% annually for four 
years or more, starting from a revenue base of at least $1 million. This growth pace means that the company 
has effectively doubled its revenues over a four-year period. As gazelle companies are characterized by their 
rapid growth pace, rather than their absolute size, they can range in size from small companies to very large 
enterprises” (Investopedia ULC., 2012) (101). In opposition to gazelles, Birch identified the “elephants”, very 
“large ponderous companies” that “employ thousands of people but create very few new jobs”. Also, Birch 
identified “mouse” companies as the ones “with little or no potential for generating new jobs”, typically small 
businesses owned by a single person that don’t grow much (Canada, 1998) (102). 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
New Companies (< 1 year) 21.292                   21.940                   25.514                   28.724                   29.491                   25.875                   27.923                   
CIT paid be New Companies (< 1 year) 128.266.002,29 €    114.460.420,39 €    154.365.894,29 €    225.770.381,23 €    232.018.033,31 €    151.602.493,86 €    166.472.144,93 €    
Survival Rate (2 years) 57,47% 56,25% 58,70% 53,79% 54,07% 49,36% -                         
Failure Rate New Companies (2 years) 42,53% 43,76% 41,30% 46,21% 45,93% 50,64% -                         
Failure Rate New Companies (1 year) 21,26% 21,88% 20,65% 23,11% 22,97% 25,32% -                         
Survival Rate (1 years) 78,74% 78,12% 79,35% 76,90% 77,04% 74,68% -                         
Failure Rate (Market) 4,44% 4,71% 2,63% 3,48% 12,00% 8,39% -                         
CIT Variation 1 to 4 years (%) -                         -5,24% 16,64% 32,24% 1,98% -21,31% -1,43%
CIT Variation 5 to 9 years (%) -                         -                         -                         -                         -                         -21,59% -1,41%
Fast Growth Companies Rate 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00%
Year
Criteria
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failures is used the real survival rate for the first two years and then it is also assumed that companies 




The second situation, the realistic one is displayed on table 52, already considering a deferral of taxes. 
In here the assumptions are that the tax deferral will help the companies survive therefore the failure 
of startups will always be equal to the market failure (even for the first two years).  
Regarding the CIT contribution is considered that this will change according to the change from year 
to year, for all the years. The total CIT contribution is of 4.556.950.094,64 €, a value superior to the 
previous one, but still incomplete because it does not account for the situations where there is failure 
and the deferred CIT is not paid. Also the contribution of the first two years will not be paid on the 
third and fourth years entirely but repaid for a period of 8 years, which means that by year the CIT 
contribution will be lower.  
These particulars will be taken into account and the model will be better detailed in the following 
steps, with these tables being used as the basis of that future calculation. The next years will also be 
incomplete in the same way, but completed in the following steps as well. 
 
Table 52 
CIT Contribution Companies Average CIT CIT Contribution Companies Average CIT CIT Contribution Companies Average CIT CIT Contribution Companies Average CIT
2004 128.266.002,29 €    21.292       6.024,04 €       100.991.840,23 €      16.765            6.024,04 €       73.717.678,17 €        9.635           7.650,91 €       97.480.987,82 €      9.382       10.390,74 €     
2005 -  €                       -              -  €               114.460.420,39 €      21.940            5.217,09 €       89.419.341,92 €        17.140         5.217,09 €       64.378.263,45 €      12.340     5.217,09 €       
2006 -  €                       -              -  €               -  €                         -                  -  €               154.365.894,29 €      25.514         6.050,21 €       122.489.337,12 €    20.245     6.050,21 €       
2007 -  €                       -              -  €               -  €                         -                  -  €               -  €                         -                -  €               225.770.381,23 €    28.724     7.859,88 €       
2008 -  €                       -              -  €               -  €                         -                  -  €               -  €                         -                -  €               -  €                       -            -  €               
2009 -  €                       -              -  €               -  €                         -                  -  €               -  €                         -                -  €               -  €                       -            -  €               
Total 128.266.002,29 €    21.292       6.024,04 €       215.452.260,62 €      38.704            5.620,57 €       317.502.914,37 €      52.289         6.306,07 €       510.118.969,61 €    70.691     7.379,48 €       
Cumulative CIT 128.266.002,29 €    343.718.262,91 €      661.221.177,29 €      1.171.340.146,90 €  
CIT Contribution Companies Average CIT CIT Contribution Companies Average CIT CIT Contribution Companies Average CIT
2004 99.407.763,27 €      9.055         10.978,07 €     77.949.430,63 €        7.968              9.782,46 €       76.853.714,60 €        7.300           10.527,83 €     
2005 65.650.741,91 €      11.911       5.511,98 €       51.659.040,63 €        10.481            4.928,83 €       50.932.882,17 €        9.602           5.304,38 €       
2006 90.612.779,95 €      14.977       6.050,21 €       71.301.087,31 €        13.179            5.410,12 €       70.279.635,78 €        12.074         5.820,75 €       
2007 173.606.134,65 €    22.088       7.859,88 €       121.441.888,06 €      15.451            7.859,88 €       119.702.124,95 €      14.155         8.456,46 €       
2008 232.018.033,31 €    29.491       7.867,40 €       178.735.091,96 €      22.718            7.867,40 €       125.452.150,61 €      15.946         7.867,40 €       
2009 -  €                       -              -  €               151.602.493,86 €      25.875            5.859,03 €       113.216.742,41 €      19.323         5.859,03 €       
Total 661.295.453,09 €    87.521       7.653,51 €       652.689.032,45 €      95.673            6.951,29 €       556.437.250,52 €      78.400         7.305,98 €       
Cumulative CIT 1.832.635.599,99 €  2.485.324.632,44 €   3.041.761.882,96 €   
Total CIT Contribution 3.041.761.882,96 €  
No Model (in units €)
2004 2005 2006 2007
2008 2009 2010
CIT Contribution Companies Average CIT CIT Contribution Companies Average CIT CIT Contribution Companies Average CIT CIT Contribution Companies Average CIT
2004 128.266.002,29 €    21.292       6.024,04 €       121.539.674,86 €      20.346            5.973,51 €       141.760.389,87 €      19.388         7.311,81 €       187.457.651,70 €    18.878     9.930,21 €       
2005 -  €                       -              -  €               114.460.420,39 €      21.940            5.217,09 €       133.503.350,55 €      20.906         6.385,92 €       176.538.909,15 €    20.356     8.672,75 €       
2006 -  €                       -              -  €               -  €                         -                  -  €               154.365.894,29 €      25.514         6.050,21 €       204.126.611,61 €    24.843     8.216,82 €       
2007 -  €                       -              -  €               -  €                         -                  -  €               -  €                         -                -  €               225.770.381,23 €    28.724     7.859,88 €       
2008 -  €                       -              -  €               -  €                         -                  -  €               -  €                         -                -  €               -  €                       -            -  €               
2009 -  €                       -              -  €               -  €                         -                  -  €               -  €                         -                -  €               -  €                       -            -  €               
Total 128.266.002,29 €    21.292       6.024,04 €       236.000.095,25 €      42.286            5.595,30 €       429.629.634,71 €      65.808         6.582,65 €       793.893.553,69 €    92.800     8.669,92 €       
Cumulative CIT 128.266.002,29 €    364.266.097,55 €      793.895.732,25 €      1.587.789.285,95 €  
CIT to be paid -  €                       -  €                         391.566.067,03 €      611.960.331,79 €    
CIT Contribution Companies Average CIT CIT Contribution Companies Average CIT CIT Contribution Companies Average CIT
2004 191.162.874,74 €    18.221       10.491,50 €     149.898.124,17 €      16.034            9.348,88 €       147.791.043,01 €      14.689         10.061,22 €     
2005 180.028.316,10 €    19.647       9.162,97 €       141.660.091,34 €      17.289            8.193,56 €       139.668.810,18 €      15.839         8.817,87 €       
2006 208.161.307,54 €    23.978       8.681,27 €       163.797.287,44 €      21.100            7.762,82 €       161.450.745,54 €      19.331         8.352,02 €       
2007 230.232.880,41 €    27.725       8.304,15 €       181.164.894,37 €      25.277            7.167,25 €       178.569.546,04 €      23.157         7.711,25 €       
2008 232.018.033,31 €    29.491       7.867,40 €       182.569.589,63 €      25.951            7.035,05 €       179.954.117,79 €      23.775         7.569,02 €       
2009 -  €                       -              -  €               151.602.493,86 €      25.875            5.859,03 €       149.430.653,23 €      23.705         6.303,74 €       
Total 1.041.603.412,10 €  119.062     8.901,46 €       970.692.480,81 €      131.526          7.561,10 €       956.864.915,78 €      120.496       8.135,85 €       
Cumulative CIT 2.629.392.698,05 €  3.600.085.178,86 €   4.556.950.094,64 €   
Total CIT Contribution 4.556.950.094,64 €  
Realistic Model (in units 
€)
2004 2005 2006 2007
2008 2009 2010
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Table 53 demonstrates the optimistic model. In this case it is calculated the CIT contribution as in the 
best realistic situation possible. This model is calculated using the concept of “gazelle” companies 
(considered the best performers in the marketplace). As seen before, to be considered a “gazelle” a 
company must have at least a growing rate of 20% over a five year period. This assumption will be 
used for the optimistic model and in the best possible scenario is consider that no startup would fail 
and in fact each would have its contribution to the CIT grown by 20% each year. Although it is not 
expectable that it would evidently happen, it is in a reasonable way the best scenario conceivable. 




Finally, the pessimistic model is the worst situation possible. To calculate this model we have to 
consider that the companies will not be worse than they were without a model. In this case the failure 
rate and the CIT contribution will be equal to the ones in the situation without deferral, with the only 
difference residing in the payment of the tax that is deferred. In this case the state will be harmed 
when the companies fail and do not pay the deferral in debt. This is still not accounted on table 54 but 
will be ahead. 
 
Table 54 
CIT Contribution Companies Average CIT CIT Contribution Companies Average CIT CIT Contribution Companies Average CIT CIT Contribution Companies Average CIT
2004 128.266.002,29 €    21.292       6.024,04 €       153.919.202,75 €      21.292            7.228,85 €       184.703.043,30 €      21.292         8.674,62 €       221.643.651,96 €    21.292     10.409,55 €     
2005 -  €                       -              -  €               114.460.420,39 €      21.940            5.217,09 €       137.352.504,47 €      21.940         6.260,51 €       164.823.005,36 €    21.940     7.512,61 €       
2006 -  €                       -              -  €               -  €                         -                  -  €               154.365.894,29 €      25.514         6.050,21 €       185.239.073,14 €    25.514     7.260,25 €       
2007 -  €                       -              -  €               -  €                         -                  -  €               -  €                         -                -  €               225.770.381,23 €    28.724     7.859,88 €       
2008 -  €                       -              -  €               -  €                         -                  -  €               -  €                         -                -  €               -  €                       -            -  €               
2009 -  €                       -              -  €               -  €                         -                  -  €               -  €                         -                -  €               -  €                       -            -  €               
Total 128.266.002,29 €    21.292       6.024,04 €       268.379.623,14 €      43.232            6.222,97 €       476.421.442,06 €      68.746         6.995,11 €       797.476.111,70 €    97.470     8.260,57 €       
Cumulative CIT 128.266.002,29 €    396.645.625,44 €      873.067.067,49 €      1.670.543.179,19 €  
CIT Contribution Companies Average CIT CIT Contribution Companies Average CIT CIT Contribution Companies Average CIT
2004 265.972.382,36 €    21.292       12.491,46 €     319.166.858,83 €      21.292            14.989,75 €     383.000.230,59 €      21.292         17.987,70 €     
2005 197.787.606,43 €    21.940       9.015,13 €       237.345.127,72 €      21.940            10.818,15 €     284.814.153,26 €      21.940         12.981,79 €     
2006 222.286.887,77 €    25.514       8.712,30 €       266.744.265,33 €      25.514            10.454,77 €     320.093.118,39 €      25.514         12.545,72 €     
2007 270.924.457,48 €    28.724       9.431,86 €       325.109.348,97 €      28.724            11.318,23 €     390.131.218,77 €      28.724         13.581,88 €     
2008 232.018.033,31 €    29.491       7.867,40 €       278.421.639,97 €      29.491            9.440,88 €       334.105.967,97 €      29.491         11.329,06 €     
2009 -  €                       -              -  €               151.602.493,86 €      25.875            5.859,03 €       181.922.992,63 €      25.875         7.030,84 €       
Total 1.188.989.367,35 €  126.961     9.503,63 €       1.578.389.734,68 €   152.836          10.480,14 €     1.894.067.681,62 €   152.836       12.576,16 €     
Cumulative CIT 2.859.532.546,54 €  4.437.922.281,22 €   6.331.989.962,84 €   
Total CIT Contribution 6.331.989.962,84 €  
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The next tables are the characterization of the four situations. They provide information regarding the 
CIT values paid and meant to be paid by the companies. In the end it will be possible to observe the 
impact on the state. 
For all the following tables, the values were calculated using as basis all the previous tables that were 
relevant, so there is no new data, it has just been treated and organized. 
Table 55 shows the situation without a model. The only row with values is the “CIT Year” because this 




On table 56 is displayed the realistic model. The first row, “CIT to be Received” corresponds to the tax 
deferred on the first two years of the companies’ activity. On other words, it is the CIT in debt by the 
company to the state while in activity that is amortized each year, that is why it always decreases after 
the second year. 
The second row, “CIT Deferred” corresponds to the payments of the CIT in debt. The logic of payment 
already described is implicit in here. With the payment of 25% of the value in debt of the first year 
being paid at the third year of activity and so on, until the second year of deferral is totally paid. For 
example, for the companies in activity in 2004, the values deferred would be totally paid in 2013. This 
value will be deducted each year to the “CIT to be Received”. 
The “CIT Year”, on the third row corresponds to the CIT that is meant to be and is actually paid that 
year (from the third year forward). This information is extracted from the table 52. 
The “CIT Lost” is a new value based on the number of companies failed from one year to the other  
(with less than two years) and its contribution to the CIT, calculated based on the average CIT 
contribution of the year before. For example for 2004, the average CIT was 6.024,04€ and the number 
of failed companies the difference between 21.282 and 20.346 (all displayed on table 52), which will be 
946 companies times 6.024,04€ of average CIT which gives the expected value of 5.698.105,77€.  
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
CIT to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT Year 128.266.002,29 €  100.991.840,23 €  73.717.678,17 €      97.480.987,82 €      99.407.763,27 €      77.949.430,63 €      76.853.714,60 €      654.667.417,01 €    
CIT Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT Year -  €                     114.460.420,39 €  89.419.341,92 €      64.378.263,45 €      65.650.741,91 €      51.659.040,63 €      50.932.882,17 €      436.500.690,46 €    
CIT Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT Year -  €                     -  €                     154.365.894,29 €    122.489.337,12 €    90.612.779,95 €      71.301.087,31 €      70.279.635,78 €      509.048.734,44 €    
CIT Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       225.770.381,23 €    173.606.134,65 €    121.441.888,06 €    119.702.124,95 €    640.520.528,89 €    
CIT Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       232.018.033,31 €    178.735.091,96 €    125.452.150,61 €    536.205.275,88 €    
CIT Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       151.602.493,86 €    113.216.742,41 €    264.819.236,27 €    
CIT Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
-  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
-  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
128.266.002,29 €  215.452.260,62 €  317.502.914,37 €    510.118.969,61 €    661.295.453,09 €    652.689.032,45 €    556.437.250,52 €    3.041.761.882,96 €  
-  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
128.266.002,29 €  215.452.260,62 €  317.502.914,37 €    510.118.969,61 €    661.295.453,09 €    652.689.032,45 €    556.437.250,52 €    3.041.761.882,96 €  
128.266.002,29 €  215.452.260,62 €  317.502.914,37 €    510.118.969,61 €    661.295.453,09 €    652.689.032,45 €    556.437.250,52 €    3.041.761.882,96 €  
Total Received (B+C)
Total (A+B+C-D)







Total CIT to be Received (A)
Total CIT Deferred (B)
Total CIT Year (C)
Total CIT Lost (D)
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The same logic was then applied to the rest of the model, with the total CIT received being 
3.088.839.570,03 € and the value in debt of 1.468.110.524,61€ which summed gives the total of 




The optimistic model, shown on table 57 is deduced on the same way as the realistic model but in this 
case, the model assumes no failure among companies, therefore there is not “CIT Lost”.  
The only note to refer is the difference between the total and total received that resides on the deferred 



















2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
CIT to be Received 128.266.002,29 €  249.805.677,16 €  217.739.176,59 €    185.672.676,01 €    153.606.175,44 €    121.539.674,86 €    91.154.756,15 €      91.154.756,15 €      
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     32.066.500,57 €      32.066.500,57 €      32.066.500,57 €      32.066.500,57 €      30.384.918,72 €      158.650.921,01 €    
CIT Year -  €                     -  €                     141.760.389,87 €    187.457.651,70 €    191.162.874,74 €    149.898.124,17 €    147.791.043,01 €    818.070.083,48 €    
CIT Lost 5.698.105,77 €      8.774.680,01 €      8.533.790,13 €        6.521.959,56 €        11.931.372,94 €      6.536.983,23 €        9.234.178,09 €        57.231.069,73 €      
CIT to be Received -  €                     114.460.420,39 €  247.963.770,94 €    219.348.665,84 €    190.733.560,74 €    162.118.455,65 €    133.503.350,55 €    133.503.350,55 €    
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       28.615.105,10 €      28.615.105,10 €      28.615.105,10 €      28.615.105,10 €      114.460.420,39 €    
CIT Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       176.538.909,15 €    180.028.316,10 €    141.660.091,34 €    139.668.810,18 €    637.896.126,77 €    
CIT Lost -  €                     8.263.586,06 €      8.036.727,16 €        6.142.078,58 €        7.879.701,34 €        4.332.222,57 €        6.105.961,95 €        40.760.277,65 €      
CIT to be Received -  €                     -  €                     154.365.894,29 €    358.492.505,90 €    319.901.032,33 €    281.309.558,76 €    242.718.085,19 €    242.718.085,19 €    
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       38.591.473,57 €      38.591.473,57 €      38.591.473,57 €      115.774.420,71 €    
CIT Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       208.161.307,54 €    163.797.287,44 €    161.450.745,54 €    533.409.340,52 €    
CIT Lost -  €                     -  €                     9.292.625,01 €        7.101.900,05 €        10.875.758,95 €      5.979.440,88 €        8.427.599,91 €        41.677.324,81 €      
CIT to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       225.770.381,23 €    456.003.261,64 €    399.560.666,34 €    343.118.071,03 €    343.118.071,03 €    
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       56.442.595,31 €      56.442.595,31 €      112.885.190,62 €    
CIT Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       181.164.894,37 €    178.569.546,04 €    359.734.440,41 €    
CIT Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       7.854.922,34 €        15.330.324,37 €      10.184.341,05 €      12.757.332,71 €      46.126.920,47 €      
CIT to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       232.018.033,31 €    414.587.622,94 €    356.583.114,61 €    356.583.114,61 €    
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       58.004.508,33 €      58.004.508,33 €      
CIT Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       179.954.117,79 €    179.954.117,79 €    
CIT Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       27.847.862,12 €      14.989.054,95 €      21.418.458,53 €      64.255.375,60 €      
CIT to be Received -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       151.602.493,86 €    301.033.147,08 €    301.033.147,08 €    
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       12.713.665,16 €      12.713.665,16 €      25.427.330,32 €      
128.266.002,29 €  364.266.097,55 €  620.068.841,81 €    989.284.228,98 €    1.352.262.063,47 €  1.530.718.472,40 €  1.468.110.524,61 €  1.468.110.524,61 €  
-  €                     -  €                     32.066.500,57 €      60.681.605,67 €      99.273.079,24 €      155.715.674,55 €    212.038.601,02 €    559.775.461,06 €    
-  €                     -  €                     141.760.389,87 €    363.996.560,85 €    579.352.498,38 €    636.520.397,32 €    807.434.262,56 €    2.529.064.108,97 €  
5.698.105,77 €      17.038.266,07 €    25.863.142,30 €      27.620.860,53 €      73.865.019,72 €      54.735.707,85 €      70.657.196,36 €      275.478.298,58 €    
-  €                     -  €                     173.826.890,44 €    424.678.166,52 €    678.625.577,62 €    792.236.071,87 €    1.019.472.863,58 €  3.088.839.570,03 €  
122.567.896,53 €  347.227.831,48 €  768.032.589,96 €    1.386.341.534,97 €  1.957.022.621,37 €  2.268.218.836,43 €  2.416.926.191,83 €  4.281.471.796,06 €  
Total CIT Deferred (B)
Total (A+B+C-D)
Realistic Model (in units €)







Total CIT Year (C)
Total Received (B+C)
Total CIT Lost (D)
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
CIT to be Received 128.266.002,29 €  229.257.842,53 €  197.191.341,95 €    165.124.841,38 €    133.058.340,81 €    100.991.840,23 €    75.743.880,17 €      75.743.880,17 €      
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     32.066.500,57 €      32.066.500,57 €      32.066.500,57 €      32.066.500,57 €      25.247.960,06 €      153.513.962,35 €    
CIT Year -  €                     -  €                     73.717.678,17 €      97.480.987,82 €      99.407.763,27 €      77.949.430,63 €      76.853.714,60 €      425.409.574,48 €    
CIT Lost 27.274.162,06 €    42.949.304,85 €    1.940.460,57 €        3.391.523,66 €        11.931.372,94 €      6.536.983,23 €        9.234.178,09 €        103.257.985,40 €    
CIT to be Received -  €                     114.460.420,39 €  203.879.762,31 €    175.264.657,21 €    146.649.552,11 €    118.034.447,02 €    89.419.341,92 €      89.419.341,92 €      
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       28.615.105,10 €      28.615.105,10 €      28.615.105,10 €      28.615.105,10 €      114.460.420,39 €    
CIT Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       64.378.263,45 €      65.650.741,91 €      51.659.040,63 €      50.932.882,17 €      232.620.928,16 €    
CIT Lost -  €                     25.041.078,47 €    25.041.078,47 €      2.239.825,51 €        7.879.701,34 €        4.332.222,57 €        6.105.961,95 €        70.639.868,32 €      
CIT to be Received -  €                     -  €                     154.365.894,29 €    276.855.231,40 €    238.263.757,83 €    199.672.284,26 €    161.080.810,69 €    161.080.810,69 €    
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       38.591.473,57 €      38.591.473,57 €      38.591.473,57 €      115.774.420,71 €    
CIT Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       90.612.779,95 €      71.301.087,31 €      70.279.635,78 €      232.193.503,03 €    
CIT Lost -  €                     -  €                     31.876.557,17 €      31.876.557,17 €      10.875.758,95 €      5.979.440,88 €        8.427.599,91 €        89.035.914,08 €      
CIT to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       225.770.381,23 €    399.376.515,88 €    342.933.920,57 €    286.491.325,26 €    286.491.325,26 €    
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       56.442.595,31 €      56.442.595,31 €      112.885.190,62 €    
CIT Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       121.441.888,06 €    119.702.124,95 €    241.144.013,01 €    
CIT Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       52.164.246,58 €      52.164.246,58 €      10.184.341,05 €      31.174.293,82 €      145.687.128,03 €    
CIT to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       232.018.033,31 €    178.735.091,96 €    120.730.583,63 €    120.730.583,63 €    
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       58.004.508,33 €      58.004.508,33 €      
CIT Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       125.452.150,61 €    125.452.150,61 €    
CIT Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       53.282.941,35 €      53.282.941,35 €      53.282.941,35 €      159.848.824,05 €    
CIT to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       151.602.493,86 €    264.819.236,27 €    264.819.236,27 €    
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       38.385.751,45 €      38.385.751,45 €      76.771.502,89 €      
128.266.002,29 €  343.718.262,91 €  555.436.998,55 €    732.128.717,46 €    887.065.834,32 €    652.689.032,45 €    708.039.744,38 €    708.039.744,38 €    
-  €                     -  €                     32.066.500,57 €      60.681.605,67 €      99.273.079,24 €      155.715.674,55 €    206.901.642,36 €    554.638.502,40 €    
-  €                     -  €                     73.717.678,17 €      161.859.251,27 €    255.671.285,13 €    322.351.446,63 €    443.220.508,10 €    1.256.820.169,30 €  
27.274.162,06 €    67.990.383,33 €    58.858.096,21 €      89.672.152,92 €      136.134.021,17 €    118.701.680,53 €    146.610.726,57 €    645.241.222,78 €    
-  €                     -  €                     105.784.178,74 €    222.540.856,94 €    354.944.364,37 €    478.067.121,18 €    650.122.150,47 €    1.811.458.671,69 €  
100.991.840,23 €  275.727.879,59 €  602.363.081,08 €    864.997.421,47 €    1.105.876.177,53 €  1.012.054.473,10 €  1.211.551.168,28 €  1.874.257.193,30 €  
2006
Pessimistic Model (in units €)
2004
2005






Total CIT to be Received (A)
Total CIT Deferred (B)
Total CIT Year (C)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
CIT to be Received 128.266.002,29 €  242.726.422,68 €  210.659.922,11 €    178.593.421,54 €    146.526.920,96 €    114.460.420,39 €    75.980.619,70 €      75.980.619,70 €      
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     32.066.500,57 €      32.066.500,57 €      32.066.500,57 €      32.066.500,57 €      38.479.800,69 €      166.745.802,98 €    
CIT Year -  €                     -  €                     184.703.043,30 €    221.643.651,96 €    265.972.382,36 €    319.166.858,83 €    383.000.230,59 €    1.374.486.167,05 €  
CIT Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT to be Received -  €                     153.919.202,75 €  291.271.707,22 €    262.656.602,12 €    234.041.497,03 €    205.426.391,93 €    176.811.286,83 €    176.811.286,83 €    
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       28.615.105,10 €      28.615.105,10 €      28.615.105,10 €      28.615.105,10 €      114.460.420,39 €    
CIT Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       164.823.005,36 €    197.787.606,43 €    237.345.127,72 €    284.814.153,26 €    884.769.892,77 €    
CIT Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT to be Received -  €                     -  €                     154.365.894,29 €    339.604.967,43 €    301.013.493,86 €    262.422.020,29 €    223.830.546,71 €    223.830.546,71 €    
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       38.591.473,57 €      38.591.473,57 €      38.591.473,57 €      115.774.420,71 €    
CIT Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       222.286.887,77 €    266.744.265,33 €    320.093.118,39 €    809.124.271,49 €    
CIT Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       225.770.381,23 €    496.694.838,71 €    440.252.243,40 €    383.809.648,09 €    383.809.648,09 €    
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       56.442.595,31 €      56.442.595,31 €      112.885.190,62 €    
CIT Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       325.109.348,97 €    390.131.218,77 €    715.240.567,74 €    
CIT Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       232.018.033,31 €    510.439.673,29 €    452.435.164,96 €    452.435.164,96 €    
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       58.004.508,33 €      58.004.508,33 €      
CIT Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       334.105.967,97 €    334.105.967,97 €    
CIT Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT to be Received -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       151.602.493,86 €    333.525.486,49 €    333.525.486,49 €    
CIT Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
CIT Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
128.266.002,29 €  396.645.625,44 €  656.297.523,62 €    1.006.625.372,32 €  1.410.294.783,87 €  1.684.603.243,15 €  1.646.392.752,79 €  1.646.392.752,79 €  
-  €                     -  €                     32.066.500,57 €      60.681.605,67 €      99.273.079,24 €      155.715.674,55 €    220.133.482,99 €    567.870.343,03 €    
-  €                     -  €                     184.703.043,30 €    386.466.657,32 €    686.046.876,56 €    1.148.365.600,85 €  1.712.144.688,98 €  4.117.726.867,02 €  
-  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
-  €                     -  €                     216.769.543,88 €    447.148.263,00 €    785.319.955,80 €    1.304.081.275,40 €  1.932.278.171,98 €  4.685.597.210,05 €  
128.266.002,29 €  396.645.625,44 €  873.067.067,49 €    1.453.773.635,31 €  2.195.614.739,67 €  2.988.684.518,54 €  3.578.670.924,76 €  6.331.989.962,84 €  
2008






Total CIT to be Received (A)
Total CIT Deferred (B)
Total CIT Year (C)





Finally the pessimistic model, calculated under the same logic is displayed on table 58. In here the 
“CIT Lost” will be higher and the “Total Received” lower than the other models, which was 
expectable once this is the worst scenario, where the number of companies failed is equal to the no 
model situation but with these leaving a debt equal to their CIT deferred. 
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Part 3 - Model for the SC, Government Side 
The third appendix starts with the SC received by the government. The data collected was already 




Source: (INE, 2011) (76) 
 
The second table of this third part, table 60 gives us the relation between the average of employees by 
company size and the number of companies existent on that segment, by year. For example for 2005, 
the companies comprised on the segment of 1 to 4 employees had each, on average, two employees. 
The values are constant across the years which can be explained by the fact that it is a factor not 
necessarily indexed to the year and its environment, but to the companies’ directly. 
 
Table 60 
Source: (Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeamento (GEP), 2011, p. 43) (77) 
 
Table 60 is divided by company size in different ranges than the ones used on the previous analyses. 
To maintain some consistency and allow the making of cross analyses, table 61 was calculated from 
table 60 to display the results according to the ranges used.  
The values were calculated using the average of the segments. For example, for the 2005 companies 
with less than 10 employees, we see that the multiplication made was 226.368 companies times 2 
employees plus 62.591 companies times 6 employees dividing by the sum of the number of 
companies. This way we have the average from the segments from 1 to 4 and 5 to 9 which is 
correspondent to the segment of less than 10 employees. 
The reasoning was used for the rest of the years, even for 2004 and 2010 although these were 





Companies Employees ¹Companies Employees Companies Employees Companies Employees Companies Employees Companies Employees Companies Employees
2004 ² 228.337    2 62.183     6 44.235     19 4.473       68 2.225       150 569         341 373 1.425      
2005 226.368    2 62.591     6 44.240     19 4.456       68 2.183       149 574         340 370 1418
2006 230.306    2 61.775     6 44.229     19 4.490       68 2.266       150 564         342 376 1431
2007 238.296    2 62.845     6 45.822     19 4.661       68 2.327       150 570         338 392 1451
2008 240.824    2 62.715     6 45.551     19 4.752       68 2.398       150 568         344 401 1504
2009 238.729    2 60.138     6 43.161     19 4.556       68 2.267       150 552         344 378 1518
2010 ² 239.777    2 61.427     6 44.356     19 4.654       68 2.333       150 560         344 390 1.511      
2 - the values were calculated based on the average of the two preceding or proceeding years
1 to 4
Average Workers by Company Size (in units)
Year / Size
1 - the employees columns are the average employees per company in each segment
> 500250 a 499100 to 24950 to 9910 to 495 to 9
Year / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
2004         2.300.909.704,00 € 2.350.999.437,00 €        2.264.896.135,00 €        3.348.474.011,00 €        10.265.279.287,00 €      
2005         2.420.517.961,00 €         2.487.814.260,00 € 2.291.783.710,00 €        3.402.559.867,00 €        10.602.675.798,00 €      
2006         2.165.801.158,00 € 2.465.623.925,00 €        2.336.059.570,00 €        3.640.766.131,00 €        10.608.250.784,00 €      
2007         2.277.357.007,00 € 2.549.324.790,00 €        2.470.876.917,00 €        3.608.768.236,00 €        10.906.326.950,00 €      
2008         2.337.672.884,00 € 2.643.937.892,00 €        2.590.661.626,00 €        3.857.498.739,00 €        11.429.771.141,00 €      
2009         2.269.296.191,00 € 2.531.963.069,00 €        2.506.567.899,00 €        4.032.363.678,00 €        11.340.190.837,00 €      
2010 *         2.303.484.537,50 €         2.587.950.480,50 €         2.548.614.762,50 €         3.944.931.208,50 € 11.384.980.989,00 €      
SC Received by the Government (in units €)
* the values were calculated based on the average of the two preceding or proceeding years
S rce: INE, Dados Estatísticos, Encargos sociais (€) das empresas por Actividade económica e Escalão de pessoal ao serviço (2011)
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Table 61 
 
From Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeamento (2011) (77), we can have the information displayed on 
tables 62 and 63 respectively, that give us the average gain per worker and by company size (table 62) 








(Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeamento (GEP), 2011, p. 151) (77) 
 
Trying to join both tables, we have table 64. The best approximation to reach the values displayed was 
by calculating the average of the company’s size and age.  
For example, for 2004, we have the workers from the companies with less than one year receiving each 
on average 806,38€ and for the companies with less than 10 employees receiving each employee on 
average 735,38€ (calculated by the average of the correspondent values on table 62). Summing and 
dividing by two we have the average which is 770,88€ has it is shown. 




Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeamento (2011) (64) also provides information regarding the other years 
but on this case just regarding the company’s size and not the company’s age. This will force some 
further calculation as we’ll see. 
Year / Size 1 to 4 5 to 9 10 to 49 50 to 99 100 to 249 250 a 499 > 500
2009 680,97 €     789,78 €     917,33 €     1.059,24 € 1.182,91 € 1.299,57 € 1.416,52 € 
Source: Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeamento, Quadros de Pessoal 2009, p. 144 (2011)
Average Gain per Worker/Month by Company Size (in units €)
Year / Age < 1 1 to 4 5 to 9 10 to 14 15 to 19 > 20
2009 806,38 €     916,91 €     1.025,44 € 1.173,79 € 1.293,02 € 1.449,33 € 
Source: Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeamento, Quadros de Pessoal 2009, p. 151 (2011)
Average Gain per Worker/Month by Company Age (in units €)
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 AVERAGE 
< 1 Year 770,88 €                         861,86 €                                963,73 €                         1.082,21 €                            806,38 €                                
1 to 4 Years 826,14 €                         917,12 €                                1.018,99 €                     1.137,48 €                            916,91 €                                
5 to 9 Years 880,41 €                         971,39 €                                1.073,26 €                     1.191,74 €                            1.025,44 €                            
10 to 19 Years 984,39 €                         1.075,37 €                            1.177,24 €                     1.295,73 €                            1.233,41 €                            
20 to 49 Years 1.092,35 €                     1.183,33 €                            1.285,20 €                     1.403,69 €                            1.449,33 €                            
> 50 Years 1.092,35 €                     1.183,33 €                            1.285,20 €                     1.403,69 €                            1.449,33 €                            
AVERAGE 735,38 €                         917,33 €                                1.121,08 €                     1.358,05 €                            -
Average Gain per Worker/Month by Company  Age and Size (in units €)
2009
Year / Size < 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
2004 * 3    19      95        770     
2005 3    19      95        763     
2006 3    19      96        778     
2007 3    19      95        792     
2008 3    19      96        824     
2009 3    19      95        821     
2010 * 3    19      95        823     
TOTAL 20  133    667      5.570  
Average Number of Workers by Company 
Size (in units)
* the values were calculated based on the average of 
the two preceding or proceeding years
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Table 65 
 
Source: (Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeamento (GEP), 2011, p. 38) (64) 
 
With no information regarding the year of 2010, this will have to be calculated based on the average of 
the two preceding years.  
To do that, for the year of 2008 was calculated the average by company size according to the ranges 
previously used (like it was done for 2009). These values are shown on the “Average” row of table 66.  
For the age segments, the logic applied was of seeing the change on the average from 2009 to 2008. We 
can see that the value for 2009 for the first column (735,38€) is lower by 6,88% in comparison to the 
value of 2008 (785,97€). The assumption is that this change will be equal for all the companies within 
this column, in spite of their age. For example, for the companies with less than one year, the change 
was from 770,88€ to 823,92€, a change exactly of 6,88%. By applying the logic to all the remaining 




For 2010, like mentioned, the values were calculated as the average of the previous 2 years (2008 and 




For the remaining years, the logic applied was the same as in 2008, with the values being calculated 
according to the variation of the average of the companies by size in relation with the year of 2009. 
Tables 68 to 71 show the final values. 
Gain Employees Gain Employees Gain Employees Gain Employees Gain Employees Gain Employees
1 to 4 607,50 €     481.510  626,30 €     521.237  650,60 €     530.106  680,50 €     545.211  721,50 €     549.547  750,40 €     538.897  
5 to 9 735,00 €     433.419  761,20 €     453.890  794,10 €     449.986  824,40 €     460.577  863,10 €     459.373  884,10 €     441.432  
10 to 19 793,10 €     399.676  819,80 €     422.309  841,60 €     423.355  871,50 €     438.300  914,30 €     440.128  938,10 €     413.562  
20 a 49 870,50 €     491.179  899,50 €     518.556  924,20 €     524.144  946,20 €     540.849  992,10 €     541.613  1.023,50 € 506.295  
50 to 99 976,80 €     304.823  1.013,10 € 321.364  1.049,90 € 325.812  1.067,60 € 339.538  1.106,40 € 346.900  1.134,90 € 328.675  
100 to 149 1.055,50 € 148.825  1.080,70 € 156.975  1.121,00 € 159.834  1.158,20 € 163.320  1.209,00 € 164.178  1.243,50 € 156.982  
150 to 199 1.115,10 € 95.528     1.188,40 € 100.493  1.193,10 € 104.728  1.219,60 € 109.825  1.250,30 € 113.553  1.296,20 € 101.996  
200 to 249 1.115,50 € 72.253     1.140,30 € 73.613     1.215,50 € 77.817     1.251,10 € 76.771     1.283,80 € 78.366     1.381,40 € 71.196     
250 to 499 1.172,60 € 164.395  1.214,10 € 175.779  1.239,80 € 179.217  1.269,80 € 187.034  1.320,10 € 188.787  1.346,70 € 179.603  
500 to 999 1.176,90 € 100.692  1.212,30 € 102.848  1.230,60 € 107.234  1.273,40 € 114.587  1.351,00 € 125.991  1.406,10 € 115.708  
> 1000 1.336,10 € 99.143     1.392,60 € 113.152  1.388,30 € 108.760  1.378,50 € 118.165  1.382,80 € 129.581  1.282,70 € 144.435  
Source: Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeamento, Quadros de Pessoal 1999-2009, p. 38 (2011)
Size / Year
Gain per Worker/Month by Company Size (in units and units €)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 823,92 €                         899,33 €                              1.008,69 €                     1.073,53 €                          
1 to 4 Years 882,98 €                         957,00 €                              1.066,54 €                     1.128,35 €                          
5 to 9 Years 940,98 €                         1.013,63 €                          1.123,33 €                     1.182,18 €                          
10 to 19 Years 1.052,12 €                     1.122,13 €                          1.232,17 €                     1.285,33 €                          
20 to 49 Years 1.167,51 €                     1.234,79 €                          1.345,17 €                     1.392,42 €                          
> 50 Years 1.167,51 €                     1.234,79 €                          1.345,17 €                     1.392,42 €                          
AVERAGE 785,97 €                         957,22 €                              1.173,38 €                     1.347,15 €                          
Average Gain per Worker/Month by Company  Age and Size (in units €)
2008
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 797,40 €                  880,59 €                  986,21 €                  1.077,87 €                   
1 to 4 Years 854,56 €                  937,06 €                  1.042,76 €               1.132,91 €                   
5 to 9 Years 910,70 €                  992,51 €                  1.098,29 €               1.186,96 €                   
10 to 19 Years 1.018,26 €               1.098,75 €               1.204,70 €               1.290,53 €                   
20 to 49 Years 1.129,93 €               1.209,06 €               1.315,18 €               1.398,05 €                   
> 50 Years 1.129,93 €               1.209,06 €               1.315,18 €               1.398,05 €                   
Average Gain per Worker/Month by Company  Age and Size (in units €)
2010
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Knowing what the average gain per worker is, the number of workers is important to know as well, in 
order to calculate their contribution for the SC received by the government. 
The procedures to achieve the values displayed on the tables 72 to 78 were simple. Having the number 
of companies existent (calculated on part 2 for the CIT Model) which are displayed on the tables 42, 
38, 34, 30, 26, 22 and 17 corresponding to the years of 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2009, 
respectively. The next step was to multiply these tables by the average number of employees for each 
year, displayed on table 61. 
These procedures tend to, once again, lower the bias of the model as much as possible. 
Tables 72 to 78 show the final results. 
 
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 782,43 €                         857,56 €                              974,59 €                         1.037,06 €                          
1 to 4 Years 838,52 €                         912,55 €                              1.030,47 €                     1.090,02 €                          
5 to 9 Years 893,60 €                         966,55 €                              1.085,35 €                     1.142,02 €                          
10 to 19 Years 999,14 €                         1.070,01 €                          1.190,50 €                     1.241,66 €                          
20 to 49 Years 1.108,72 €                     1.177,44 €                          1.299,68 €                     1.345,12 €                          
> 50 Years 1.108,72 €                     1.177,44 €                          1.299,68 €                     1.345,12 €                          
AVERAGE 746,40 €                         912,76 €                              1.133,71 €                     1.301,38 €                          
Average Gain per Worker/Month by Company  Age and Size (in units €)
2007
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 751,08 €                         833,63 €                              953,04 €                         1.018,56 €                          
1 to 4 Years 804,92 €                         887,09 €                              1.007,69 €                     1.070,58 €                          
5 to 9 Years 857,79 €                         939,58 €                              1.061,35 €                     1.121,65 €                          
10 to 19 Years 959,10 €                         1.040,16 €                          1.164,18 €                     1.219,52 €                          
20 to 49 Years 1.064,29 €                     1.144,58 €                          1.270,94 €                     1.321,13 €                          
> 50 Years 1.064,29 €                     1.144,58 €                          1.270,94 €                     1.321,13 €                          
AVERAGE 716,48 €                         887,29 €                              1.108,64 €                     1.278,17 €                          
Average Gain per Worker/Month by Company  Age and Size (in units €)
2006
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 722,36 €                         811,49 €                              929,47 €                         1.008,21 €                          
1 to 4 Years 774,15 €                         863,53 €                              982,77 €                         1.059,70 €                          
5 to 9 Years 825,00 €                         914,62 €                              1.035,11 €                     1.110,25 €                          
10 to 19 Years 922,43 €                         1.012,53 €                          1.135,39 €                     1.207,12 €                          
20 to 49 Years 1.023,60 €                     1.114,18 €                          1.239,52 €                     1.307,70 €                          
> 50 Years 1.023,60 €                     1.114,18 €                          1.239,52 €                     1.307,70 €                          
AVERAGE 689,09 €                         863,73 €                              1.081,23 €                     1.265,18 €                          
Average Gain per Worker/Month by Company  Age and Size (in units €)
2005
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 700,14 €                         785,23 €                              888,04 €                         970,85 €                              
1 to 4 Years 750,34 €                         835,58 €                              938,97 €                         1.020,42 €                          
5 to 9 Years 799,62 €                         885,02 €                              988,97 €                         1.069,10 €                          
10 to 19 Years 894,07 €                         979,76 €                              1.084,79 €                     1.162,39 €                          
20 to 49 Years 992,12 €                         1.078,13 €                          1.184,27 €                     1.259,24 €                          
> 50 Years 992,12 €                         1.078,13 €                          1.184,27 €                     1.259,24 €                          
AVERAGE 667,90 €                         835,78 €                              1.033,03 €                     1.218,29 €                          
Average Gain per Worker/Month by Company  Age and Size (in units €)
2004
Portuguese Startups: Benefits and Consequences of a Model of Tax Deferral 
 
 
CATÓLICA-LISBON School of Business & Economics                     Page 109 

















< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 74.529                   24.218                   16.366                   5.800                          120.913                     
1 to 4 Years 194.971                 109.528                 56.951                   61.603                       423.053                     
5 to 9 Years 199.722                 160.961                 79.562                   90.351                       530.596                     
10 to 19 Years 210.223                 249.824                 166.976                 238.199                     865.222                     
20 to 49 Years 151.214                 247.289                 261.106                 265.305                     924.914                     
> 50 Years 11.205                   35.065                   75.021                   104.315                     225.605                     
TOTAL 841.864                 826.884                 655.982                 765.573                     3.090.304                 
2010
Number of Workers by Company Age and Size (in units)
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 68.906                   21.799                   14.771                   5.198                          110.673                     
1 to 4 Years 201.079                 109.972                 57.338                   61.588                       429.977                     
5 to 9 Years 205.979                 161.614                 80.101                   90.329                       538.024                     
10 to 19 Years 216.809                 250.838                 168.108                 238.141                     873.895                     
20 to 49 Years 155.951                 248.292                 262.877                 265.239                     932.359                     
> 50 Years 11.556                   35.207                   75.529                   104.289                     226.582                     
TOTAL 860.280                 827.722                 658.724                 764.784                     3.111.509                 
2009
Number of Workers by Company Age and Size (in units)
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 78.892                   26.329                   17.743                   6.331                          129.294                     
1 to 4 Years 189.140                 109.125                 56.584                   61.624                       416.473                     
5 to 9 Years 193.749                 160.370                 79.048                   90.382                       523.549                     
10 to 19 Years 203.935                 248.907                 165.898                 238.280                     857.020                     
20 to 49 Years 146.692                 246.380                 259.421                 265.394                     917.887                     
> 50 Years 10.870                   34.936                   74.537                   104.350                     224.693                     
TOTAL 823.277                 826.047                 653.231                 766.361                     3.068.915                 
2008
Number of Workers by Company Age and Size (in units)
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 77.025                   25.972                   16.982                   5.907                      125.887                     
1 to 4 Years 188.709                 110.003                 55.344                   58.758                   412.815                     
5 to 9 Years 193.307                 161.660                 77.317                   86.179                   518.463                     
10 to 19 Years 203.471                 250.909                 162.264                 227.198                 843.842                     
20 to 49 Years 146.357                 248.363                 253.739                 253.052                 901.510                     
> 50 Years 10.845                   35.217                   72.904                   99.497                   218.463                     
TOTAL 819.715                 832.124                 638.550                 730.590                 3.020.979                 
2007
Number of Workers by Company Age and Size (in units)
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 68.734                   22.789                   14.972                   5.165                      111.660                     
1 to 4 Years 185.251                 106.185                 53.677                   56.516                   401.629                     
5 to 9 Years 189.766                 156.048                 74.987                   82.890                   503.691                     
10 to 19 Years 199.743                 242.199                 157.375                 218.529                 817.846                     
20 to 49 Years 143.676                 239.741                 246.093                 243.396                 872.906                     
> 50 Years 10.646                   33.995                   70.707                   95.701                   211.049                     
TOTAL 797.817                 800.957                 617.811                 702.197                 2.918.782                 
2006
Number of Workers by Company Age and Size (in units)
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Finally, to reach the global gain of the workers by segments a multiplication between the average gain 
per worker and the number of workers is done, matching each cell to its correspondent. For example 
for the year of 2010 (table 79), the companies with less than one year and less than 10 employees 
presents the value of 59.429.359,22€ that was achieved by multiplying the average gain of 797,40€ from 
table 67 with the number of employees (74.529 )from table 72. 
For the rest of the cells, the logic was maintained and also for the rest of the years, with the final result 









< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 59.527                   19.654                   12.538                   4.376                      96.095                       
1 to 4 Years 187.082                 106.786                 52.415                   55.846                   402.130                     
5 to 9 Years 191.641                 156.932                 73.225                   81.908                   503.706                     
10 to 19 Years 201.717                 243.571                 153.676                 215.940                 814.904                     
20 to 49 Years 145.096                 241.099                 240.310                 240.512                 867.017                     
> 50 Years 10.752                   34.187                   69.046                   94.567                   208.551                     
TOTAL 795.816                 802.228                 601.210                 693.150                 2.892.403                 
2005
Number of Workers by Company Age and Size (in units)
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 57.439                   19.775                   12.890                   4.401                      94.505                       
1 to 4 Years 169.049                 100.615                 50.463                   52.596                   372.722                     
5 to 9 Years 173.169                 147.863                 70.497                   77.140                   468.669                     
10 to 19 Years 182.273                 229.495                 147.952                 203.370                 763.089                     
20 to 49 Years 131.110                 227.165                 231.358                 226.512                 816.145                     
> 50 Years 9.715                      32.211                   66.474                   89.062                   197.462                     
TOTAL 722.755                 757.124                 579.633                 653.080                 2.712.593                 
2004
Number of Workers by Company Age and Size (in units)
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 53.117.703,80 €          18.787.191,10 €                  14.235.065,37 €          5.625.276,44 €                    
1 to 4 Years 166.119.928,66 €        100.857.520,64 €               58.426.595,00 €          70.055.037,66 €                  
5 to 9 Years 181.345.588,72 €        156.989.415,39 €               85.969.227,88 €          107.649.100,50 €               
10 to 19 Years 213.424.405,78 €        269.743.032,97 €               197.903.200,69 €        308.564.620,26 €               
20 to 49 Years 170.353.808,60 €        293.811.372,36 €               337.849.859,07 €        372.313.040,11 €               
> 50 Years 12.623.339,77 €          41.661.499,31 €                  97.070.629,80 €          146.389.337,75 €               
TOTAL 796.984.775,33 €        881.850.031,76 €               791.454.577,81 €        1.010.596.412,72 €            
Global Gain of Workers by Company Age and Size (in units €)
2009
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 59.429.359,22 €    21.326.231,87 €    16.140.198,81 €    6.251.350,98 €          
1 to 4 Years 166.615.106,45 €  102.634.045,06 €  59.386.930,09 €    69.791.136,15 €        
5 to 9 Years 181.886.151,85 €  159.754.658,17 €  87.382.270,45 €    107.243.579,91 €      
10 to 19 Years 214.060.590,90 €  274.494.340,39 €  201.156.058,19 €  307.402.238,92 €      
20 to 49 Years 170.861.606,94 €  298.986.624,30 €  343.402.965,04 €  370.910.514,67 €      
> 50 Years 12.660.968,00 €    42.395.333,24 €    98.666.141,77 €    145.837.880,38 €      
TOTAL 805.513.783,35 €  899.591.233,03 €  806.134.564,35 €  1.007.436.701,01 €  
Global Gain of Workers by Company Age and Size (in units €)
2010
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< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 40.215.742,53 €          15.527.936,13 €               11.446.711,49 €          4.273.098,38 €                  
1 to 4 Years 126.843.974,09 €        84.072.018,81 €               47.383.065,40 €          53.669.765,51 €               
5 to 9 Years 138.469.811,20 €        130.862.002,16 €             69.719.714,91 €          82.470.899,66 €               
10 to 19 Years 162.964.191,09 €        224.850.275,89 €             160.496.436,60 €        236.394.003,47 €             
20 to 49 Years 130.076.832,20 €        244.912.972,95 €             273.991.013,27 €        285.232.214,96 €             
> 50 Years 9.638.786,85 €             34.727.864,93 €               78.722.780,26 €          112.150.127,86 €             
TOTAL 608.209.337,96 €        734.953.070,87 €             641.759.721,92 €        774.190.109,84 €             
2004
Global Gain of Workers by Company Age and Size (in units €)
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 42.999.806,89 €          15.949.150,25 €               11.653.426,36 €          4.412.397,08 €                  
1 to 4 Years 144.829.148,94 €        92.212.758,65 €               51.512.399,20 €          59.180.294,23 €               
5 to 9 Years 158.103.410,53 €        143.533.441,83 €             75.795.640,41 €          90.938.577,07 €               
10 to 19 Years 186.070.842,32 €        246.622.651,83 €             174.483.361,16 €        260.665.694,11 €             
20 to 49 Years 148.520.393,17 €        268.628.030,88 €             297.868.749,83 €        314.518.355,81 €             
> 50 Years 11.005.467,98 €          38.090.583,20 €               85.583.303,84 €          123.665.112,04 €             
TOTAL 691.529.069,85 €        805.036.616,64 €             696.896.880,80 €        853.380.430,35 €             
2005
Global Gain of Workers by Company Age and Size (in units €)
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 51.624.768,46 €          18.998.056,96 €               14.268.793,75 €          5.260.417,26 €                  
1 to 4 Years 149.112.695,71 €        94.195.397,22 €               54.089.433,58 €          60.504.789,83 €               
5 to 9 Years 162.779.564,18 €        146.619.510,85 €             79.587.503,62 €          92.973.844,84 €               
10 to 19 Years 191.574.176,16 €        251.925.210,69 €             183.212.320,15 €        266.499.571,24 €             
20 to 49 Years 152.913.114,22 €        274.403.720,73 €             312.770.366,14 €        321.557.492,47 €             
> 50 Years 11.330.971,77 €          38.909.557,28 €               89.864.818,97 €          126.432.822,12 €             
TOTAL 719.335.290,51 €        825.051.453,72 €             733.793.236,20 €        873.228.937,77 €             
2006
Global Gain of Workers by Company Age and Size (in units €)
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 60.267.053,93 €          22.272.659,78 €               16.550.649,42 €          6.125.766,63 €                  
1 to 4 Years 158.236.741,01 €        100.383.756,25 €             57.031.011,66 €          64.047.306,90 €               
5 to 9 Years 172.739.870,45 €        156.251.979,11 €             83.915.758,52 €          98.417.404,48 €               
10 to 19 Years 203.296.393,73 €        268.475.952,01 €             193.176.065,54 €        282.102.952,09 €             
20 to 49 Years 162.269.703,03 €        292.431.233,67 €             329.779.944,39 €        340.384.479,68 €             
> 50 Years 12.024.301,74 €          41.465.800,12 €               94.751.991,27 €          133.835.383,65 €             
TOTAL 768.834.063,89 €        881.281.380,93 €             775.205.420,80 €        924.913.293,42 €             
Global Gain of Workers by Company Age and Size (in units €)
2007
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 65.000.092,91 €          23.678.398,78 €               17.896.880,82 €          6.796.079,44 €                  
1 to 4 Years 167.007.489,73 €        104.433.129,64 €             60.348.709,17 €          69.533.401,56 €               
5 to 9 Years 182.314.498,87 €        162.555.016,87 €             88.797.437,72 €          106.847.535,64 €             
10 to 19 Years 214.564.709,64 €        279.305.984,84 €             204.413.806,79 €        306.267.020,43 €             
20 to 49 Years 171.263.990,84 €        304.227.596,95 €             348.964.420,86 €        369.540.763,83 €             
> 50 Years 12.690.784,93 €          43.138.486,16 €               100.264.052,81 €        145.299.309,62 €             
TOTAL 812.841.566,93 €        917.338.613,24 €             820.685.308,17 €        1.004.284.110,52 €         
Global Gain of Workers by Company Age and Size (in units €)
2008
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With all the tables complete, now comes an important step. The goal of all the previous calculations 
was to find the contribution given by each segment to the total SC received by the government every 
year.  
The SC paid by each company will be a percentage of the income received by the workers and as it can 
vary under some circumstances, to calculate its contribution an average would have to be estimated. 
But, by having an equal percentage charged, the yearly contribution will have an equal distribution. In 
face of this reality it is pointless to calculate an average for the SC and is possible to calculate 
immediately the percentage of the contribution of each segment by dividing each cell of the global 
gain by its correspondent total (because the distribution will be equal). 










< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 7,38% 2,37% 2,00% 0,62%
1 to 4 Years 20,68% 11,41% 7,37% 6,93%
5 to 9 Years 22,58% 17,76% 10,84% 10,65%
10 to 19 Years 26,57% 30,51% 24,95% 30,51%
20 to 49 Years 21,21% 33,24% 42,60% 36,82%
> 50 Years 1,57% 4,71% 12,24% 14,48%
TOTAL 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00%
Global Gain of Workers by Company Age and Size (%)
2010
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 6,66% 2,13% 1,80% 0,56%
1 to 4 Years 20,84% 11,44% 7,38% 6,93%
5 to 9 Years 22,75% 17,80% 10,86% 10,65%
10 to 19 Years 26,78% 30,59% 25,00% 30,53%
20 to 49 Years 21,37% 33,32% 42,69% 36,84%
> 50 Years 1,58% 4,72% 12,26% 14,49%
TOTAL 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00%
2009
Global Gain of Workers by Company Age and Size (%)
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 8,00% 2,58% 2,18% 0,68%
1 to 4 Years 20,55% 11,38% 7,35% 6,92%
5 to 9 Years 22,43% 17,72% 10,82% 10,64%
10 to 19 Years 26,40% 30,45% 24,91% 30,50%
20 to 49 Years 21,07% 33,16% 42,52% 36,80%
> 50 Years 1,56% 4,70% 12,22% 14,47%
TOTAL 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00%
2008
Global Gain of Workers by Company Age and Size (%)
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 7,84% 2,53% 2,14% 0,66%
1 to 4 Years 20,58% 11,39% 7,36% 6,92%
5 to 9 Years 22,47% 17,73% 10,82% 10,64%
10 to 19 Years 26,44% 30,46% 24,92% 30,50%
20 to 49 Years 21,11% 33,18% 42,54% 36,80%
> 50 Years 1,56% 4,71% 12,22% 14,47%
TOTAL 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00%
2007
Global Gain of Workers by Company Age and Size (%)
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With the percentages calculated and already knowing the total received each year by company size 
(table 59), by matching each percentage to its respective value we’ll have the contribution by company 
age and size.  
For 2010, for example, the percentage of SC paid by the companies with less than 10 employees and 
less than one year was 7,38% (table 86) while the total paid by the companies with less than 10 
employees in 2010 was 2.300.909.704,00€ (table 59), which gives 169.946.949,21€, like is shown in table 
93. For the rest of the segments and the remaining years, the same logic is applied. The final results are 






< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 7,18% 2,30% 1,94% 0,60%
1 to 4 Years 20,73% 11,42% 7,37% 6,93%
5 to 9 Years 22,63% 17,77% 10,85% 10,65%
10 to 19 Years 26,63% 30,53% 24,97% 30,52%
20 to 49 Years 21,26% 33,26% 42,62% 36,82%
> 50 Years 1,58% 4,72% 12,25% 14,48%
TOTAL 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00%
2006
Global Gain of Workers by Company Age and Size (%)
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 6,22% 1,98% 1,67% 0,52%
1 to 4 Years 20,94% 11,45% 7,39% 6,93%
5 to 9 Years 22,86% 17,83% 10,88% 10,66%
10 to 19 Years 26,91% 30,63% 25,04% 30,55%
20 to 49 Years 21,48% 33,37% 42,74% 36,86%
> 50 Years 1,59% 4,73% 12,28% 14,49%
TOTAL 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00%
2005
Global Gain of Workers by Company Age and Size (%)
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250
< 1 Year 6,61% 2,11% 1,78% 0,55%
1 to 4 Years 20,86% 11,44% 7,38% 6,93%
5 to 9 Years 22,77% 17,81% 10,86% 10,65%
10 to 19 Years 26,79% 30,59% 25,01% 30,53%
20 to 49 Years 21,39% 33,32% 42,69% 36,84%
> 50 Years 1,58% 4,73% 12,27% 14,49%
TOTAL 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00%
2004
Global Gain of Workers by Company Age and Size (%)
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 169.946.949,21 €    61.351.456,07 €      51.027.645,74 €      24.479.105,79 €      306.805.156,81 €      
1 to 4 Years 476.460.278,35 €    295.258.353,45 €    187.753.277,70 €    273.288.863,50 €    1.232.760.772,99 €    
5 to 9 Years 520.130.067,33 €    459.583.340,96 €    276.261.252,52 €    419.945.535,92 €    1.675.920.196,73 €    
10 to 19 Years 612.137.584,01 €    789.667.277,77 €    635.959.952,76 €    1.203.728.913,85 €  3.241.493.728,40 €    
20 to 49 Years 488.603.767,88 €    860.126.854,96 €    1.085.677.137,42 €  1.452.415.286,64 €  3.886.823.046,90 €    
> 50 Years 36.205.890,71 €      121.963.197,29 €    311.935.496,37 €    571.073.502,80 €    1.041.178.087,17 €    
TOTAL 2.303.484.537,50 €  2.587.950.480,50 €  2.548.614.762,50 €  3.944.931.208,50 €  11.384.980.989,00 €  
SC by Company Age and Size (in units €)
2010
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< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 151.244.799,95 €    53.941.682,06 €      45.083.014,10 €      22.445.320,53 €      272.714.816,63 €      
1 to 4 Years 473.001.910,48 €    289.581.570,89 €    185.039.333,38 €    279.525.422,56 €    1.227.148.237,31 €    
5 to 9 Years 516.354.724,05 €    450.747.165,25 €    272.267.939,24 €    429.528.857,77 €    1.668.898.686,30 €    
10 to 19 Years 607.694.407,84 €    774.484.745,69 €    626.767.250,93 €    1.231.198.479,82 €  3.240.144.884,28 €    
20 to 49 Years 485.057.256,98 €    843.589.632,33 €    1.069.983.843,89 €  1.485.559.973,19 €  3.884.190.706,39 €    
> 50 Years 35.943.091,70 €      119.618.272,78 €    307.426.517,46 €    584.105.624,13 €    1.047.093.506,08 €    
TOTAL 2.269.296.191,00 €  2.531.963.069,00 €  2.506.567.899,00 €  4.032.363.678,00 €  11.340.190.837,00 €  
SC by Company Age and Size (in units €)
2009
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 186.935.512,19 €    68.245.481,93 €      56.495.177,75 €      26.104.035,29 €      337.780.207,17 €      
1 to 4 Years 480.301.323,24 €    300.995.406,33 €    190.503.087,44 €    267.080.805,16 €    1.238.880.622,16 €    
5 to 9 Years 524.323.161,75 €    468.513.330,23 €    280.307.338,38 €    410.406.009,31 €    1.683.549.839,68 €    
10 to 19 Years 617.072.408,68 €    805.011.002,61 €    645.274.138,35 €    1.176.384.882,25 €  3.243.742.431,89 €    
20 to 49 Years 492.542.709,05 €    876.839.653,06 €    1.101.577.821,57 €  1.419.422.069,46 €  3.890.382.253,14 €    
> 50 Years 36.497.769,09 €      124.333.017,84 €    316.504.062,50 €    558.100.937,53 €    1.035.435.786,96 €    
TOTAL 2.337.672.884,00 €  2.643.937.892,00 €  2.590.661.626,00 €  3.857.498.739,00 €  11.429.771.141,00 €  
SC by Company Age and Size (in units €)
2008
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 178.361.916,29 €    64.992.383,07 €      53.596.189,72 €      23.885.097,34 €      320.835.586,42 €      
1 to 4 Years 468.305.757,66 €    292.923.234,38 €    184.684.288,97 €    249.728.116,18 €    1.195.641.397,19 €    
5 to 9 Years 511.228.147,09 €    455.948.619,68 €    271.745.524,86 €    383.741.240,82 €    1.622.663.532,45 €    
10 to 19 Years 601.660.973,85 €    783.422.011,24 €    625.564.640,63 €    1.099.953.178,47 €  3.110.600.804,18 €    
20 to 49 Years 480.241.413,84 €    853.324.342,54 €    1.067.930.811,30 €  1.327.199.830,97 €  3.728.696.398,65 €    
> 50 Years 35.586.234,26 €      120.998.623,10 €    306.836.642,52 €    521.840.181,22 €    985.261.681,11 €      
TOTAL 2.275.384.443,00 €  2.571.609.214,00 €  2.510.358.098,00 €  3.606.347.645,00 €  10.963.699.400,00 €  
SC by Company Age and Size (in units €)
2007
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 155.433.752,24 €    56.774.718,17 €      45.425.264,98 €      21.932.334,31 €      279.566.069,70 €      
1 to 4 Years 448.953.990,31 €    281.498.110,16 €    172.195.834,89 €    252.263.501,65 €    1.154.911.437,01 €    
5 to 9 Years 490.102.700,73 €    438.164.883,16 €    253.369.941,70 €    387.637.205,69 €    1.569.274.731,28 €    
10 to 19 Years 576.798.577,86 €    752.865.562,49 €    583.263.612,57 €    1.111.120.544,61 €  3.024.048.297,53 €    
20 to 49 Years 460.396.430,17 €    820.041.436,06 €    995.716.737,35 €    1.340.674.337,66 €  3.616.828.941,24 €    
> 50 Years 34.115.706,70 €      116.279.214,95 €    286.088.178,52 €    527.138.207,07 €    963.621.307,24 €      
TOTAL 2.165.801.158,00 €  2.465.623.925,00 €  2.336.059.570,00 €  3.640.766.131,00 €  10.608.250.784,00 €  
SC by Company Age and Size (in units €)
2006
< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 150.509.659,60 €    49.287.849,29 €      38.322.933,31 €      17.592.910,14 €      255.713.352,35 €      
1 to 4 Years 506.936.832,55 €    284.966.188,10 €    169.401.357,07 €    235.960.993,37 €    1.197.265.371,10 €    
5 to 9 Years 553.399.938,74 €    443.563.107,57 €    249.258.130,97 €    362.586.182,80 €    1.608.807.360,07 €    
10 to 19 Years 651.292.672,29 €    762.140.923,00 €    573.798.126,79 €    1.039.314.469,77 €  3.026.546.191,85 €    
20 to 49 Years 519.857.074,60 €    830.144.408,39 €    979.557.761,53 €    1.254.033.367,61 €  3.583.592.612,13 €    
> 50 Years 38.521.783,23 €      117.711.783,65 €    281.445.400,32 €    493.071.943,30 €    930.750.910,50 €      
TOTAL 2.420.517.961,00 €  2.487.814.260,00 €  2.291.783.710,00 €  3.402.559.867,00 €  10.602.675.798,00 €  
SC by Company Age and Size (in units €)
2005
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Table 99 
 
Following the same methodology as used in the calculation of the CIT, now is the estimation of the 
three different scenarios plus another one without deferral. These scenarios will be once again one 
realistic, another optimistic and the last one a pessimistic. 
The same conditions assumed for the CIT models that are displayed on the table 50 are maintained for 
this model, without the need to explain them again. 
Table 100 shows the situation without deferral. It is observable that the number of companies failed 
from year to year is the same as in the previous CIT situation without a model as a result of using the 
same assumptions for this model that otherwise wouldn’t allow for cross matching and comparison. 
The final SC contribution is 5.456.945.605,85€. 
Remember that the following tables are not the final models but the basis of them, that still require 




The realistic model, already with deferral is shown on table 101 and although the total contribution is 
valued in 7.786.885.818,23€, this still does not account for the impact of the deferral, like it was 
mentioned before. 
Nevertheless, once again these calculations were made under the same assumption as the realistic 






SC Contribution Companies Average SC SC Contribution Companies Average SC SC Contribution Companies Average SC SC Contribution Companies Average SC
2004 260.690.544,55 €      21.292      12.243,39 €    205.257.958,88 €    16.765      12.243,39 €    149.825.373,22 €      9.635        15.549,88 €    155.109.225,55 €    9.382        16.533,48 €    
2005 -  €                         -            -  €              255.713.352,35 €    21.940      11.655,38 €    199.769.663,69 €      17.140      11.655,38 €    143.825.975,03 €    12.340      11.655,38 €    
2006 -  €                         -            -  €              -  €                       -            -  €              279.566.069,70 €      25.514      10.957,30 €    221.835.676,31 €    20.245      10.957,30 €    
2007 -  €                         -            -  €              -  €                       -            -  €              -  €                         -            -  €              320.835.586,42 €    28.724      11.169,45 €    
2008 -  €                         -            -  €              -  €                       -            -  €              -  €                         -            -  €              -  €                       -            -  €              
2009 -  €                         -            -  €              -  €                       -            -  €              -  €                         -            -  €              -  €                       -            -  €              
Total 260.690.544,55 €      21.292      12.243,39 €    460.971.311,23 €    38.704      11.949,38 €    629.161.106,61 €      52.289      12.720,85 €    841.606.463,30 €    70.691      12.578,90 €    
Cumulative SC 260.690.544,55 €      721.661.855,78 €    1.350.822.962,39 €    2.192.429.425,69 €  
SC Contribution Companies Average SC SC Contribution Companies Average SC SC Contribution Companies Average SC
2004 160.718.602,00 €      9.055        17.748,91 €    159.319.942,55 €    7.968        19.994,26 €    159.990.244,86 €      7.300        21.916,32 €    
2005 149.027.303,54 €      11.911      12.512,20 €    147.615.992,68 €    10.481      14.084,15 €    148.237.053,29 €      9.602        15.438,07 €    
2006 164.105.282,92 €      14.977      10.957,30 €    162.551.181,33 €    13.179      12.333,91 €    163.294.632,11 €      12.074      13.524,51 €    
2007 246.706.524,18 €      22.088      11.169,45 €    172.577.461,94 €    15.451      11.169,45 €    173.366.769,32 €      14.155      12.247,64 €    
2008 337.780.207,17 €      29.491      11.453,65 €    260.208.982,59 €    22.718      11.453,65 €    182.637.758,01 €      15.946      11.453,65 €    
2009 -  €                         -            -  €              272.714.816,63 €    25.875      10.539,70 €    203.663.425,06 €      19.323      10.539,70 €    
Total 1.058.337.919,80 €    87.521      12.768,30 €    1.174.988.377,72 €  95.673      13.262,52 €    1.031.189.882,64 €    78.400      14.186,65 €    
Cumulative SC 3.250.767.345,49 €    4.425.755.723,21 €  5.456.945.605,85 €    
Total SC 5.456.945.605,85 €    




< 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 > 250 TOTAL
< 1 Year 152.139.709,92 €    49.671.428,75 €      40.397.693,60 €      18.481.712,28 €      260.690.544,55 €      
1 to 4 Years 479.861.969,67 €    268.933.183,26 €    167.224.146,38 €    232.128.792,02 €    1.148.148.091,33 €    
5 to 9 Years 523.843.539,41 €    418.606.990,84 €    246.054.570,64 €    356.697.483,82 €    1.545.202.584,71 €    
10 to 19 Years 616.507.944,36 €    719.260.716,07 €    566.423.454,95 €    1.022.435.144,69 €  2.924.627.260,07 €    
20 to 49 Years 492.092.157,73 €    783.438.132,77 €    966.968.112,48 €    1.233.666.830,34 €  3.476.165.233,33 €    
> 50 Years 36.464.382,91 €      111.088.985,31 €    277.828.156,95 €    485.064.047,84 €    910.445.573,02 €      
TOTAL 2.300.909.704,00 €  2.350.999.437,00 €  2.264.896.135,00 €  3.348.474.011,00 €  10.265.279.287,00 €  
2004
SC by Company Age and Size (in units €)
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Table 101 
 
Again, under the same conditions as before we reach the optimistic model (table 102) and the 















SC Contribution Companies Average SC SC Contribution Companies Average SC SC Contribution Companies Average SC SC Contribution Companies Average SC
2004 260.690.544,55 €      21.292      12.243,39 €    271.842.773,53 €    20.346      13.360,70 €    262.226.182,93 €      19.388      13.525,28 €    271.474.045,27 €    18.878      14.380,81 €    
2005 -  €                         -            -  €              255.713.352,35 €    21.940      11.655,38 €    246.667.349,07 €      20.906      11.798,95 €    255.366.502,08 €    20.356      12.545,29 €    
2006 -  €                         -            -  €              -  €                       -            -  €              279.566.069,70 €      25.514      10.957,30 €    289.425.453,31 €    24.843      11.650,40 €    
2007 -  €                         -            -  €              -  €                       -            -  €              -  €                         -            -  €              320.835.586,42 €    28.724      11.169,45 €    
2008 -  €                         -            -  €              -  €                       -            -  €              -  €                         -            -  €              -  €                       -            -  €              
2009 -  €                         -            -  €              -  €                       -            -  €              -  €                         -            -  €              -  €                       -            -  €              
Total 260.690.544,55 €      21.292      12.243,39 €    527.556.125,87 €    42.286      12.508,04 €    788.459.601,69 €      65.808      12.093,84 €    1.137.101.587,08 €  92.800      12.436,49 €    
Cumulative SC 260.690.544,55 €      788.246.670,42 €    1.576.706.272,12 €    2.713.807.859,19 €  
SC Contribution Companies Average SC SC Contribution Companies Average SC SC Contribution Companies Average SC
2004 281.291.643,88 €      18.221      15.437,99 €    278.843.693,17 €    16.034      17.390,99 €    280.016.864,39 €      14.689      19.062,80 €    
2005 264.601.586,83 €      19.647      13.467,53 €    262.095.770,21 €    17.289      15.159,50 €    263.198.478,36 €      15.839      16.616,80 €    
2006 299.892.247,38 €      23.978      12.506,86 €    297.052.222,93 €    21.100      14.078,14 €    298.410.833,20 €      19.331      15.437,12 €    
2007 332.438.297,85 €      27.725      11.990,55 €    329.290.057,43 €    25.277      13.027,38 €    330.796.111,98 €      23.157      14.284,93 €    
2008 337.780.207,17 €      29.491      11.453,65 €    334.581.378,07 €    25.951      12.892,61 €    336.111.633,23 €      23.775      14.137,14 €    
2009 -  €                         -            -  €              272.714.816,63 €    25.875      10.539,70 €    273.962.116,34 €      23.705      11.557,11 €    
Total 1.516.003.983,10 €    119.062    12.971,32 €    1.774.577.938,44 €  131.526    13.848,06 €    1.782.496.037,50 €    120.496    15.182,65 €    
Cumulative SC 4.229.811.842,29 €    6.004.389.780,73 €  7.786.885.818,23 €    
Total SC 7.786.885.818,23 €    
2008 2009 2010
Realistic Model (in units €)
2004 2005 2006 2007
SC Contribution Companies Average SC SC Contribution Companies Average SC SC Contribution Companies Average SC SC Contribution Companies Average SC
2004 260.690.544,55 €      21.292      12.243,39 €    312.828.653,46 €    21.292      14.692,07 €    375.394.384,15 €      21.292      17.630,49 €    450.473.260,99 €    21.292      21.156,58 €    
2005 -  €                         -            -  €              255.713.352,35 €    21.940      11.655,38 €    306.856.022,81 €      21.940      13.986,45 €    368.227.227,38 €    21.940      16.783,74 €    
2006 -  €                         -            -  €              -  €                       -            -  €              279.566.069,70 €      25.514      10.957,30 €    335.479.283,64 €    25.514      13.148,76 €    
2007 -  €                         -            -  €              -  €                       -            -  €              -  €                         -            -  €              320.835.586,42 €    28.724      11.169,45 €    
2008 -  €                         -            -  €              -  €                       -            -  €              -  €                         -            -  €              -  €                       -            -  €              
2009 -  €                         -            -  €              -  €                       -            -  €              -  €                         -            -  €              -  €                       -            -  €              
Total 260.690.544,55 €      21.292      12.243,39 €    568.542.005,81 €    43.232      13.173,72 €    961.816.476,67 €      68.746      14.191,41 €    1.475.015.358,43 €  97.470      15.564,63 €    
Cumulative SC 260.690.544,55 €      829.232.550,36 €    1.791.049.027,03 €    3.266.064.385,46 €  
SC Contribution Companies Average SC SC Contribution Companies Average SC SC Contribution Companies Average SC
2004 540.567.913,18 €      21.292      25.387,90 €    648.681.495,82 €    21.292      30.465,48 €    778.417.794,98 €      21.292      36.558,58 €    
2005 441.872.672,85 €      21.940      20.140,49 €    530.247.207,42 €    21.940      24.168,59 €    636.296.648,91 €      21.940      29.002,30 €    
2006 402.575.140,37 €      25.514      15.778,52 €    483.090.168,45 €    25.514      18.934,22 €    579.708.202,14 €      25.514      22.721,06 €    
2007 385.002.703,70 €      28.724      13.403,34 €    462.003.244,45 €    28.724      16.084,00 €    554.403.893,33 €      28.724      19.300,81 €    
2008 337.780.207,17 €      29.491      11.453,65 €    405.336.248,60 €    29.491      13.744,38 €    486.403.498,32 €      29.491      16.493,25 €    
2009 -  €                         -            -  €              272.714.816,63 €    25.875      10.539,70 €    327.257.779,96 €      25.875      12.647,64 €    
Total 2.107.798.637,28 €    126.961    17.232,78 €    2.802.073.181,36 €  152.836    18.989,39 €    3.362.487.817,64 €    152.836    22.787,27 €    
Cumulative SC 5.373.863.022,73 €    8.175.936.204,10 €  11.538.424.021,74 €  
Total SC 11.538.424.021,74 €  
2008 2009 2010
Optimistic Model (in units €)
2004 2005 2006 2007
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Table 103 
 
The following tables will indeed show the impact of the tax deferred. First the no model situation 
(table 104), without deferral, shows the same final contribution as shown on table 100. This is expected 





Table 105, for its turn, the realistic model, already accounts for some deferral and some loss of SC. The 
total actually received (with the deferred yet to be received) is therefore lower than the initial value 
SC Contribution Companies Average SC SC Contribution Companies Average SC SC Contribution Companies Average SC SC Contribution Companies Average SC
2004 260.690.544,55 €      21.292      12.243,39 €    205.257.958,88 €    16.765      12.243,39 €    149.825.373,22 €      9.635        15.549,88 €    155.109.225,55 €    9.382        16.533,48 €    
2005 -  €                         -            255.713.352,35 €    21.940      11.655,38 €    199.769.663,69 €      17.140      11.655,38 €    143.825.975,03 €    12.340      11.655,38 €    
2006 -  €                         -            -  €                       -            -  €              279.566.069,70 €      25.514      10.957,30 €    221.835.676,31 €    20.245      10.957,30 €    
2007 -  €                         -            -  €                       -            -  €              -  €                         -            -  €              320.835.586,42 €    28.724      11.169,45 €    
2008 -  €                         -            -  €                       -            -  €              -  €                         -            -  €              -  €                       -            -  €              
2009 -  €                         -            -  €                       -            -  €              -  €                         -            -  €              -  €                       -            -  €              
Total 260.690.544,55 €      21.292      12.243,39 €    460.971.311,23 €    38.704      11.949,38 €    629.161.106,61 €      52.289      12.720,85 €    841.606.463,30 €    70.691      12.578,90 €    
Total SC 5.456.945.605,85 €    
Cumulative SC 260.690.544,55 €      721.661.855,78 €    1.350.822.962,39 €    2.192.429.425,69 €  
SC Contribution Companies Average SC SC Contribution Companies Average SC SC Contribution Companies Average SC
2004 160.718.602,00 €      9.055        17.748,91 €    159.319.942,55 €    7.968        19.994,26 €    159.990.244,86 €      7.300        21.916,32 €    
2005 149.027.303,54 €      11.911      12.512,20 €    147.615.992,68 €    10.481      14.084,15 €    148.237.053,29 €      9.602        15.438,07 €    
2006 164.105.282,92 €      14.977      10.957,30 €    162.551.181,33 €    13.179      12.333,91 €    163.294.632,11 €      12.074      13.524,51 €    
2007 246.706.524,18 €      22.088      11.169,45 €    172.577.461,94 €    15.451      11.169,45 €    173.366.769,32 €      14.155      12.247,64 €    
2008 337.780.207,17 €      29.491      11.453,65 €    260.208.982,59 €    22.718      11.453,65 €    182.637.758,01 €      15.946      11.453,65 €    
2009 -  €                         -            -  €              272.714.816,63 €    25.875      10.539,70 €    203.663.425,06 €      19.323      10.539,70 €    
Total 1.058.337.919,80 €    87.521      12.768,30 €    1.174.988.377,72 €  95.673      13.262,52 €    1.031.189.882,64 €    78.400      14.186,65 €    
Cumulative SC 3.250.767.345,49 €    4.425.755.723,21 €  5.456.945.605,85 €    
Total SC 5.456.945.605,85 €    
2008 2009 2010
Pessimistic Model (in units €)
2007200620052004
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
SC to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
SC Year 260.690.544,55 €  205.257.958,88 €  149.825.373,22 €    155.109.225,55 €    160.718.602,00 €    159.319.942,55 €    159.990.244,86 €    1.250.911.891,61 €  
SC Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
SC to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
SC Year -  €                     255.713.352,35 €  199.769.663,69 €    143.825.975,03 €    149.027.303,54 €    147.615.992,68 €    148.237.053,29 €    1.044.189.340,56 €  
SC Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
SC to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
SC Year -  €                     -  €                     279.566.069,70 €    221.835.676,31 €    164.105.282,92 €    162.551.181,33 €    163.294.632,11 €    991.352.842,37 €    
SC Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
SC to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
SC Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       320.835.586,42 €    246.706.524,18 €    172.577.461,94 €    173.366.769,32 €    913.486.341,85 €    
SC Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
SC to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
SC Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       337.780.207,17 €    260.208.982,59 €    182.637.758,01 €    780.626.947,77 €    
SC Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
SC to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
SC Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       272.714.816,63 €    203.663.425,06 €    476.378.241,69 €    
SC Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
-  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
-  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
260.690.544,55 €  460.971.311,23 €  629.161.106,61 €    841.606.463,30 €    1.058.337.919,80 €  1.174.988.377,72 €  1.031.189.882,64 €  5.456.945.605,85 €  
-  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
260.690.544,55 €  460.971.311,23 €  629.161.106,61 €    841.606.463,30 €    1.058.337.919,80 €  1.174.988.377,72 €  1.031.189.882,64 €  5.456.945.605,85 €  




Total SC to be Received (A)
Total SC Deferred (B)
Total SC Year (C)
Total SC Lost (D)
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calculated on table 101 (with now being 7.198.350.077,41€). Once again the calculation logic was the 




On the optimistic model (table 106), there is no failure and the only note to be referred is the difference 
between the value already received and the one to be received (that accounts for the SC deferred).  
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
SC to be Received 260.690.544,55 €  532.533.318,08 €  467.360.681,94 €    402.188.045,80 €    337.015.409,66 €    271.842.773,53 €    203.882.080,14 €    203.882.080,14 €    
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     65.172.636,14 €      65.172.636,14 €      65.172.636,14 €      65.172.636,14 €      67.960.693,38 €      328.651.237,93 €    
SC Year -  €                     -  €                     262.226.182,93 €    271.474.045,27 €    281.291.643,88 €    278.843.693,17 €    280.016.864,39 €    1.373.852.429,63 €  
SC Lost 11.580.951,07 €    12.807.411,42 €    6.902.544,68 €        9.445.027,87 €        33.761.905,49 €      23.384.347,16 €      28.573.126,33 €      126.455.314,02 €    
SC to be Received -  €                     255.713.352,35 €  502.380.701,41 €    438.452.363,33 €    374.524.025,24 €    310.595.687,15 €    246.667.349,07 €    246.667.349,07 €    
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       63.928.338,09 €      63.928.338,09 €      63.928.338,09 €      63.928.338,09 €      255.713.352,35 €    
SC Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       255.366.502,08 €    264.601.586,83 €    262.095.770,21 €    263.198.478,36 €    1.045.262.337,48 €  
SC Lost -  €                     12.047.501,08 €    6.492.991,58 €        8.884.619,99 €        31.758.688,75 €      21.979.835,41 €      26.869.262,08 €      108.032.898,90 €    
SC to be Received -  €                     -  €                     279.566.069,70 €    568.991.523,01 €    499.100.005,59 €    429.208.488,16 €    359.316.970,73 €    359.316.970,73 €    
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       69.891.517,43 €      69.891.517,43 €      69.891.517,43 €      209.674.552,28 €    
SC Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       299.892.247,38 €    297.052.222,93 €    298.410.833,20 €    895.355.303,51 €    
SC Lost -  €                     -  €                     7.358.980,20 €        10.069.586,84 €      35.994.434,72 €      24.911.348,10 €      30.452.891,41 €      108.787.241,27 €    
SC to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       320.835.586,42 €    653.273.884,27 €    573.064.987,66 €    492.856.091,06 €    492.856.091,06 €    
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       80.208.896,61 €      80.208.896,61 €      160.417.793,21 €    
SC Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       329.290.057,43 €    330.796.111,98 €    660.086.169,41 €    
SC Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       11.162.396,95 €      29.356.030,24 €      27.614.872,45 €      28.485.451,34 €      96.618.750,98 €      
SC to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       337.780.207,17 €    672.361.585,23 €    587.916.533,44 €    587.916.533,44 €    
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       84.445.051,79 €      84.445.051,79 €      
SC Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       336.111.633,23 €    336.111.633,23 €    
SC Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       40.541.920,38 €      28.058.612,37 €      34.300.266,38 €      102.900.799,13 €    
SC to be Received -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       272.714.816,63 €    546.676.932,97 €    546.676.932,97 €    
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
SC Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
SC Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       22.870.368,26 €      22.870.368,26 €      45.740.736,51 €      
260.690.544,55 €  788.246.670,42 €  1.249.307.453,05 €  1.730.467.518,56 €  2.201.693.531,92 €  2.529.788.338,36 €  2.437.315.957,41 €  2.437.315.957,41 €  
-  €                     -  €                     65.172.636,14 €      129.100.974,22 €    198.992.491,65 €    279.201.388,25 €    366.434.497,29 €    1.038.901.987,56 €  
-  €                     -  €                     262.226.182,93 €    526.840.547,35 €    845.785.478,09 €    1.167.281.743,74 €  1.508.533.921,16 €  4.310.667.873,26 €  
11.580.951,07 €    24.854.912,50 €    20.754.516,46 €      39.561.631,65 €      171.412.979,59 €    148.819.383,75 €    171.551.365,80 €    588.535.740,82 €    
-  €                     -  €                     327.398.819,06 €    655.941.521,57 €    1.044.777.969,74 €  1.446.483.131,99 €  1.874.968.418,45 €  5.349.569.860,82 €  
249.109.593,49 €  763.391.757,92 €  1.555.951.755,65 €  2.346.847.408,48 €  3.075.058.522,07 €  3.827.452.086,61 €  4.140.733.010,07 €  7.198.350.077,41 €  






Total SC to be Received (A)
Total SC Deferred (B)
Total SC Year (C)
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
SC to be Received 260.690.544,55 €  465.948.503,44 €  400.775.867,30 €    335.603.231,16 €    270.430.595,02 €    205.257.958,88 €    153.943.469,16 €    153.943.469,16 €    
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     65.172.636,14 €      65.172.636,14 €      65.172.636,14 €      65.172.636,14 €      51.314.489,72 €      312.005.034,27 €    
SC Year -  €                     -  €                     149.825.373,22 €    155.109.225,55 €    160.718.602,00 €    159.319.942,55 €    159.990.244,86 €    784.963.388,17 €    
SC Lost 55.432.585,67 €    87.291.078,46 €    3.943.833,23 €        5.396.504,69 €        19.290.179,32 €      13.360.864,66 €      16.325.521,99 €      201.040.568,02 €    
SC to be Received -  €                     255.713.352,35 €  455.483.016,03 €    391.554.677,94 €    327.626.339,86 €    263.698.001,77 €    199.769.663,69 €    199.769.663,69 €    
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       63.928.338,09 €      63.928.338,09 €      63.928.338,09 €      63.928.338,09 €      255.713.352,35 €    
SC Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       143.825.975,03 €    149.027.303,54 €    147.615.992,68 €    148.237.053,29 €    588.706.324,53 €    
SC Lost -  €                     55.943.688,66 €    55.943.688,66 €      5.003.941,87 €        17.886.936,38 €      12.379.349,81 €      15.133.143,09 €      162.290.748,47 €    
SC to be Received -  €                     -  €                     279.566.069,70 €    501.401.746,01 €    431.510.228,59 €    361.618.711,16 €    291.727.193,73 €    291.727.193,73 €    
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       69.891.517,43 €      69.891.517,43 €      69.891.517,43 €      209.674.552,28 €    
SC Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       164.105.282,92 €    162.551.181,33 €    163.294.632,11 €    489.951.096,35 €    
SC Lost -  €                     -  €                     57.730.393,39 €      57.730.393,39 €      19.696.664,20 €      13.631.842,32 €      16.664.253,26 €      165.453.546,56 €    
SC to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       320.835.586,42 €    567.542.110,60 €    487.333.213,99 €    407.124.317,39 €    407.124.317,39 €    
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       80.208.896,61 €      80.208.896,61 €      160.417.793,21 €    
SC Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       172.577.461,94 €    173.366.769,32 €    345.944.231,25 €    
SC Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       74.129.062,24 €      74.129.062,24 €      14.472.664,73 €      44.300.863,48 €      207.031.652,70 €    
SC to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       337.780.207,17 €    597.989.189,76 €    513.544.137,97 €    513.544.137,97 €    
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       84.445.051,79 €      84.445.051,79 €      
SC Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       182.637.758,01 €    182.637.758,01 €    
SC Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       77.571.224,58 €      77.571.224,58 €      77.571.224,58 €      232.713.673,73 €    
SC to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       272.714.816,63 €    476.378.241,69 €    476.378.241,69 €    
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
SC Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       
SC Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       69.051.391,57 €      69.051.391,57 €      138.102.783,14 €    
260.690.544,55 €  721.661.855,78 €  1.135.824.953,03 €  1.549.395.241,54 €  1.934.889.481,23 €  2.188.611.892,20 €  2.042.487.023,63 €  2.042.487.023,63 €  
-  €                     -  €                     65.172.636,14 €      129.100.974,22 €    198.992.491,65 €    279.201.388,25 €    349.788.293,63 €    1.022.255.783,90 €  
-  €                     -  €                     149.825.373,22 €    298.935.200,57 €    473.851.188,45 €    642.064.578,50 €    827.526.457,58 €    2.392.202.798,32 €  
55.432.585,67 €    143.234.767,12 €  117.617.915,28 €    142.259.902,20 €    208.574.066,72 €    200.467.337,66 €    239.046.397,97 €    1.106.632.972,62 €  
-  €                     -  €                     214.998.009,36 €    428.036.174,80 €    672.843.680,10 €    921.265.966,75 €    1.177.314.751,21 €  3.414.458.582,22 €  
205.257.958,88 €  578.427.088,66 €  1.233.205.047,11 €  1.835.171.514,13 €  2.399.159.094,62 €  2.909.410.521,29 €  2.980.755.376,87 €  4.350.312.633,23 €  Total (A+B+C-D)
2009
Total SC to be Received (A)
Total SC Deferred (B)
Total SC Year (C)
Total SC Lost (D)
Total Received (B+C)








Finally, the pessimistic model (table 107) simulates the worst situation possible. A situation that 
although is the worst for the state, for the companies, will not be worse than the no model case that is 
why the failure rate will be equal to the one in that model. In here the state will be harmed by the SC 








2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
SC to be Received 260.690.544,55 €  573.519.198,01 €  508.346.561,88 €    443.173.925,74 €    378.001.289,60 €    312.828.653,46 €    234.621.490,10 €    234.621.490,10 €      
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     65.172.636,14 €      65.172.636,14 €      65.172.636,14 €      65.172.636,14 €      78.207.163,37 €      338.897.707,92 €      
SC Year -  €                     -  €                     375.394.384,15 €    450.473.260,99 €    540.567.913,18 €    648.681.495,82 €    778.417.794,98 €    2.793.534.849,12 €    
SC Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                         
SC to be Received -  €                     255.713.352,35 €  562.569.375,16 €    498.641.037,07 €    434.712.698,99 €    370.784.360,90 €    306.856.022,81 €    306.856.022,81 €      
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       63.928.338,09 €      63.928.338,09 €      63.928.338,09 €      63.928.338,09 €      255.713.352,35 €      
SC Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       368.227.227,38 €    441.872.672,85 €    530.247.207,42 €    636.296.648,91 €    1.976.643.756,56 €    
SC Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                         
SC to be Received -  €                     -  €                     279.566.069,70 €    615.045.353,35 €    545.153.835,92 €    475.262.318,49 €    405.370.801,07 €    405.370.801,07 €      
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       69.891.517,43 €      69.891.517,43 €      69.891.517,43 €      209.674.552,28 €      
SC Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       402.575.140,37 €    483.090.168,45 €    579.708.202,14 €    1.465.373.510,95 €    
SC Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                         
SC to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       320.835.586,42 €    705.838.290,12 €    625.629.393,52 €    545.420.496,91 €    545.420.496,91 €      
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       80.208.896,61 €      80.208.896,61 €      160.417.793,21 €      
SC Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       462.003.244,45 €    554.403.893,33 €    1.016.407.137,78 €    
SC Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                         
SC to be Received -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       337.780.207,17 €    743.116.455,77 €    658.671.403,97 €    658.671.403,97 €      
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       84.445.051,79 €      84.445.051,79 €        
SC Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       486.403.498,32 €    486.403.498,32 €      
SC Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                         
SC to be Received -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       272.714.816,63 €    599.972.596,59 €    599.972.596,59 €      
SC Deferred -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                         
SC Year -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                         
SC Lost -  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                         
260.690.544,55 €  829.232.550,36 €  1.350.482.006,74 €  1.877.695.902,58 €  2.401.486.321,80 €  2.800.335.998,77 €  2.750.912.811,46 €  2.750.912.811,46 €    
-  €                     -  €                     65.172.636,14 €      129.100.974,22 €    198.992.491,65 €    279.201.388,25 €    376.680.967,27 €    1.049.148.457,54 €    
-  €                     -  €                     375.394.384,15 €    818.700.488,36 €    1.385.015.726,41 €  2.124.022.116,13 €  3.035.230.037,68 €  7.738.362.752,74 €    
-  €                     -  €                     -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                       -  €                         
-  €                     -  €                     440.567.020,29 €    947.801.462,59 €    1.584.008.218,06 €  2.403.223.504,39 €  3.411.911.004,95 €  8.787.511.210,28 €    
260.690.544,55 €  829.232.550,36 €  1.791.049.027,03 €  2.825.497.365,16 €  3.985.494.539,85 €  5.203.559.503,16 €  6.162.823.816,41 €  11.538.424.021,74 €  
Total SC Deferred (B)
Total SC Year (C)








Total SC to be Received (A)
Optimistic Model (in units €)
2004
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Part 4 - Model for the Impact caused by the Unemployment 
This fourth appendix is meant to address an external impact of the failure of companies, based on the 
unemployment resultant. There are two impacts to be addressed, the direct cost impacts the Social 
Security through the increase of the unemployment subsidy and the other impact can be seen in the 
loss of buying power by the workers that see their monthly gain reduced, which will also affect the 
rest of the economy because this way they have less money to spent. 
 
The first step of this study was to find the average number of employees per company per year. For 
that it is necessary to know the number of companies and workers. 
Table 108 shows the number of workers by year and by company age. Although the company age is 
not implicit referred on the table, the categories used were the same as on the previously analyses, 
being grouped in companies with less than one year, from 1 to 4 years and from 5 to 9 years – the only 
ones that matter for this case. 
The goal is to find the average number of employees per company age starting with the companies 
created each year that is why the total workers is needed. From tables 72 to 78 all of the values 
displayed on table 108 can be retrieved. And because the companies will grow older there are years in 
which they will be contemplated on the same segment. For example, in the year of 2006 the companies 
created in 2004 and 2005 have already two and one year respectively that is why they share the same 




The same logic is applied for the total number of companies, with the data being retrieved from the 
tables 17, 22, 26, 30, 34, 38 and 42 for each of the years. 
In both tables (108 and 109) the year of 2010 does not show any values because they will not be 




Table 110 is the result of dividing the values from the table 108 with the ones of the table 109. This 
way, the average number of workers per company is achieved. As expected the numbers will be 
shared in the cases in which the companies are in the same segment. 
Although the values show two decimal cases, this wouldn’t make sense therefore when to be used, 
these values will be rounded to the unit. 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2004  94.505    402.130   401.629  412.815  416.473  538.024  -   
2005          -        96.095   401.629  412.815  416.473  429.977  -   
2006          -                -     111.660  412.815  416.473  429.977  -   
2007          -                -     -           125.887  416.473  429.977  -   
2008          -                -     -           -           129.294  429.977  -   
2009          -                -     -           -           -           110.673  -   
2010          -                -     -           -           -           -           -   
Total Workers by Year and Company Age (in units)
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2004  21.292    71.514   71.315  73.014  73.328  82.893  -      
2005          -      21.940   71.315  73.014  73.328  82.893  -      
2006          -              -     25.514  73.014  73.328  82.893  -      
2007          -              -     -         28.724  73.328  82.893  -      
2008          -              -     -         -         29.491  82.893  -      
2009          -              -     -         -         -         25.875  -      
2010          -              -     -         -         -         -         -      
Total Companies by Year and Company Age (in units)
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Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2004   -      4.528    7.130       254       326    1.087       668   
2005   -            -      4.800    4.800       429    1.430       879   
2006   -            -            -      5.269    5.269    1.798    1.105   
2007   -            -            -            -      6.637    6.637    1.296   
2008   -            -            -            -            -      6.773    6.773   
2009   -            -            -            -            -            -      6.552   
2010   -            -            -            -            -            -            -     




Tables 111 to 114 show the number of companies failed in each year, per model. These failed 
companies are referent only to those created in the preceding years (the startups).  
These values can be calculated by subtracting the companies that are existent in each year from the 














Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2004      4,44        5,62   5,63    5,65    5,68    6,49    -       
2005         -          4,38   5,63    5,65    5,68    5,50    -       
2006         -             -     4,38    5,65    5,68    5,50    -       
2007         -             -     -      4,38    5,68    5,50    -       
2008         -             -     -      -       4,38    5,50    -       
2009         -             -     -      -       -       4,28    -       
2010         -             -     -      -       -       -       -       
Average Number of Workers per Company / Year (in units)
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2004   -      4.528   7.130  254     326     1.087  668     
2005   -            -     4.800  4.800  429     1.430  879     
2006   -            -             -     5.269  5.269  1.798  1.105  
2007   -            -             -             -     6.637  6.637  1.296  
2008   -            -             -             -             -     6.773  6.773  
2009   -            -             -             -             -             -     6.552  
2010   -            -             -             -             -             -             -     
Failed Companies (in units)
No Model
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2004   -      946   959     510  657  2.187  1.345  
2005   -         -     1.034  550  708  2.358  1.450  
2006   -         -             -     672  864  2.878  1.770  
2007   -         -             -           -     999  2.448  2.120  
2008   -         -             -           -           -     3.540  2.176  
2009   -         -             -           -           -             -     2.170  
2010   -         -             -           -           -             -             -     
Failed Companies (in units)
Realistic Model
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2004   -       -       -       -       -       -       -     
2005   -       -       -       -       -       -       -     
2006   -       -       -       -       -       -       -     
2007   -       -       -       -       -       -       -     
2008   -       -       -       -       -       -       -     
2009   -       -       -       -       -       -       -     
2010   -       -       -       -       -       -       -     
Failed Companies (in units)
Optimistic Model
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Knowing the number of companies failed and the average number of workers per company it is 
possible to estimate the number of workers unemployed as a result of the failure of the startups by 
multiplying each by its correspondent value. 










Instituto Nacional de Estatistica (2011) (78) provides the necessary data to continue with the 
reasoning. It displays information about the annual subsidy paid to each unemployed worker, on 
average and the number of days, on average, each worker was unemployed that year. 
From the annual subsidy, the daily subsidy is reached through its division by 365 (number of days on 
a common year). Multiplying that value by the average unemployment days, the average subsidy that 
a worker receives is achieved. Table 119 shows the final values for each year. 
 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2004   -      20.095   40.091  1.428    1.845    6.173    4.337    
2005   -              -     21.023  27.031  2.427    8.119    4.836    
2006   -              -               -     23.058  29.788  10.209  6.081    
2007   -              -               -               -     29.086  37.694  7.129    
2008   -              -               -               -               -     29.692  37.261  
2009   -              -               -               -               -               -     28.022  
2010   -              -               -               -               -               -               -     
No Model
Unemployment (in units)
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2004   -      4.198   5.390  2.874  3.713  12.421  8.727    
2005   -            -     4.527  3.099  4.004  13.393  7.977    
2006   -            -             -     2.939  4.887  16.346  9.735    
2007   -            -             -             -     4.380  13.905  11.662  
2008   -            -             -             -             -     15.518  11.973  
2009   -            -             -             -             -               -     9.281    
2010   -            -             -             -             -               -               -     
Realistic Model
Unemployment (in units)
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2004   -       -       -       -       -       -       -     
2005   -       -       -       -       -       -       -     
2006   -       -       -       -       -       -       -     
2007   -       -       -       -       -       -       -     
2008   -       -       -       -       -       -       -     
2009   -       -       -       -       -       -       -     
2010   -       -       -       -       -       -       -     
Optimistic Model
Unemployment (in units)
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2004   -      20.095    40.091      1.428      1.845      6.173      4.337   
2005   -              -      21.023    27.031      2.427      8.119      4.836   
2006   -              -              -      23.058    29.788    10.209      6.081   
2007   -              -              -              -      29.086    37.694      7.129   
2008   -              -              -              -              -      29.692    37.261   
2009   -              -              -              -              -              -      28.022   
2010   -              -              -              -              -              -              -     
Pessimistic Model
Unemployment (in units)
Portuguese Startups: Benefits and Consequences of a Model of Tax Deferral 
 
 
CATÓLICA-LISBON School of Business & Economics                     Page 123 
by Pedro Filipe Abreu 
Table 119 
Source: (INE, 2011) (78) 
 
With the unemployment numbers calculated on the tables 115 to 118 and the average subsidy for each 
worker per year it is easy to find the total cost of those subsidies per year for each model. 
For example, for the year of 2005, we see that the subsidy cost was only spent with the unemployed 
workers from the previous year. From 2004 we had in the no model situation 20.095 unemployed 
workers (table 115) that will receive the subsidy during the year of 2005. Therefore that value of 20.095 
will multiply by 2.254,42€ with the expected result of 45.303.508,91€. 
The same logic was applied for the rest of the model and for the remaining models with the 
correspondent values.  
The optimistic model, as it assumes no failure, will not have unemployment costs. While the 






Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2004  -   €  45.303.508,91 €     82.710.293,01 €       2.672.817,96 €       3.139.382,79 €     12.402.408,62 €       9.017.273,12 € 
2005  -   €                     -   € 43.372.545,67 €   50.582.787,27 €   4.129.353,66 €     16.313.375,86 €   10.053.640,11 €   
2006  -   €                     -   € -  €                    43.147.415,73 €   50.675.370,45 €   20.513.066,85 €   12.641.834,13 €   
2007  -   €                     -   €                        -   €                        -   € 49.480.479,65 €   75.735.307,92 €   14.820.847,07 €   
2008  -   €                     -   €                        -   €                        -   €                        -   € 59.658.297,82 €   77.466.349,49 €   
2009  -   €                     -   €                        -   €                        -   €                        -   €                        -   € 58.259.567,15 €   
2010  -   €                     -   €                        -   €                        -   €                        -   €                        -   €                        -   € 
Total  -   €  45.303.508,91 €   126.082.838,68 €     96.403.020,96 €   107.424.586,56 €   184.622.457,07 €   182.259.511,08 € 
Total Cumulative  -   €  45.303.508,91 €   171.386.347,59 €   267.789.368,55 €   375.213.955,11 €   559.836.412,18 €   742.095.923,25 € 
Unemployment Cost (in units €)
No Model
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2004  -   €  9.464.788,87 €  11.120.484,82 €    5.378.250,20 €    6.317.072,99 €     24.956.154,01 €     18.144.576,88 € 
2005  -   €                   -   €    9.340.299,21 €    5.799.352,41 €    6.811.682,44 €     26.910.152,29 €     16.584.242,82 € 
2006  -   €                   -   €                     -   €    5.500.066,07 €    8.313.172,20 €     32.841.920,01 €     20.239.884,57 € 
2007  -   €                   -   €                     -   €                     -   €    7.450.799,17 €     27.938.286,90 €     24.246.107,90 € 
2008  -   €                   -   €                     -   €                     -   €                     -   €     31.179.886,27 €     24.893.250,91 € 
2009  -   €                   -   €                     -   €                     -   €                     -   €                        -   €     19.296.030,46 € 
2010  -   €                   -   €                     -   €                     -   €                     -   €                        -   €                        -   € 
Total  -   €  9.464.788,87 €  20.460.784,03 €  16.677.668,69 €  28.892.726,80 €   143.826.399,49 €   123.404.093,54 € 
Total Cumulative  -   €  9.464.788,87 €  29.925.572,90 €  46.603.241,58 €  75.495.968,38 €   219.322.367,87 €   342.726.461,42 € 
Unemployment Cost (in units €)
Realistic Model
Year Annual Subsidy Daily Subsidy Unemployment Days Average Subsidy
2010 3.497,00 €         9,58 €            217 2.079,04 €            
2009 3.411,00 €         9,35 €            215 2.009,22 €            
2008 3.136,00 €         8,59 €            198 1.701,17 €            
2007 3.268,00 €         8,95 €            209 1.871,27 €            
2006 3.392,00 €         9,29 €            222 2.063,08 €            
2005 3.472,00 €         9,51 €            237 2.254,42 €            
2004 2.994,00 €         8,20 €            210 1.722,58 €            
Average Unemployment Cost per Worker per Year (in units and units €)
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To assess the loss of buying power, table 124 shows the average monthly gain per worker and by 
company age each year. The values were calculated dividing the total gain of workers of each segment 
(tables 79-85) by the total number of workers of the correspondent segment (tables 72 to 78). For 
example for the year of 2004, the value of 756,18€ is the result of the division of the sum of the values 
displayed on row of the companies with less than one year of the table 85 (71.463.488,53€) with the 
sum of the values of the correspondent row on the table 78 (94.505). 
Applying the same calculations for the rest of the cells, table 124 is achieved. However not all the 




The Portuguese remuneration system used, at the years in question, to pay the equivalent of 14 
months of salary (the 12 months of the year plus the holiday and the Christmas subsidy), therefore it is 
important to calculate the average annual gain before the daily one. 







Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2004  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   € 
2005  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   € 
2006  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   € 
2007  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   € 
2008  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   € 
2009  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   € 
2010  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   € 
Total  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   € 
Total Cumulative  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   €  -   € 
Unemployment Cost (in units €)
Optimistic Model
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2004  -   €  45.303.508,91 €     82.710.293,01 €       2.672.817,96 €       3.139.382,79 €     12.402.408,62 €       9.017.273,12 € 
2005  -   €                     -   €     43.372.545,67 €     50.582.787,27 €       4.129.353,66 €     16.313.375,86 €     10.053.640,11 € 
2006  -   €                     -   €                        -   €     43.147.415,73 €     50.675.370,45 €     20.513.066,85 €     12.641.834,13 € 
2007  -   €                     -   €                        -   €                        -   €     49.480.479,65 €     75.735.307,92 €     14.820.847,07 € 
2008  -   €                     -   €                        -   €                        -   €                        -   €     59.658.297,82 €     77.466.349,49 € 
2009  -   €                     -   €                        -   €                        -   €                        -   €                        -   €     58.259.567,15 € 
2010  -   €                     -   €                        -   €                        -   €                        -   €                        -   €                        -   € 
Total  -   €  45.303.508,91 €   126.082.838,68 €     96.403.020,96 €   107.424.586,56 €   184.622.457,07 €   182.259.511,08 € 
Total Cumulative  -   €  45.303.508,91 €   171.386.347,59 €   267.789.368,55 €   375.213.955,11 €   559.836.412,18 €   742.095.923,25 € 
Unemployment Cost (in units €)
Pessimistic Model
Year < 1 year 1 - 4 years 4 to 9 years
2010 853,07 €     941,79 €  1.010,69 €  
2009 829,16 €     919,72 €  988,72 €     
2008 876,85 €     963,62 €  -  €          
2007 835,80 €     919,78 €  -  €          
2006 807,38 €     891,13 €  -  €          
2005 780,63 €     864,73 €  -  €          
2004 756,18 €     -  €        -  €          
Average Monthly Gain per Worker / 
Year by Company Age (in units €)
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Table 125 
 
To achieve the average daily gain, from the annual gain the same method as before is used, by 
dividing the values of table 125 by 365 (the number of days of a common year), with the final values 




The average daily loss is achieved by subtracting the average daily subsidy (table 119) to the average 
daily gain (table 126). This will give how much has the worker really lost in buying power. 
Table 127 shows the values for all the years. For example in 2005, the workers used to gain on average 




Calculating the annual loss of buying power by multiplying the average unemployment days on table 




Year < 1 year 1 - 4 years 4 to 9 years
2010 11.942,99 € 13.185,05 € 14.149,61 € 
2009 11.608,21 € 12.876,11 € 13.842,05 € 
2008 12.275,94 € 13.490,72 € -  €            
2007 11.701,21 € 12.876,93 € -  €            
2006 11.303,28 € 12.475,77 € -  €            
2005 10.928,83 € 12.106,24 € -  €            
2004 10.586,57 € -  €            -  €            
Average Annual Gain per Worker / Year by 
Company Age (in units €)
Year < 1 year 1 - 4 years 4 to 9 years
2010 32,72 € 36,12 €    38,77 €       
2009 31,80 € 35,28 €    37,92 €       
2008 33,63 € 36,96 €    -  €          
2007 32,06 € 35,28 €    -  €          
2006 30,97 € 34,18 €    -  €          
2005 29,94 € 33,17 €    -  €          
2004 29,00 € -  €        -  €          
Average Daily Gain per Worker / 
Year by Company Age (in units €)
Year < 1 year 1 - 4 years 4 to 9 years
2010 23,14 € 26,54 €    29,19 €       
2009 22,46 € 25,93 €    28,58 €       
2008 25,04 € 28,37 €    -  €          
2007 23,10 € 26,33 €    -  €          
2006 21,67 € 24,89 €    -  €          
2005 20,43 € 23,66 €    -  €          
2004 20,80 € -  €        -  €          
Average Daily Loss of Buying Power per 
Worker / Year by Company Age (in units 
Year < 1 year 1 - 4 years 4 to 9 years
2010 5.021,31 € 5.759,75 €   6.333,20 €    
2009 4.828,49 € 5.575,34 €   6.144,32 €    
2008 4.958,10 € 5.617,08 €   -  €            
2007 4.828,88 € 5.502,10 €   -  €            
2006 4.811,79 € 5.524,92 €   -  €            
2005 4.841,83 € 5.606,34 €   -  €            
2004 4.368,33 € -  €            -  €            
Average Annual Loss of Buying Power per 
Worker / Year by Company Age (in units €)
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Having the average loss of buying power per worker in each year, the next step is to apply that 
estimated cost to each model, because the number of unemployed workers will be different (except for 
the no model and pessimistic one). Once again on the optimistic model there is no loss of buying 
power once there is no failure or unemployment. 










Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2004  -   €     97.298.530,45 €   221.498.031,41 €         7.858.908,72 €       10.365.885,30 €       37.927.323,71 €       27.468.548,76 € 
2005  -   €                        -   €   101.159.244,82 €     148.728.987,09 €       13.634.656,65 €       45.267.631,66 €       30.625.544,99 € 
2006  -   €                        -   €                        -   €     111.343.714,91 €     167.324.315,85 €       56.921.262,79 €       35.022.814,42 € 
2007  -   €                        -   €                        -   €                          -   €     144.211.883,59 €     210.156.257,77 €       41.059.530,72 € 
2008  -   €                        -   €                        -   €                          -   €                          -   €     143.368.943,09 €     214.612.021,89 € 
2009  -   €                        -   €                        -   €                          -   €                          -   €                          -   €     140.709.088,40 € 
2010  -   €                        -   €                        -   €                          -   €                          -   €                          -   €                          -   € 
Total  -   €     97.298.530,45 €   322.657.276,23 €     267.931.610,71 €     335.536.741,40 €     493.641.419,01 €     489.497.549,18 € 
Total Cumulative  -   €     97.298.530,45 €   419.955.806,68 €     687.887.417,39 €   1.023.424.158,78 €   1.517.065.577,80 €   2.006.563.126,98 € 
Loss of Buying Power (in units €)
No Model
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2004        -   €  20.327.565,57 €     29.780.640,42 €     15.813.713,48 €     20.858.257,30 €       76.317.444,52 €       55.272.274,47 € 
2005        -   €                     -   €     21.784.693,52 €     17.051.883,79 €     22.491.401,53 €       74.672.395,97 €       50.519.162,11 € 
2006        -   €                     -   €                        -   €     14.193.151,04 €     27.449.150,12 €       91.132.329,12 €       56.072.379,53 € 
2007        -   €                     -   €                        -   €                        -   €     21.715.508,62 €       77.525.344,32 €       67.171.181,74 € 
2008        -   €                     -   €                        -   €                        -   €                        -   €       74.930.521,05 €       68.964.020,43 € 
2009        -   €                     -   €                        -   €                        -   €                        -   €                          -   €       46.603.965,47 € 
2010        -   €                     -   €                        -   €                        -   €                        -   €                          -   €                          -   € 
Total        -   €  20.327.565,57 €     51.565.333,94 €     47.058.748,31 €     92.514.317,58 €     394.578.034,99 €     344.602.983,75 € 
Total Cumulative        -   €  20.327.565,57 €     71.892.899,51 €   118.951.647,82 €   211.465.965,39 €     606.044.000,38 €     950.646.984,13 € 
Loss of Buying Power (in units €)
Realistic Model
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2004        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   € 
2005        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   € 
2006        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   € 
2007        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   € 
2008        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   € 
2009        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   € 
2010        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   € 
Total        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   € 
Total Cumulative        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   €        -   € 
Loss of Buying Power (in units €)
Optimistic Model
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2004  -   €     97.298.530,45 €   221.498.031,41 €         7.858.908,72 €       10.365.885,30 €       37.927.323,71 €       27.468.548,76 € 
2005  -   €                        -   €   101.159.244,82 €     148.728.987,09 €       13.634.656,65 €       45.267.631,66 €       30.625.544,99 € 
2006  -   €                        -   €                        -   €     111.343.714,91 €     167.324.315,85 €       56.921.262,79 €       35.022.814,42 € 
2007  -   €                        -   €                        -   €                          -   €     144.211.883,59 €     210.156.257,77 €       41.059.530,72 € 
2008  -   €                        -   €                        -   €                          -   €                          -   €     143.368.943,09 €     214.612.021,89 € 
2009  -   €                        -   €                        -   €                          -   €                          -   €                          -   €     140.709.088,40 € 
2010  -   €                        -   €                        -   €                          -   €                          -   €                          -   €                          -   € 
Total  -   €     97.298.530,45 €   322.657.276,23 €     267.931.610,71 €     335.536.741,40 €     493.641.419,01 €     489.497.549,18 € 
Total Cumulative  -   €     97.298.530,45 €   419.955.806,68 €     687.887.417,39 €   1.023.424.158,78 €   1.517.065.577,80 €   2.006.563.126,98 € 
Pessimistic Model
Loss of Buying Power (in units €)
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Part 5 - Resumed Impact on the Number of Companies and Unemployment 
This fifth part is meant to resume the values achieved, concerning the creation of companies, the 
failure of these and the unemployment resultant. The values are resumed and displayed for each 
situation from table 133 to 136. 















Year of Creation Companies Created Companies Failed Existent Existent (%) Unemployment
2004                    23.556                   13.992        9.564   40,60%             73.970   
2005                    22.059                   12.337        9.722   44,07%             63.437   
2006                    25.651                   13.440      12.211   47,60%             69.136   
2007                    28.911                   14.569      14.342   49,61%             73.909   
2008                    29.657                   13.545      16.112   54,33%             66.953   
2009                    25.875                     6.552      19.323   74,68%             28.022   
TOTAL                  155.709                   74.436      81.273   52,20%           375.427   
Companies Dissolved / Unemployment- No Model
Year of Creation Companies Created Companies Failed Existent Existent (%) Unemployment
2004                    23.556                     6.603       16.953   71,97%             37.324   
2005                    22.059                     6.100       15.959   72,35%             33.001   
2006                    25.651                     6.183       19.468   75,89%             33.907   
2007                    28.911                     5.567       23.344   80,74%             29.947   
2008                    29.657                     5.716       23.941   80,73%             27.492   
2009                    25.875                     2.170       23.705   91,61%               9.281   
TOTAL                  155.709                   32.340     123.369   79,23%           170.952   
Companies Dissolved / Unemployment- Realistic Model
Year of Creation Companies Created Companies Failed Existent Existent (%) Unemployment
2004                    23.556                          -         23.556   100,00%                    -     
2005                    22.059                          -         22.059   100,00%                    -     
2006                    25.651                          -         25.651   100,00%                    -     
2007                    28.911                          -         28.911   100,00%                    -     
2008                    29.657                          -         29.657   100,00%                    -     
2009                    25.875                          -         25.875   100,00%                    -     
TOTAL                  155.709                          -       155.709   100,00%                    -     
Companies Dissolved / Unemployment - Optimistic Model
Year of Creation Companies Created Companies Failed Existent Existent (%) Unemployment
2004                    23.556                   13.992         9.564   40,60%             73.970   
2005                    22.059                   12.337         9.722   44,07%             63.437   
2006                    25.651                   13.440       12.211   47,60%             69.136   
2007                    28.911                   14.569       14.342   49,61%             73.909   
2008                    29.657                   13.545       16.112   54,33%             66.953   
2009                    25.875                     6.552       19.323   74,68%             28.022   
TOTAL                  155.709                   74.436       81.273   52,20%           375.427   
Companies Dissolved / Unemployment- Pessimistic Model
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Part 6 - Startups’ Analysis 
The sixth part of the third appendix addresses the impact that a model of tax deferral would have on 
the startups. With this purpose, seven companies were analyzed on their initial years of existence. 
The calculations done were meant to see the real impact of the CIT and SC charged on the net income. 
Not all the necessary information was able to be extracted for all the companies and in some cases the 
analyses could only be done for one year. 
The following tables (from the 133 to the 138) show the calculations made. The Income Before Tax, 
Income Tax, Net Income and Social Charges were provided by the companies.  
With this information, the first step was to calculate the percentage of the net income which is 
represented by the income tax (CIT). To do that a simple division was performed dividing the income 
tax by the net income (row 5) and multiply it by 100 to have the value in percentage. The next row was 
to see what would the company’s final result be without the CIT, which will be equal to the value of 
the Income Before Tax. 
The same procedure was performed for the Social Charges and then for the combination of both. With 











Income Before Tax 14.285,76 €-   Income Before Tax 76.144,82 €-   
Income Tax 3.394,40 €     Income Tax -  €              
Net Income 17.680,16 €-   Net Income 76.144,82 €-   
Social Charges 1.377,21 €     Social Charges 6.886,13 €     
Income Tax / Net Income (%) 19,20% Income Tax / Net Income (%) 0,00%
Income Tax + Net Income 14.285,76 €-   Income Tax + Net Income 76.144,82 €-   
Social Charges / Net Income (%) 7,79% Social Charges / Net Income (%) 9,04%
Social Charges + Net Income 16.302,95 €-   Social Charges + Net Income 69.258,69 €-   
(IT + SC) / Net Income (%) 26,99% (IT + SC) / Net Income (%) 9,04%
IT + SC + Net Income 12.908,55 €-   IT + SC + Net Income 69.258,69 €-   
Year / Results *
* Although the company was created in 2001 it was on a research and development phase until 2004. Only in 2004 the 
commercialization process started. Therefore, for simulation purposes this company is considered for this study.
MOVE INTERACTIVE - PRODUÇÕES MULTIMÉDIA
Year of Constitution - 2001
Company Still Existent
2006 2007
Income Before Tax 145.130,42 €- Income Before Tax 237.256,53 €- 
Income Tax 37.019,40 €-   Income Tax -  €              
Net Income 108.111,02 €- Net Income 237.256,53 €- 
Social Charges 11.585,06 €   Social Charges 16.666,67 €   
Income Tax / Net Income (%) -34,24% Income Tax / Net Income (%) 0,00%
Income Tax + Net Income 145.130,42 €- Income Tax + Net Income 237.256,53 €- 
Social Charges / Net Income (%) 10,72% Social Charges / Net Income (%) 7,02%
Social Charges + Net Income 96.525,96 €-   Social Charges + Net Income 220.589,86 €- 
(IT + SC) / Net Income (%) 23,53% (IT + SC) / Net Income (%) 7,02%
IT + SC + Net Income 96.525,96 €-   IT + SC + Net Income 220.589,86 €- 
MTB - MARCAS, TRADE & BRANDING
Year of Constitution - 2006
Year / Results
Failed Company
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Income Before Tax 420.241,57 €- 
Income Tax 1.130,36 €     
Net Income 421.371,93 €- 
Social Charges 29.294,59 €   
Income Tax / Net Income (%) 0,27%
Income Tax + Net Income 420.241,57 €- 
Social Charges / Net Income (%) 6,95%
Social Charges + Net Income 392.077,34 €- 
(IT + SC) / Net Income (%) 7,22%
IT + SC + Net Income 390.946,98 €- 
OON - RECYCLING SOLUTIONS
Year of Constitution - 2008
Failed Company
Year / Results*
* In this case, it was only possible to access information of the first year of activity
2006
Income Before Tax 319.170,72 €- 
Income Tax 1.338,32 €     
Net Income 320.509,04 €- 
Social Charges 17.885,66 €   
Income Tax / Net Income (%) 0,42%
Income Tax + Net Income 319.170,72 €- 
Social Charges / Net Income (%) 5,58%
Social Charges + Net Income 302.623,38 €- 
(IT + SC) / Net Income (%) 6,00%
IT + SC + Net Income 301.285,06 €- 
* In this case, it was only possible to access information of the second year of activity
SATELLITE NEWSPAPERS PORTUGAL - DISTRIBUIÇÃO DE IMPRENSA, JORNAIS E REVISTAS




Income Before Tax 1.373,35 €-     Income Before Tax 10.597,78 €-   
Income Tax -  €              Income Tax 388,82 €        
Net Income 1.373,35 €-     Net Income 10.986,60 €-   
Social Charges 1.200,63 €     Social Charges 1.487,50 €     
Income Tax / Net Income (%) 0,00% Income Tax / Net Income (%) 3,54%
Income Tax + Net Income 1.373,35 €-     Income Tax + Net Income 10.597,78 €-   
Social Charges / Net Income (%) 87,42% Social Charges / Net Income (%) 13,54%
Social Charges + Net Income 172,72 €-        Social Charges + Net Income 9.499,10 €-     
(IT + SC) / Net Income (%) 87,42% (IT + SC) / Net Income (%) 17,08%
IT + SC + Net Income 172,72 €-        IT + SC + Net Income 9.110,28 €-     
LUFTHAFEN
Year of Constitution - 2005
Still Existent Company
Year / Results*
Portuguese Startups: Benefits and Consequences of a Model of Tax Deferral 
 
 
CATÓLICA-LISBON School of Business & Economics                     Page 130 
by Pedro Filipe Abreu 
Company Net Income (NI) CIT CIT % of NI NI + CIT SC SC % of NI NI + SC CIT + SC (CIT + SC) % of NI NI + CIT + SC
MTB 108.111,02 €-        37.019,40 €-  -34,24% 108.111,02 €-  11.585,06 € 10,72% 96.525,96 €-   11.585,06 €   10,72% 96.525,96 €-     
OON 421.371,93 €-        1.130,36 €    0,27% 420.241,57 €-  29.294,59 € 6,95% 392.077,34 €- 30.424,95 €   7,22% 390.946,98 €-   
SATELLITE
SMART ADVERTISING 365.069,68 €-        -  €            0,00% 365.069,68 €-  -  €            0,00% 365.069,68 €- -  €             0,00% 365.069,68 €-   
MOVE 17.680,16 €-          3.394,40 €    19,20% 14.285,76 €-    1.377,21 €   7,79% 16.302,95 €-   4.771,61 €     26,99% 12.908,55 €-     
WIDESCOPE 3.842,40 €-            2.224,18 €    57,89% 1.618,22 €-      1.114,69 €   29,01% 2.727,71 €-     3.338,87 €     86,90% 503,53 €-          
LUFTHAFEN 1.373,35 €-            -  €            0,00% 1.373,35 €-      1.200,63 €   87,42% 172,72 €-        1.200,63 €     87,42% 172,72 €-          
Company Net Income (NI) CIT CIT % of NI NI + CIT SC SC % of NI NI + SC CIT + SC (CIT + SC) % of NI NI + CIT + SC
MTB 237.256,53 €-        -  €            -  €            237.256,53 €-  16.666,67 € 0,07 €       220.589,86 €- 16.666,67 €   0,07 €                      220.589,86 €-   
OON
SATELLITE 320.509,04 €-        1.338,32 €    0,00 €          319.170,72 €-  17.885,66 € 0,06 €       302.623,38 €- 19.223,98 €   0,06 €                      301.285,06 €-   
SMART ADVERTISING 130.174,28 €-        -  €            -  €            130.174,28 €-  -  €            -  €         130.174,28 €- -  €             -  €                       130.174,28 €-   
MOVE 76.144,82 €-          -  €            -  €            76.144,82 €-    6.886,13 €   0,09 €       69.258,69 €-   6.886,13 €     0,09 €                      69.258,69 €-     
WIDESCOPE 500,22 €               -  €            -  €            500,22 €         1.540,16 €   3,08 €       2.040,38 €     1.540,16 €     3,08 €                      2.040,38 €       











Table 143 resumes the most important findings of the previous tables by displaying the calculated 


















Income Before Tax 1.618,22 €-     Income Before Tax 500,22 €        
Income Tax 2.224,18 €     Income Tax -  €              
Net Income 3.842,40 €-     Net Income 500,22 €        
Social Charges 1.114,69 €     Social Charges 1.540,16 €     
Income Tax / Net Income (%) 57,89% Income Tax / Net Income (%) 0,00%
Income Tax + Net Income 1.618,22 €-     Income Tax + Net Income 500,22 €        
Social Charges / Net Income (%) 29,01% Social Charges / Net Income (%) 307,90%
Social Charges + Net Income 2.727,71 €-     Social Charges + Net Income 2.040,38 €     
(IT + SC) / Net Income (%) 86,90% (IT + SC) / Net Income (%) 307,90%
IT + SC + Net Income 503,53 €-        IT + SC + Net Income 2.040,38 €     
WIDESCOPE
Year of Constitution - 2005
Still Existent Company
Year / Results*
Portuguese Startups: Benefits and Consequences of a Model of Tax Deferral 
 
 
CATÓLICA-LISBON School of Business & Economics                     Page 131 
by Pedro Filipe Abreu 
Appendix 4 – Surveys 
This appendix includes the detailed information about the two surveys made.  
Survey one was made with the goal of questioning entrepreneurs with failed businesses, trying to 
understand the reasons and if taxes played any role in that failure. 
Survey two was made to the general public with the goal of trying to understand until what point the 
hypothesis of a tax deferral would act as an incentive to the creation of one’s own business and assess 
the perception of the level of risk a creation of a new business have in Portugal. 
The methods of collecting answers were exactly the same for both surveys and were done through an 
online survey using the platform available in the Survey Monkey (SM)52 web site, being diffused 
among the social networks and a mobile application of Jornal de Negócios (JN)53 available for 
smartphones and tablets.  
 
Survey 1 – Survey to Entrepreneurs 
This survey, aimed to question entrepreneurs, comprised seven closed questions, six of simple 
multiply choice and one demanding a quantitative measure. The sample size achieved 152 answers, 6 
from SM’s internet survey and the remaining 146 from the JN’s mobile application. 
In here, the most important questions were derived from the respondents who answered positively to 
the question of already having had a failed business (question 4). 
 
Briefly analyzing the questions and their purpose: 
 Question 1: ‚Please state your gender‛; Possible answer: ‚Male or Female‛. The goal was to have 
a demographic characterization of the sample, in this case defining its gender. 
 Question 2: ‚Please state your age‛; Possible answer: ‚15-24, 25-64, >65‛. The goal was also to 
have a demographic characterization of the sample, defining its age. In this case the answer 
would limit the possible respondents, excluding the ones with less than 15 years, because the 
target of this survey was to address a sample with propensity to engage in entrepreneurial 
activities (Ressi, 2011) (79). 
 Question 3: ‚Do you have or had in any time of your life your own business?‛; Possible  answer: 
‚Yes or No‛. The goal was to verify if the respondent has ever been or is currently involved in 
any entrepreneurial business. 
 Question 4: ‚Have you ever been involved in a business that failed (the company closed)?‛; Possible  
answer: ‚Yes or No‛. The goal in here was to verify the size of the sample that was of interest 
for this analysis. 
 Question 5: ‚If yes, what might have been the main reasons? (please classify in terms of importance, 
with 1- very important and 5- less important)”; Possible answer: evaluating the options ‚low sales, 
taxes, high costs, competition and lack of knowledge/expertise‛ from 1 to 5, not by order but as a 
factor of importance. The goal was to understand the significance of each of the five variables 
for the failure of the startups for the persons who answered yes on question 4. 
                                                          
52
 From this point forward the abbreviation SM (displayed in brackets) will be used when referring to Survey 
Monkey. SM is a private company founded in 1999 by Ryan Finley. Its mission “is to set research free. 
SurveyMonkey was created as a cost-effective and modern alternative to traditional market research” 
(Wikipedia, 2012) (109). All abbreviations can be seen on the list of abbreviations. 
53
 From this point forward the abbreviation JN (displayed in brackets) will be used when referring to Jornal de 
NegócioS. JN “is a daily business newspaper of *Portuguese+ national scope, initially created as a weekly 
newspaper on the 8
th
 of January of 1998 become daily on the 8
th
 of May of 2003”. Its web site “was the first 
economical and financial online publication in Portugal” (Wikipedia, 2012) (108). All abbreviations can be seen 
on the list of abbreviations. 
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 Question 6: ‚Is it possible that your company would have survived if it had more time to implement 
itself in the marketplace?‛; Possible answer: ‚Yes or No‛. The goal was to understand if with 
more time (possible gained from the deferral of taxes) the company would have survived. 
 Question 7: ‚Do you think your company would have survived or expanded (if it did not fail) if it 
didn't had to pay the CIT and Social Charges for the first 2 years of its activity, deferring them into the 
future?‛; Possible  answer: ‚Yes or No‛. The goal is to verify the possibility indicated on 
question 6 that the taxes might have had an impact on the firm’s survival. 
 
Question 1 - Gender 
 
 
More than 90% of the answers were given by men a consequence of the sources used (especially the 
JN application) that is targeted to businessmen. 
 
 
Question 2 - Age 
 
 
Once again the age of the respondents reflect the sources used, with more than 92% being within the 
25 to 65 segment (despite being the larger segment). 
 
 
Question 3 – Business Ownership 
 
 
A significant percentage (more than 60%) confirmed that have had a business in any time of their lives 
which is positive for the significance of this study.  
 
 
Question 4 – Failed Business Onership 
 
 
This question is important to define the size of the sample that matters for the questions 5 and 6. In 
here, only the people who answered ‚yes‛ will be relevant which represents a total of 40 people.  
 
Answer SM JN Total
Male 6 138 144   94,74% 94,74%
Female 0 8 8       5,26% 5,26%
Total 6 146 152   100%
Q1. Please state your gender
% of Total
Answer SM JN Total
15 - 24 0 8 8       5,26% 5,26%
25 -65 5 135 140   92,11% 92,11%
> 65 1 3 4       2,63% 2,63%
Total 6 138 152   100%
Q2. Please state your age
% of Total
Answer SM JN Total
Yes 6 86 92     60,53% 60,53%
No 0 60 60     39,47%
Total 6 146 152   100%
% of Total
Q3. Do you have or had in any time of your life your own business?
Answer SM JN Total
Yes 2 38 40     26,32% 26,32%
No 4 108 112   73,68% 73,68%
Total 6 146 152   100%
Q4. Have you ever been involved in a business that failed (the company 
closed)?
% of Total
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Question 5 – Failure Reasons 
 
 
From the people who answered ‚yes‛ on question 4, only 35 answers were validated (because they 
were the only ones that were completed). 
In the chart is displayed the significance each factor had on the failure of the company and how many 
times and in what measure (from 1 to 5) the respondents considered its importance. 
 
 
Question 6 – Time To Implement Importance For Survival 
 
 
On question 6, the answers validated were 40 (from the 40 that answered ‚yes‛ on question 4). From 
the validated questions, about 2/3 agreed that with more time the company would have survived. 
 
 
Question 7 – Taxes Importance For Survival 
 
 
Finally, question 7 includes once again the entire sample and about 67% agreed that the CIT and SC, if 
deferred, could influence the company’s existence or expansion. 
 
  


























0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Low Sales   2,43
High Costs   2,54
Taxes   2,74
Lack of Knowledge / Expertise   3,11
Competition   3,20
1 - Very Important 5 - Less Important
Answer SM JN Total
Yes 2 23 25     16,45% 16,45%
No 0 15 15     9,87% 9,87%
No answer / Not applicable 2 108 110   72,37% 72,37%
Total 2 146 150   100%
Q6.  Is it possible that your company would have survived if it had more 
time to implement itself in the marketplace?
% of Total
Answer SM JN Total
Yes 5 97 102   67,11% 67,11%
No 1 49 50     32,89% 32,89%
Total 6 146 152   100%
Q7. Do you think your company would have survived or expanded (if it did not 
fail) if it didn't had to pay the CIT and Social Charges for the first 2 years of its 
activity, deferring them into the future?
% of Total
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Survey 2 – Survey to the General Public 
This second survey, aimed to question the general public, also comprised seven closed questions, but 
all were simple multiply choice. The sample achieved 146 answers, 31 from the SM’s internet survey 
and the remaining 115 from the JN’s mobile application. 
Briefly analyzing the questions and its purpose: 
 Question 1: ‚Please state your gender‛; Possible answer: ‚Male or Female‛. The goal was to have 
a demographic characterization of the sample, in this case defining its gender. 
 Question 2: ‚Please state your age‛; Possible answer: ‚15-24, 25-64, >65‛. The goal was also to 
have a demographic characterization of the sample, defining its age. In this case the answer 
would limit the possible respondents, excluding the ones with less than 15 years, because the 
target of this survey was to address a sample with propensity to engage in entrepreneurial 
activities (Ressi, 2011) (79). 
 Question 3: ‚Do you have or had in any time of your life your own business?‛; Possible  answer: 
‚Yes or No‛. The goal was to verify if the respondent has ever been or is currently involved in 
any entrepreneurial business. 
 Question 4: ‚Do you intend to have your own business in any time of your life?‛; Possible  answer: 
‚Yes or No‛. The goal in here was to verify the size of the sample that might have interest in 
creating their own business. It is considered yes the persons that also answered yes on the 
previous question. 
 Question 5: ‚Do you think it is risky to start your own business in Portugal?”; Possible  answer: 
‚Yes or No‛. The goal was to understand the perception of risk associated with the creation of 
a business in Portugal. 
 Question 6: ‚Do you think that that risk has ever stopped, is stopping or will stop you from starting 
your own business?‛; Possible  answer: ‚Yes or No‛. The goal was to understand if the previous 
perception of risk is a blocker of the creation of new businesses in Portugal. 
 Question 7: ‚Knowing that the CIT and Social Charges are the most relevant taxes for the companies, 
would you have a higher incentive to create your own business if you knew that you wouldn't have to 
pay them for the first 2 years of your company's activity, deferring them into the future?; Possible  
answer: ‚Yes or No‛. The goal is to verify if in fact, the deferral of taxes would create an 
incentive for the creation of new businesses in Portugal or not. 
 




Once again, more than 90% of the answers were given by men and once again this might have been a 
consequence of the sources used. 
 
Question 2 - Age 
 
 
Answer SM JN Total
Male 22 110 132     90,41% 90,41%
Female 9 5 14       9,59% 9,59%
Total 31 115 146     100%
Q1. Please state your gender
% of Total
Answer SM JN Total
15 - 24 26 7 33       22,60% 22,60%
25 -65 5 105 110     75,34% 75,34%
> 65 0 3 3         2,05% 2,05%
Total 5 108 146     100%
% of Total
Q2. Please state your age
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The sources used are again in evidence in this question, with more than 75% of the respondent being 
within the 25 to 65 segment (despite being the larger segment). 
 




This question shows that, on this case, about 58% of the surveyed never started their own business 
which was expected and is in fact positive because the goal of this survey is to understand the general 
public’s opinion. 
 




Although have never started their own business the same people do intend to start it one day. This 
intention is shared by 82% of the sample (although this value includes the respondents that had 
already started their business). 
 




This question’s results are very clear concerning the perception of the level of risk to start a business in 
Portugal, considered by the participants of this survey, with 83,56% agreeing with the proposition that 
it is risky to be an entrepreneur. 
 
Question 6 - Business Ownership Risk Importance 
 
 
Question 6 verifies that that risk is in fact a constraint to the creation of new businesses, with 60,27% of 
the respondent stating that that risk has stopped, is stopping or might stop them from starting their 
own business. 
 
Answer SM JN Total
Yes 3 58 61       41,78% 41,78%
No 28 57 85       58,22% 58,22%
Total 31 115 146     100%
% of Total
Q3. Do you have or had in any time of your life your own business?
Answer SM JN Total
Yes 25 95 120     82,19% 82,19%
No 6 20 26       17,81% 17,81%
Total 31 115 146     100%
Q4. Do you intend to have your own business in any time of your life?
% of Total
Answer SM JN Total
Yes 26 96 122     83,56% 83,56%
No 5 18 23       15,75% 15,75%
No answer / Not applicable 0 1 1         0,68% 0,68%
Total 31 115 146     100%
Q5. Do you think it is risky to start your own business in Portugal?
% of Total
Answer SM JN Total
Yes 11 77 88       60,27% 60,27%
No 20 38 58       39,73% 39,73%
Total 31 115 146     100%
Q6. Do you think that that risk has ever stopped, is stopping or will 
stop you from starting your own business?
% of Total
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Question 7 – Tax Deferral Incentive 
 
 
Finally, question 7 confirms the possibility of using the CIT and SC as an incentive to the creation of 
new businesses with about 85% of the respondents considering that they would have higher incentive 
to create their own business if these taxes were possible to be deferred.  
Answer SM JN Total
Yes 27 97 124     84,93% 84,93%
No 4 18 22       15,07% 15,07%
Total 31 115 146     100%
% of Total
Q7. Knowing that the CIT and Social Charges are the most relevant taxes for 
the companies, would you have a higher incentive to create your own 
business if you knew that you wouldn't have to pay them for the first 2 years 
of your company's activity, deferring them into the future?
Portuguese Startups: Benefits and Consequences of a Model of Tax Deferral 
 
 
CATÓLICA-LISBON School of Business & Economics                     Page 137 
by Pedro Filipe Abreu 
Bibliography 
1. Wikipedia. Startup company. Wikipedia Web site. [Online] February 09, 2012. [Cited: February 22, 
2012.] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Startup_company. 
2. The Economics of Small Business Finance: The Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial 
Growth Cycle. Berger, Allen N. and Udell, Gregory F. 1998, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 22, 
pp. 1-52. 
3. Craig, Ben R., Jackson, William E. and Thomson, James B. SBA Guaranteed Lending and Local 
Economic Growth. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta: Working Paper Series. December 2005. 
4. Mason, Moya K. Worldwide Business Start-Ups. MKM Research Web site. [Online] 2012. [Cited: 
February 22, 2012.] http://www.moyak.com/papers/business-startups-entrepreneurs.html. 
5. European Commission. The new SME definition. s.l. : Enterprise and Industry Publications, 2005. p. 
5. 
6. National Economic Council. The Small Business Agenda: Growing America's Small Business to Win the 
Future. Washington : National Economic Council, 2011. p. 1. 
7. Ahmad, Nadim and Seymour, Richard G. Defining Entrepreneurial Activity: Definitions Supporting 
Frameworks for Data Collection. s.l. : OECD Statistics Working Paper, 2008. pp. 5,8. 
8. In Search of the Meaning of Entrepreneurship. Hébert, Robert F. and Link, Alber N. 1989, Small 
Business Economics, pp. 39-49. 
9. The Instability of Capitalism. Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1928, Economic Journal 38, pp. 361-386. 
10. Bohoney, Jason. The Entrepreneurship Toolkit: Successful Approaches to Fostering Entrepreneurship. s.l. : 
Office of Economic Growth of EGAT/USAID, 2011. p. 7. 
11. Linking Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth. Wennekers, Sander and Thurik, Roy. 1999, Small 
Busimess Economics 13, pp. 27-55. 
12. Wikipedia. Globalization. Wikipedia Web site. [Online] March 28, 2012. [Cited: March 28, 2012.] 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Globalization#Positive. 
13. Porter, Michael E. The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York : Free Press, 1990. 
14. An Empirical Investigation of the Growth Cycle Theory of Small Firm Financing. Gregory, Brian T., et 
al., et al. October 2005, Journal of Small Business Management, pp. 382-392. 
15. Small Firm Bankruptcy. Carter, Richard and Auken, Howard Van. October 2006, Journal of Small 
Business Management, pp. 493-512. 
16. Thornhill, Stewart and Amit, Raphael. Learning about Failure: Bankrupcty, Firm Age, and the 
Resource-Based View. Organization Science. September - October 2003, pp. 497-509. 
17. Mason, Moya K. Research on Small Businesses. MKM Research Web site. [Online] 2012. [Cited: 
February 22, 2012.] http://www.moyak.com/papers/small-business-statistics.html. 
18. The Capital Structure Puzzle. Myers, Stewart C. 1984, Journal of Finance, pp. 575-592. 
Portuguese Startups: Benefits and Consequences of a Model of Tax Deferral 
 
 
CATÓLICA-LISBON School of Business & Economics                     Page 138 
by Pedro Filipe Abreu 
19. Hamilton, Brian, Kinnett, Jerry and Pinson, Linda. Financing for the Small Business. s.l. : U. S. Small 
Business Administration, Financial Management Series, 1990. 
20. Bhaird, Ciarán Mac an. SME Financing: A Life Cycle Approach. Resourcing Small and Medium 
Enterprises. Berlin : Physica Verlag Heidelberg, 2010, pp. 23-43. 
21. Business Angels as facilitators for further finance: an exploratory study. Sorheim, Roger. 2, s.l. : Emerald 
Group Publishing Limited, 2005, Journal of small Business and Enterprise Development, Vol. 12, pp. 
178-191. 
22. Zider, Bob. How Venture Capital Works. Harvard Business Review. November - December 1998, pp. 
131-139. 
23. Encyclopædia Britannica. Taxation. Chicago : Encyclopædia Britannica, 2012. 
24. Taxation and Economic Stability. Gilbert, Donald W. s.l. : Oxford University Press, May 1942, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 56, pp. 406-429. 
25. Tax Policy and Economic Growth. Kresner-Skreb, Marina. 1999, Croation Economic Survey, pp. 145-
206. 
26. Krelove, Russel. Taxation and Risk Taking. [book auth.] International Monetary Fund. [ed.] 
Parthasarathi Shome. Tax Policy Handbook. Washington D.C. : IMF Graphics Design, 1995, pp. 55-58. 
27. Investopedia ULC. Tax Avoidance. Investopedia Web site. [Online] 2012. [Cited: March 5, 2012.] 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tax_avoidance.asp#axzz1oCUDxUcQ. 
28. —. Tax Deferred. Investopedia Web site. [Online] 2012. [Cited: March 5, 2012.] 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/taxdeferred.asp#axzz1oCUDxUcQ. 
29. Accountancy Students. Deferred Tax - the complications. Accountancy Students Web site. [Online] 
2011. [Cited: March 5, 2012.] http://www.accountancystudents.co.uk/news/read/deferred_tax_-
_the_complications/. 
30. Ernst & Young . Restart, Ernst & Young European Attractiveness Survey. s.l. : Ernst & Young, 2011. 
31. Ernst & Young. Como Retomar o Crescimento? Ernst & Young Portuguese Attractiveness Survey. s.l. : 
Ernst & Young, 2011. 
32. Matthews, Dylan. Everything you need to know about the European debt crisis in one post. The 
Washington Post Web site. [Online] September 28, 2011. [Cited: March 24, 2012.] 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-
european-debt-crisis-in-one-post/2011/08/05/gIQAg69QwI_blog.html. 
33. Barrientos, Michael. Portugal. The New York Times Web site. [Online] February 14, 2012. [Cited: 
March 24, 2012.] 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/portugal/index.html. 
34. CSF III Observatory. National Strategic Reference Framework. Santa Maria da Feira : Rainho & 
Neves, Lda, 2007. p. 14. 
35. Wikipedia. Population ageing. Wikipedia Web site. [Online] March 11, 2012. [Cited: March 25, 2012.] 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_ageing. 
Portuguese Startups: Benefits and Consequences of a Model of Tax Deferral 
 
 
CATÓLICA-LISBON School of Business & Economics                     Page 139 
by Pedro Filipe Abreu 
36. —. Unemployment. Wikipedia Web site. [Online] March 25, 2012. [Cited: March 26, 2012.] 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unemployment. 
37. RTP. Inflação em Portugal sobe aos 3,6 por cento. RTP Notícias Web site. [Online] March 12, 2012. 
[Cited: March 25, 2012.] 
http://www.rtp.pt/noticias/index.php?article=534890&tm=6&layout=121&visual=49. 
38. Wikipedia. Inflation. Wikipedia Web site. [Online] March 22, 2012. [Cited: March 26, 2012.] 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inflation#Negative. 
39. The World Bank. Economy Rankings. Doing Business, Measuring Business Regulations. [Online] June 
2011. [Cited: March 28, 2012.] http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings. 
40. Forbes. Best Countries For Business. Forbes Web site. [Online] March 25, 2011. [Cited: March 28, 
2012.] http://www.forbes.com/lists/2011/6/best-countries-11_rank.html. 
41. Valente, Mário. The Paradox of Portuguese Entrepreneurship. [Online] March 8, 2011. [Cited: 
April 14, 2012.] http://mvalente.eu/2011/03/08/the-paradox-of-portuguese-entrepreneurship/. 
42. Kwintessential. Portugal - Language, Culture, Customs and Etiquette. Kwintessential Web site. 
[Online] 2010. [Cited: April 3, 2012.] http://www.kwintessential.co.uk/resources/global-
etiquette/portugal.html. 
43. Itim International. Dimensions. Geert Hofstede Web site. [Online] 2012. [Cited: April 3, 2012.] 
http://geert-hofstede.com/dimensions.html. 
44. Fortune Small Business. Who in the world is entrepreneurial? CNN Money. [Online] June 1, 2007. 
[Cited: April 4, 2012.] 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fsb/fsb_archive/2007/06/01/100049637/index.htm. 
45. Jornal de Notícias. Novo aumento de impostos resolve "metade do desvio" orçamental. Jornal de 
Notícias Web site. [Online] August 12, 2011. [Cited: May 17, 2012.] 
http://www.jn.pt/PaginaInicial/Economia/Interior.aspx?content_id=1951388&page=-1. 
46. Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira. The Portuguese Tax System. s.l. : DSRI - Direção de Serviços de 
Relações Internacionais, 2009. 
47. European Commission. Taxation and Customs Union. European Commission Web site. [Online] 
April 4, 2012. [Cited: April 4, 2012.] 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/vat/how_vat_works/index_en.htm. 
48. Deloitte & Associados. Fiscal Guide 2012. s.l. : Deloitte & Associados, SROC, S.A., 2012. 
49. PwC Portugal . Social Security: Regimes. PwC Web site. [Online] May 5, 2012. [Cited: May 11, 2012.] 
http://origin-pwc.pwc.com/pt/en/guia-fiscal-2012/seguranca-social/regime.jhtml. 
50. Direcção-Geral da Segurança Social. Contributions - Temporary Exemption from Payment of 
Contributions. Social Security System in Portugal Web site. [Online] 2012. [Cited: April 16, 2012.] 
http://www2.seg-social.pt/ingles/left.asp?03.03.04. 
51. QREN. Incentivos às Empresas. COMPETE - Programa Operacional Factores Competitividade. [Online] 
2011. [Cited: April 16, 2012.] http://www.pofc.qren.pt/areas-do-compete/incentivos-as-empresas. 
Portuguese Startups: Benefits and Consequences of a Model of Tax Deferral 
 
 
CATÓLICA-LISBON School of Business & Economics                     Page 140 
by Pedro Filipe Abreu 
52. Dinheiro Vivo. Empresas. Dinheiro Vivo. [Online] February 26, 2012. [Cited: April 30, 2012.] 
http://www.dinheirovivo.pt/Empresas/Artigo/CIECO036144.html. 
53. Diário Notícias. Empresas em dificuldades vão ter acesso a 220 milhões. Diário Notícias Web site. 
[Online] May 20, 2012. [Cited: May 20, 2012.] 
http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=2533949. 
54. IAPMEI. Condições Gerais da Linha de Crédito. IAPMEI Web site. [Online] August 5, 2010. [Cited: 
May 17, 2012.] http://www.iapmei.pt/iapmei-art-03.php?id=2587. 
55. PORDATA. População residente: total e por sexo - Portugal. PORDATA, Base de Dados Portugal 
Contemporâneo. [Online] December 23, 2011. [Cited: March 23, 2012.] 
http://www.pordata.pt/Portugal/Populacao+residente+total+e+por+sexo-6. 
56. —. População residente: total e por grupo etário - Portugal. PORDATA, Base de Dados Portugal 
Contemporâneo. [Online] December 23, 2011. [Cited: March 23, 2012.] 
http://www.pordata.pt/Portugal/Populacao+residente+total+e+por+grupo+etario-10. 
57. —. População activa: total e por sexo - Portugal. PORDATA, Base de Dados Portugal Contemporâneo. 
[Online] March 5, 2012. [Cited: March 23, 2012.] 
http://www.pordata.pt/Portugal/Populacao+activa+total+e+por+sexo-28. 
58. —. Taxa de desemprego: total e por sexo (%) - Portugal. PORDATA, Base de Dados Portugal 
Contemporâneo. [Online] February 20, 2012. [Cited: March 25, 2012.] 
http://www.pordata.pt/Portugal/Taxa+de+desemprego+total+e+por+sexo+(percentagem)-550. 




60. PORDATA. População desempregada: total e por sexo - Portugal. PORDATA, Base de Dados 
Portugal Contemporâneo. [Online] February 20, 2012. [Cited: March 25, 2012.] 
http://www.pordata.pt/Portugal/Populacao+desempregada+total+e+por+sexo-38. 
61. —. PIB e rendimentos per capita em Portugal. PORDATA, Base de Dados Portugal Contemporâneo. 
[Online] March 9, 2012. [Cited: March 25, 2012.] 
http://www.pordata.pt/Europa/PIB+e+rendimentos+per+capita-534. 
62. Triami Media BV. Historic harmonised inflation Portugal – HICP inflation. Inflation.eu. [Online] 
2012. [Cited: March 5, 2012.] http://www.inflation.eu/inflation-rates/portugal/historic-inflation/hicp-
inflation-portugal.aspx. 
63. —. Historic harmonised inflation Europe – HICP inflation. Inflation.eu. [Online] 2012. [Cited: March 
25, 2012.] http://www.inflation.eu/inflation-rates/europe/historic-inflation/hicp-inflation-europe.aspx. 
64. Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeamento (GEP). Séries Cronológicas. Quadros de Pessoal 1999-2009. 
October 2011, pp. 5-6, 38. 
65. PORDATA. Receitas do Estado: execução orçamental - Portugal. PORDATA, Base de Dados Portugal 
Contemporâneo. [Online] December 23, 2011. [Cited: March 25, 2012.] 
http://www.pordata.pt/Portugal/Receitas+do+Estado+execucao+orcamental-674. 
Portuguese Startups: Benefits and Consequences of a Model of Tax Deferral 
 
 
CATÓLICA-LISBON School of Business & Economics                     Page 141 
by Pedro Filipe Abreu 
66. Bloomberg Finance L.P. GSPT30YR Index (Portuguese Government Bonds 30YR Note Portugal L.P.). 
March 31, 2012. 
67. —. GSPT10YR Index (Portuguese Government Bonds 10YR Note Portugal L.P.). March 31, 2012. 
68. —. GSPT 5YR Index (Portuguese Government Bonds 5YR Note Portugal L.P.). March 31, 2012. 
69. PORDATA. Sociedades dissolvidas: total e por sector de actividade económica principal - 




70. —. Sociedades constituídas: total e por sector de actividade económica principal - Portugal. 
PORDATA, Base de Dados Portugal Contemporâneo. [Online] December 28, 2011. [Cited: March 19, 2012.] 
http://www.pordata.pt/Portugal/Sociedades+constituidas+total+e+por+sector+de+actividade+economi
ca+principal-176. 
71. INE. Dados Estatísticos, Taxa de sobrevivência (%) das empresas nascidas 2 anos antes por 
Localização geográfica e Actividade económica. INE Web site. [Online] June 16, 2011. [Cited: March 15, 
2012.] http://www.ine.pt/xportal/xmain?xpid=INE&xpgid=ine_main. 
72. AIP-CE. Inquérito ao Crédito. 2009. 
73. Cleary Cultural. Uncertainty Avoidance. Cleary Cultural Web site. [Online] June 9, 2009. [Cited: 
March 25, 2012.] http://www.clearlycultural.com/geert-hofstede-cultural-dimensions/uncertainty-
avoidance-index/. 
74. LinkedIn . Jose Silva-Jorge. LinkedIn Web site. [Online] 2012. [Cited: April 14, 2012.] 
http://www.linkedin.com/pub/jose-silva-jorge/9/106/4b3. 
75. —. Francisco Banha. LinkedIn Web site. [Online] 2012. [Cited: April 14, 2012.] 
http://www.linkedin.com/profile/view?id=70061&locale=en_US&trk=tyah. 
76. INE. Dados Estatísticos, Imposto sobre o rendimento (€) das empresas por Actividade económica e 
Escalão de pessoal ao serviço. INE Web site. [Online] June 1, 2011. [Cited: March 25, 2012.] 
http://www.ine.pt/xportal/xmain?xpgid=ine_main&xpid=INE. 
77. Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeamento (GEP). Séries Cronológicas. Quadros de Pessoal 2009. 
October 2011, pp. 80, 144, 151. 
78. INE. Dados Estatísticos, Encargos sociais (€) das empresas por Actividade económica e Escalão de 
pessoal ao serviço. INE Web site. [Online] June 1, 2011. [Cited: April 2012, 11.] 
http://www.ine.pt/xportal/xmain?xpid=INE&xpgid=ine_main. 
79. Ressi, Adeo. Is There A Peak Age for Entrepreneurship? TechCrunch Web site. [Online] May 28, 
2011. [Cited: May 18, 2012.] http://techcrunch.com/2011/05/28/peak-age-entrepreneurship/. 
80. Investopedia ULC. Tax Evasion. Investopedia Web site. [Online] 2012. [Cited: March 5, 2012.] 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/taxevasion.asp#axzz1oCUDxUcQ. 
81. —. Tax Liability. Investopedia Web site. [Online] 2012. [Cited: March 5, 2012.] 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/taxliability.asp#axzz1oCUDxUcQ. 
Portuguese Startups: Benefits and Consequences of a Model of Tax Deferral 
 
 
CATÓLICA-LISBON School of Business & Economics                     Page 142 
by Pedro Filipe Abreu 
82. —. Foreign Direct Investment - FDI. Investopedia Web site. [Online] 2012. [Cited: March 23, 2012.] 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fdi.asp#axzz1pwVjhQL1. 
83. Princeton University Library. Richard A. Musgrave Papers, 1874-2008: Preliminary Finding Aid. 
Princeton University Library Web site. [Online] 2007. [Cited: MArch 24, 2012.] 
http://findingaids.princeton.edu/getEad?eadid=MC236&kw=. 
84. World Investment Conferences. Ronald Kent. World Investment Conferences Web site. [Online] 2011. 
[Cited: March 24, 2012.] http://www.worldinvestmentconferences.com/conferences/europe-
2011/speakers/ronald-kent.html. 
85. Investopedia ULC. Gross Domestic Product - GDP. Investopedia Web site. [Online] 2012. [Cited: 
March 26, 2012.] http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp#axzz1qBSsKUq7. 
86. —. Deferred Tax Asset. Investopedia Web site. [Online] 2012. [Cited: March 5, 2012.] 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/deferredtaxasset.asp#axzz1oCUDxUcQ. 
87. —. Deflation. Investopedia Web site. [Online] 2012. [Cited: March 28, 2012.] 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/deflation.asp#axzz1qMcabiMM. 
88. Comissão Normabilização Contabilística. Directriz Contabilística Nº 28 - Impostos sobre 
Rendimento. Comissão Normabilização Contabilística Website. [Online] April 2012, 2012. [Cited: April 17, 
2012.] http://www.contabilista.biz/directriz28.html. 
89. Encyclopædia Britannica. Obama, Barack. Chicago : Encyclopædia Britannica, 2012. 
90. —. Cantillon, Richard. Chicago : Encyclopædia Britannica, 2012. 
91. —. Schumpeter, Joseph A. Chicago : Encyclopædia Britannica, 2012. 
92. Wikipedia. European Commission. Wikipedia Web site. [Online] March 3, 2012. [Cited: March 4, 
2012.] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Commission. 
93. —. Eurozone. Wikipedia Web site. [Online] February 19, 2012. [Cited: March 26, 2012.] 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone. 
94. —. Geert Hofstede. Wikipedia Web site. [Online] March 25, 2012. [Cited: April 3, 2012.] 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geert_Hofstede. 
95. —. Imposto sobre o valor acrescentado. Wikipedia Web site. [Online] March 23, 2012. [Cited: April 
30, 2012.] http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imposto_sobre_o_valor_acrescentado. 
96. —. Joseph Schumpeter. Wikipedia Web site. [Online] February 20, 2012. [Cited: February 20, 2012.] 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Schumpeter. 
97. —. Small and medium enterprises. Wikipedia Web site. [Online] April 23, 2012. [Cited: May 10, 
2012.] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small_and_medium_enterprises. 
98. Dictionary of Sociology. Positive discrimination. Encyclopedia.com. [Online] 2012. [Cited: May 14, 
2012.] http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/positive_discrimination.aspx. 
99. Investopedia ULC. Tax Base. Investopedia Web site. [Online] 2012. [Cited: April 16, 2012.] 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/taxbase.asp#axzz1sAMiVpgf. 
Portuguese Startups: Benefits and Consequences of a Model of Tax Deferral 
 
 
CATÓLICA-LISBON School of Business & Economics                     Page 143 
by Pedro Filipe Abreu 
100. FNABA. FNABA - Angel Investment Industry Update. FNABA Web site. [Online] 2010. [Cited: 
May 1, 2012.] http://www.fnaba.org/doc/FNABA_presentation_eng.pdf. 
101. Investopedia ULC. Gazelle Company. Investopedia Web site. [Online] 2012. [Cited: April 20, 2012.] 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gazellecompany.asp#axzz1sao58aYL. 
102. Canada, Eric P. What's a Gazelle? Wheaton, Illinois, United States of America : Blane, Canada Ltd., 
February 28, 1998. The Economic Development Marketing Letter, Vol. 1. 
103. Business Dictionary. Economically active population. Business Dictionary Web site. [Online] 2012. 
[Cited: March 23, 2012.] http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/economically-active-
population.html. 
104. A Vida é Bela . Termos e Condições. A Vida é Bela Web site. [Online] 2009. [Cited: May 18, 2012.] 
http://www.avidaebela.com/topic.aspx?t=avebpt_termcond. 
105. Diário de Notícias. Facturação ibérica da marca 'A vida é bela' cresceu 30%. Diário de Notícias Web 
site. [Online] March 5, 2012. [Cited: May 18, 2012.] http://www.dnoticias.pt/dossier/turismo/311655-
facturacao-iberica-da-marca-a-vida-e-bela-cresceu-30. 
106. Wikipedia. NASA. Wikipedia Web site. [Online] May 17, 2012. [Cited: May 18, 2012.] 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NASA. 
107. —. Cross-multiplication. Wikipedia Web site. [Online] February 8, 2012. [Cited: April 19, 2012.] 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-multiplication#Rule_of_Three. 
108. —. Jornal de Negócios. Wikipedia Web site. [Online] February 12, 2012. [Cited: May 18, 2012.] 
http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jornal_de_Neg%C3%B3cios. 
109. —. SurveyMonkey. Wikipedia Web site. [Online] May 9, 2012. [Cited: May 18, 2012.] 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SurveyMonkey. 
 
 
